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1. Introduction 
The ability to innovate is a prevalent requirement for survival and success in 
many industries and the basis of economic progress (Romer, 1990; Schumpeter, 
2004; Teece, 1996). Technological development and megatrends such as 
globalization, digitization, urbanization, and drastic increases in the amount of 
available information are examples of forces that induce constant changes to the 
environment which companies operate in. These changes bring about new 
opportunities to improve the quality of life for people and create new business, 
but at the same time they undermine the factors which made companies 
successful in the past. Innovation hence becomes a necessity for finding new 
growth and maintaining competitiveness in modern business environments.  
Today, most large companies have adopted systematic innovation 
management methods which aim to develop new innovations in an efficient 
manner (Barczak et al., 2009; Griffin, 1997). They, however, often concentrate 
on incremental innovation, that is the improvement of existing products, 
services, and ways of doing business. In many cases, this is insufficient as there 
are others who are able to out-innovate them by generating innovations with 
bigger leaps in performance and customer value (Hill & Rothaermel, 2003). The 
situation resembles the Red Queen’s race that is described in Lewis Carrol’s 
(1998, p. 52) famous novel “Through the Looking-Glass”, where the Red Queen 
character says that “It takes all the running you can do to keep in the same place. 
If you want to get somewhere else, you must run at least twice as fast as that.” 
Consequently, companies aim to introduce highly novel radical innovations in 
addition to incremental ones. 
Radical innovation is defined as products, services, or processes which 
encompass novel technologies or require new market structures, and which 
have the potential to create paradigm shifts at the market, industry, or world 
level (Garcia & Calantone, 2002) and it can be contrasted with incremental 
innovation, which addresses the improvement of existing products, services, or 
other aspects of business. Radical innovation has been of the interest of both 
academics and practitioners for a long time, which has generated a vast amount 
of studies on how it should be managed. Despite these efforts, it is by no means 
a fully understood phenomenon. There seems to be a mismatch between 
companies’ innovation goals, which often put a strong emphasis on radical new-
to-the world products (Andrew et al., 2010), and the actual performance of their 
innovation activities (Barczak et al., 2009; Slater et al., 2014).  
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To explain these discrepancies, researchers have started to explore barriers 
which explain the lack of success in radical innovation endeavours (Assink, 
2006; Sandberg & Aarikka-Stenroos, 2014). Many of these barriers appear to be 
related to increases in uncertainty that are often brought about by radical 
innovation. Innovation management systems in use in large companies are 
typically focused on contexts of low-to-moderate uncertainty (Cooper, 2014; 
Tidd, 1997; Veryzer, 1998). When there is high uncertainty over the potential 
and feasibility of new ideas the established methods are likely to perform poorly 
(Assink, 2006). In situations of high uncertainty, there is insufficient knowledge 
to make educated decisions and therefore the outcomes of actions may be 
unknown (Melander & Tell, 2014; Mullins & Sutherland, 1998). Such 
uncertainties may address, for example, questions of which are the most feasible 
technologies (Green et al., 1995), what do the customers wish to buy (Lynn & 
Akgün, 1998), and where to get resources for developing the innovations 
(O’Connor & Rice, 2013a). In response, companies have started to adopt 
processes and methods for experimenting with new technologies (Chang et al., 
2012; Koberg et al., 2003; McGrath, 2001), establish separate organizational 
structures for radical innovation to decrease conflicts between their explorative 
and exploitative goals (Leifer et al., 2000), and promote culture which tolerates 
risk taking and failure (Herrmann et al., 2007; McLaughlin et al., 2008).  
In addition, managers increasingly turn their attention to outside the 
boundaries of their own organization to gain access to resources and capabilities 
that are needed to develop radical innovations (Chesbrough, 2003, 2006) and 
move to what Chesbrough & Crowther (2006) call an open environment. A 
single company is not likely to possess all assets that are required to develop 
radical innovations (Geffen & Rothenberg, 2000), and collaborating with 
external partners and acquiring ideas, knowledge, and technologies from them 
may bring about new opportunities for breakthroughs (Kelley et al., 2013; 
Knudsen et al., 2017; Pilav-Velić & Marjanovic, 2016). This phenomenon of 
accepting a more open environment for innovation and collaborating with 
external partners for the purpose of innovation is commonly called open 
innovation (Chesbrough, 2003; Chesbrough & Crowther, 2006; Enkel et al., 
2009). 
It is argued that companies need to become open in order to develop radical 
innovations in a systematic way: “Open innovation is quickly becoming viewed 
as a critical aspect to helping gain the efficiencies of learning necessary to 
make radical innovation sustainable. Any company choosing to develop 
radical innovations is, by definition, stretching the boundary of what is 
already known, certainly within its own domain. Accessing technologies, 
market partners, and expertise in arenas that are dramatically different from 
the company’s core enables creativity, opportunity recognition, and 
connectivity into new domains” (O’Connor, 2006, pp. 79–80).  
Open innovation is opposed to closed innovation. In closed innovation, 
companies try to do everything themselves. They can, for example, establish 
large R&D centres in order to conduct scientific research in interesting areas, 
explore applications for promising technologies, and create new products, and 
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services that other departments within the same corporation may then continue 
to manufacture, market, and sell. The adoption of open innovation practices has 
reportedly been useful in bridging the gap between the radical innovation goals 
that companies have and their actual performance (Kennedy et al., 2016; Pilav-
Velić & Marjanovic, 2016), but there is also variation in how companies are able 
to benefit from open innovation (Gassmann et al., 2010). In addition to the 
difficulties arising from high uncertainties related to radical innovation, open 
innovation brings about its own challenges. Companies have to develop 
capabilities to evaluate external technologies and opportunities (Chiaroni et al., 
2010; Hu et al., 2015), transfer and integrate external knowledge (Alavi & 
Leidner, 2001; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), and manage relationships with their 
innovation partners (Fliess & Becker, 2006; Lakemond et al., 2016). Radical 
innovation and open innovation are both considered to be demanding 
(Chesbrough, 2004; Chiu et al., 2016; O’Connor & Rice, 2013a) and when open 
innovation is leveraged for the purposes of radical innovation the situation is 
likely to be even more challenging (Chesbrough, 2006; O’Connor, 2006) as 
companies need to ensure that their innovation management systems are not 
restricted to incremental and closed innovation. 
The aim of this dissertation is to investigate challenges and methods related 
to the development of radical innovations in an open environment. The focus is, 
therefore, on situations where open innovation is leveraged for radical 
innovation. To make focused contributions to theory and practice, the 
dissertation includes four distinct studies which are associated with four specific 
research questions. 
The first study investigates the role of users and customers in developing 
radical innovations. Users and customers are among the most important 
sources of knowledge about market needs and therefore valuable external 
partners for innovation (Chatterji & Fabrizio, 2014; Lettl et al., 2006). In the 
case, of radical innovation there is, however,  an ongoing debate on whether the 
contributions of customers and users are limited to promoting incremental 
innovation (Agostini et al., 2016; Nicholas et al., 2015). Furthermore, customers 
and users have been rarely distinguished from each other in the literature. To 
investigate their separate contributions to companies’ innovation processes, the 
study focuses on B2B manufacturing industry where a distinction between 
customers and users is evident. By investigating a context where the diffusion 
of new digital technologies creates opportunities for radical innovation, it is 
possible to investigate their value for radical innovation specifically. The first 
research question is defined as follows: 
 
RQ1: How do B2B manufacturing firms leverage customer knowledge and user 
knowledge for the purposes of radical digital innovation? 
 
The second study investigates a poorly studied question of whether companies 
may substitute their internal innovation activities with externally generated 
knowledge and technologies. Most extant studies argue that companies must 
have high internal innovation capabilities and resources in order to benefit from 
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external partnerships as new knowledge is difficult to integrate and exploit if 
the company does not have a sufficient amount of related knowledge in-house 
(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Dahlander & Gann, 2010; Hung & Chou, 2013). The 
study investigates a company with scarce in-house innovation resources which 
introduces radical innovations based on external technologies from its 
suppliers. The process of turning these external inputs into market-ready 
innovations is examined by looking at four capabilities acquisition, assimilation, 
transformation, and exploitation that are considered to explain an 
organization’s ability to benefit from external knowledge (Todorova & Durisin, 
2007; Zahra & George, 2002). Accordingly, the second research question is 
defined as: 
 
RQ2: How do the capabilities of acquisition, assimilation, transformation, and 
exploitation manifest themselves in substituting internal R&D with supplier 
innovations? 
 
The third study addresses an important way that open innovation may benefit 
radical innovation: the absorption of radical ideas from new sources that are not 
currently used. It is widely argued that new partners and idea sources need to 
be sought and contacted to gain acces to highly novel ideas (Birkinshaw et al., 
2007; Day & Schoemaker, 2004; Phillips et al., 2006), but that companies often 
fail to integrate these ideas (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Katz & Allen, 1982). It 
has been proposed that social integration mechanisms – a set of processes, 
systems, and norms that facilitate knowledge sharing and utilization within an 
organization – may affect a company’s ability to integrate ideas (Jansen et al., 
2005; Todorova & Durisin, 2007; Zahra & George, 2002). With this 
background, the third research question is defined as: 
 
RQ3: How do social integration mechanisms influence the absorption of radical 
ideas from unusual sources?  
 
Finally, the fourth study addresses motivational issues in radical innovation 
development. Previous studies have identified highly motivated individuals 
behind many successful radical innovation projects (Chakrabarti, 1974; Ettlie et 
al., 1984; Reid & de Brentani, 2004) and argued that a lack of motivated 
employees may be detrimental for a company’s attempts to develop radical 
innovations (Alexander & van Knippenberg, 2014; Kelley et al., 2011; O’Connor 
& McDermott, 2004; Stringer, 2000). Methods for motivating them – in both 
open and closed contexts – are, however, poorly understood and therefore the 
fourth research question is defined as: 
 
RQ4: How may managers motivate individuals towards radical innovation 
work? 
 
In sum, four empirical studies have been conducted in large mature companies, 
each of which responds to one of four research questions. Theoretically, the 
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dissertation aims to contribute to the literature on radical innovation and open 
innovation by increasing understanding on the role of users and customers in 
developing radical innovations, the substitution of internal R&D with supplier 
innovations, the absorption of radical ideas from unusual sources, and 
motivational issues in radical innovation development. Each of the empirical 
studies provides a complementary viewpoint to the research problem of how 
incumbent companies may develop radical innovations in open innovation 
settings. The contributions of these studies are combined in this compiling part 
of the dissertation. 
The rest of the dissertation is structured as follows. In section 2, literature on 
the management of radical innovations is reviewed. Then, in section 3, the view 
on radical innovation is extended by discussing how open innovation may help 
companies develop radical innovations. These sections position the dissertation 
in the relevant innovation management literature. Then, in section 4, gaps in 
extant research are introduced and the theoretical motivations of the four 
research questions are discussed. In section 5, the methodological approach of 
the dissertation is described. The section starts with discussion on the 
philosophical foundations of this dissertation. Then, case study research design 
and its various forms are introduced. Next, the adopted principles of case 
selection, data collection, and analysis in all four empirical studies are 
discussed. Then, the methods to ensure the validity and reliability of the 
research are presented. Section 6 presents the main findings of the empirical 
studies and thus answers the research questions. The section is structured 
according to the four research questions. In section 7, the theoretical 
contributions of the studies to the innovation management literature are 
discussed and their practical implications for managers are presented. 
Furthermore, the limitations of the dissertation are addressed and avenues for 
further research are suggested. Finally, section 8 summarizes the study.
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2. Radical innovation and its 
management 
Following Fagerberg (2005), innovations are here defined as successful new 
products, services, methods of production, exploitation of new markets, or ways 
to organize business. Innovations are distinguished from inventions, which 
refer to new ideas for innovations. Innovation is therefore considered the 
outcome of a successful implementation of an invention. This is, however, not 
the only meaning that the concept of innovation has. Innovation is generally 
understood both as the process of successful application of new ideas and the 
outcome of such process (Dodgson et al., 2014). Innovative outcomes result 
from development activities and both a new product and creating such product 
— the noun and the verb — can be called innovation. 
Innovation management is a discipline which studies the factors that affect 
the occurrence of innovation in organizations: sources, strategies, and practices 
(Dodgson et al., 2014). It is an applied field, strongly driven by a variety of 
practical concerns, and consequently it draws from multiple theories with their 
underpinnings in sociology, economics, and psychology. Related topics in the 
management literature include the management of research and development 
(R&D), which addresses the systematic use of scientific and engineering 
knowledge to achieve practical results (Trott, 2005). Another topic is new 
product development (NPD), which concerns the management of various 
organizational functions in creating new products (Trott, 2005). Both of these 
can be understood as subsets of innovation management. Taking a wider 
perspective, innovation management can be understood as a part of the field of 
innovation studies, which also includes research on sectoral, regional, and 
national innovation systems and the economics of R&D (Fagerberg et al., 2012). 
What follows is an account of extant literature on radical innovation. Radical 
innovation will be defined, and its origins and benefits explained. Then, 
managerial challenges associated with the development of radical innovations 
are discussed paying particular attention to different forms of uncertainty 
related to radical innovations. Next, methods to overcome these challenges are 
discussed from the viewpoints of processes, organizational structures, and 
culture. 
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2.1 Innovations of varying novelty 
Innovations can be classified according to their novelty. When innovations are 
modest in novelty and include only small advances in terms of technology, 
features, or performance, they are called incremental. Incremental innovations 
provide improvements to existing technology in the existing market (Garcia & 
Calantone, 2002). Radical innovations, on the other hand, involve novel 
knowledge bases, technologies, and markets, which generate new growth 
opportunities and unforeseen features (Tellis et al., 2009). In addition to 
incremental and radical, there are a variety of related classifications and 
definitions which characterize the nature and novelty of innovations (Table 1). 
As can be seen from the table, there are multiple ways to classify innovations. 
All of the definitions address novelty and change in some respect: there are 
innovations that are modest in terms of novelty and introduce relatively minor 
change and there are innovations which have the capacity to create paradigm 
shifts in the technology and market structures (Garcia & Calantone, 2002). 
Often, many of the high-novelty innovations are referred to as radical 
innovations. Competence-enhancing, competence-destroying, discontinuous, 
disruptive, and even architectural innovations tend to be characterized as 
radical. This impreciseness in the use of concepts has downsides as it is not 
always clear which type of novelty a radical innovation is associated with: 
significant leaps in existing technologies and products, new products, new 
markets, new business models etc. It has been proposed that different 
categories, such as radical product innovations, disruptive technologies, and 
disruptive business models, follow a similar processes to invade existing 
markets but have different managerial implications, which suggests a need to 
differentiate between them (Markides, 2006).  
Distinguishing between different forms of highly novel innovations is, 
however, tricky. In general, assessments of an innovation’s type may be 
conducted ex ante that is before market introduction and ex post: after market 
introduction. Many of the ex post definitions emphasize the impact of an 
innovation as a way to define its novelty. Tushman & Anderson (1986) propose 
that innovations may be classified according to the impact they have on the 
competences of existing firms in an industry: they may be competence-
enhancing or competence-destroying. The concept of disruptive innovation 
refers to innovations which introduce a new set of performance attributes which 
initially satisfy only a niche market segment but in time mature enough to 
invade the mainstream market (Christensen, 1997; Danneels, 2004; 
Govindarajan et al., 2011). Other definitions address impacts on market 
infrastructures (Garcia & Calantone, 2002) and changes in customer behaviour 
(Veryzer, 1998). In addition, Dahlin & Behrens (2005) propose that to 
determine an innovation’s radicalness, its influence on the content of future 
inventions should be evaluated.  
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Table 1. Definitions of innovation types with varying novelty1.  
Concept Definition 
Radical innovation (Ettlie et al., 
1984) 
Technology that is new to the adopting unit and new to the 
referent group of organizations, or requires both throughput 
(process) and output (production or service) change, or requires a 
significant or costly change of the organization. 
Radical innovation (Green et al., 
1995) 
Innovation that is associated with technological uncertainty, 
technical inexperience, business inexperience, and technology 
cost. 
Radical innovation (Garcia & 
Calantone, 2002) 
Innovations that embody a new technology and result in a new 
market infrastructure at the world, market or industry level. 
Really new innovation (Garcia & 
Calantone, 2002) 
Innovations that embody a new technology or result in a new 
market infrastructure at the world, market or industry level. 
Incremental innovation (Garcia & 
Calantone, 2002) 
Products that provide new features, benefits, or improvements to 
the existing technology in the existing market. 
Discontinuous innovation (Veryzer, 
1998) 
Radically new products that involve dramatic leaps in terms of 
customer familiarity and use. 
Discontinuous innovation (Rice et 
al., 1998) 
A “game changer” which has the potential: (1) for a 5–10 times 
improvement in performance compared to existing products; (2) to 
create the basis for 30–50 percent reduction in cost; or (3) to have 
new-to-the-world performance features. 
Discontinuous innovation 
(Birkinshaw et al., 2007) 
The implementation of new technologies, products, or business 
models that represent a dramatic departure from the current state 
of the art in the industry. 
Breakthrough innovation (O’Connor 
& Rice, 2001) 
Innovations with have the potential to “change the game” from the 
developing company’s perspective. 
Disruptive innovation (Christensen, 
1997) 
Technologies which surpass seemingly superior technologies in 
the market.2 
Competence-destroying innovation 
(Tushman & Anderson, 1986) 
Innovation which creates a new product class or substitutes for an 
existing product and destroys the competence of existing firms in 
an industry. 
Competence-enhancing innovation 
(Tushman & Anderson, 1986) 
Order-of-magnitude improvements in price/performance that build 
on existing know-how within a product class. 
Radical innovation (Henderson & 
Clark, 1990) 
Establishes a new dominant design and, hence, a new set of core 
design concepts embodied in components that are linked together 
in a new architecture. 
Architectural innovation 
(Henderson & Clark, 1990) 
Innovation that changes a product's architecture but leaves the 
components, and the core design concepts that they embody, 
unchanged. 
Modular innovation (Henderson & 
Clark, 1990) 
Innovation that changes the core design concepts of a technology 
but leaves the product’s architecture intact. 
Incremental innovation (Henderson 
& Clark, 1990) 
Introduces relatively minor changes to the existing product, 
exploits the potential of the established design, and often 
reinforces the dominance of established firms. 
 
The boundaries between some of these impact-based definitions are, however, 
sometimes blurry. As an example, both competence-destroying innovations and 
disruptive innovations are likely to undermine incumbent firms’ competences 
within an industry (Danneels, 2004), and they might both be considered as 
types of radical innovation (Govindarajan et al., 2011). Moreover, it is suggested 
that also incremental innovations can be classified into competence-enhancing 
and competence-destroying categories (Gatignon et al., 2002), which would 
mean that these characterizations are not exclusive to radical innovation. 
Ex ante definitions focus on the characteristics of the innovations and the aims 
of the developers. Many authors have focused on technological novelty in 
defining whether an invention is radical or incremental: is the technology 
significantly different from existing technologies (Ettlie et al., 1984; Garcia & 
Calantone, 2002)? It has been suggested that an invention may be considered 
radical if it is dissimilar from prior inventions, and unique: dissimilar from 
current inventions (Dahlin & Behrens, 2005). Novelty can also be found in a 
                                                          
1 For a more comprehensive review of innovation types, see Augsdörfer et al. (2013). 
2 This compact summary of the key ideas of Clayton Christensen’s book is adopted from Markides (2006). 
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product’s design. Henderson & Clark (1990) propose that to be counted radical 
an innovation needs to change both a product’s architecture and the design of 
its individual components. Interestingly, some authors refer to the aims of the 
developers when defining innovations. The influential radical innovation 
research group at the Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute suggests that radical 
innovation can be defined ex ante by its potential for achieving significant 
impacts (Leifer et al., 2000; O’Connor & Rice, 2001; Rice et al., 1998). As the 
potential has not yet been realized, researchers may rely on the developing 
companies’ assessments in identifying radical inventions and radical innovation 
projects (Rice et al., 1998). Along the same lines, Govindarajan et al. (2011) 
propose that the defining feature of disruptive innovations is that they target 
emerging customer segments instead of mainstream customers. They hence 
propose that the aims related to target markets can be used to identify disruptive 
innovations. They also propose that high technological novelty is not a necessary 
requirement for disruptive innovation. Therefore, some disruptive innovations 
are radical also in a technical sense and some radical innovations are disruptive 
in that they target emerging market segments. Disruptive innovation can thus 
be considered a subset of radical innovation. 
From a developing company’s point of view, ex post definitions may be useful 
for picturing the potential impact of future innovations and classifying past 
projects, but ex ante definitions may be more helpful in understanding the 
differences between various kinds of development processes and consequently 
in informing managers who are responsible of their development. For the 
purposes of this dissertation, radical innovations are here defined as products, 
services, or processes which encompass novel technologies or require new 
market structures, and which have the potential to create paradigm shifts at 
the world, market, or industry level. They therefore cover the categories of 
radical innovation and really new innovation as proposed by Garcia and 
Calantone (2002). This is mainly an ex ante definition as it describes radical 
innovations in terms of technological novelty and their potential market impact. 
Similarly to the radical innovation research group at the Rensselaer Polytechnic 
Institute, the identification of radical innovations in this dissertation relies on 
expert evaluations in the developing companies. Naturally, ex ante evaluations 
are complemented with ex post evaluations when possible, for example by 
looking at the market impact of past innovation projects. O’Connor (2008) has 
previously named innovations of this scope major innovations, but that name is 
not used very widely. The definition is relatively broad and inclusive as it does 
not require the innovations to have both high technological novelty and require 
new market structures. Ticking just one of these boxes will suffice. Therefore, 
certain disruptive innovations with low technological novelty are included as 
long as their potential is evaluated high. Similarly, radical technologies targeted 
at existing markets are counted. Neither does the definition distinguish between 
competence-enhancing and competence-destroying innovations. While there 
are studies which suggest that it is more difficult for incumbent companies to 
target emerging than existing markets (Christensen & Bower, 1996; Christensen 
& Rosenbloom, 1995) and that it may be more demanding for them to introduce 
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competence-destroying than competence-enhancing innovations (Maine & 
Garnsey, 2006), a case can be made that this level of analysis has its merits. 
Innovations which are truly novel in terms of both technology and market 
structures and have high potential are extremely rare. Instead, companies often 
seek to develop high-potential innovations and find that to do that they need to 
explore new technologies or identify new market segments, sometimes even 
both. O’Connor (2008) points out that the difference between radical and really 
new innovations is one of degree: for radical innovations, the uncertainties may 
be even more extreme or exist in more dimensions. In contrast, the difference 
between these two types and incremental innovation is more fundamental. 
Therefore, it is often practical to treat the former innovation types characterized 
with high uncertainty together and contrast them with incremental innovation. 
This is also supported by a Sandberg & Aarikka-Stenroos (2014) who find that 
barriers to the development of innovations are significantly different between 
radical and incremental innovations, but there are no major differences between 
the barriers of radical innovations with different degrees of novelty. This 
suggests that it is possible to provide managerial insights on how to develop 
high-potential innovations in situations where new technological and/or 
market spaces are explored (Bessant et al., 2014). 
2.2 Triggers and benefits of radical innovation 
The emergence of radical innovations has been linked to the wider industry 
context. Technological development has been noted to advance according to 
trajectories (Nelson & Winter, 1982) that are defined by commonly shared ideas 
about which problems are relevant and what kind of knowledge should be 
sought to solve them (Dosi, 1982). Incremental innovations are likely to emerge 
in the kind of situations where the goals and problem-solving methods are clear 
and the main focus is on increasing productivity (Utterback & Abernathy, 1975).  
Every now and then, something happens that shakes this balance and provides 
opportunities for more novel approaches. These triggers of discontinuity (Table 
2) may make existing trajectories unavailable or challenge established ways of 
thinking. New challenges emerge that do not fit the existing schemas according 
to which organizations focus their attentional and operational resources 
(Bessant et al., 2014). External changes and their incompatibility with 
companies’ prior experiences and ways of thinking trigger turbulent, “fluid” 
phases of exploration in a new technological or market space before new 
product designs and market conditions are stabilized (Anderson & Tushman, 
1990; Bessant, 2008; Tushman & Anderson, 1986; Utterback & Abernathy, 
1975). In these phases, firms need to be able to step out of their comfort zone 
and transform themselves by developing novel products and services (Tushman 
& O’Reilly, 1996). In such situations, companies often do not fight only over the 
share of current markets, but also over emerging new markets (Martin & 
Mitchell, 1998). The more discontinuities the companies face, the more 
opportunities and pressure they have for developing radical innovations. 
  
 20 
Table 2. Triggers of discontinuity, adapted from Bessant et al. (2005, pp. 1639–1640). 
Triggers of discontinuity Explanation  
New market emerges 
 
Most markets evolve through a process of growth, segmentation, etc. 
But at certain times, completely new markets emerge which cannot be 
analysed or predicted in advance or explored using conventional 
market research/ analytical techniques.  
New technology emerges 
 
Step change takes place in product or process technology — may 
result from convergence and maturing of several streams (e.g., 
industrial automation, mobile phones) or as a result of a single 
breakthrough (e.g., LED as white light source) 
New political rules emerge Political conditions which shape the economic and social rules may 
shift dramatically, for example, the collapse of communism meant an 
alternative model — capitalist competition, as opposed to central 
planning — and many ex-state firms couldn’t adapt their ways of 
thinking. 
Running out of road Firms in mature industries may need to escape the constraints of 
diminishing space for product and process innovation and the 
increasing competition of industry structures by either exit or by radical 
reorientation of their business. 
Sea change in market 
sentiment or behaviour 
Public opinion or behaviour shifts slowly and then tips over into a new 
model — for example, the music industry has undergone a 
(technology-enabled) revolution in delivery systems from buying 
records, tapes and CDs to direct download of tracks in MP3 and 
related formats. 
Deregulation/shifts in 
regulatory regime 
Political and market pressures lead to shifts in the regulatory 
framework and enable the emergence of a new set of rules — e.g., 
liberalization, privatization or deregulation, environmental legislation.  
Fractures along ‘fault lines’ Long-standing issues of concern to a minority accumulate momentum 
(sometimes through the action of pressure groups) and suddenly the 
system switches/ tips over — for example, social attitudes to smoking 
or health concerns about obesity levels and fast-food. 
Unthinkable events Unimagined and therefore not prepared for events which — 
sometimes literally — change the world and set up new rules of the 
game (e.g., 9/11). 
Business model innovation Established business models are challenged by a reframing, usually 
by a new entrant who redefines/reframes the problem and the 
consequent ‘rules of the game’ (e.g., Amazon). 
Architectural Innovation Changes at the system architecture level rewrite the rules of the game 
for those involved at the component level. 
Shifts in ‘techno-economic 
paradigm’ — systemic 
changes which impact whole 
sectors or even whole 
societies 
Change takes place at the system level, involving technology and 
market shifts. This involves the convergence of a number of trends 
which result in a paradigm shift where the old order is replaced (e.g., 
the Industrial Revolution). 
 
The emergence of new development trajectories is often visualized in the form 
of S-curves (Figure 1). Plotted with “performance” and “time” axes, the 
evolution of (technological) innovation is noted to form a curve with an S-shape. 
This is because, initially, new technologies improve consumer benefits rapidly 
and later on more slowly when the technology matures (Foster, 1986). New 
technological breakthroughs enable the shaping of new technological 
trajectories, which may give rise to radical innovations if sufficient effort is put 
into their development (Chandy & Tellis, 1998). Often such radical innovations 
replace previous technologies in the markets because of their superior price-
performance ratio. Garcia & Calantone (2002) emphasize that similar curves 
can be identified both for technical development and marketing, which reflects 
the two dimensions of novelty in radical innovations. While the S-curves 
provide an efficient way of illustrating the performance differences between old 
and new technologies, they have their limitations (Dahlin & Behrens, 2005). 
First, it is often nearly impossible to foresee which kind of development 
trajectory a recent innovation will generate, restricting S-curves to ex post 
identification of radical innovations. Second, the approach assumes that 
different technologies may be compared using the same performance 
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dimensions, which is not always true as radical innovations may generate new 
performance criteria, which is often the case with disruptive innovations 
(Danneels, 2004). Furthermore, S-curves typically illustrate the effects of 
competence-destroying innovations (Tushman & Anderson, 1986): a new 
product emerges which provides superior performance to an existing one and 
hence undermines competences related to the established product. In contrast, 
competence-enhancing innovations could be illustrated with a steep increase in 
the performance within an existing technological trajectory instead of a new 
curve. 
 
 
Figure 1. S-curves, adapted from Foster (1986) and Garcia & Calantone (2002). 
Radical innovations have been suggested to have many beneficial outcomes for 
the developing firm, which is why they are proposed to be very attractive for 
companies to pursue. Radical innovations are often associated with high value 
creation (Tellis et al., 2009), cost reductions (Leifer et al., 2000), and 
profitability (Song & Montoya-Weiss, 1998). They are suggested to have the 
ability to fulfil customer needs in new ways (Chandy & Tellis, 1998) and 
generate new meanings and symbolic content for products (Verganti, 2008). 
Eventually, they may improve the developing firm’s long-term growth and 
renewal (Leifer et al., 2001; McDermott & O’Connor, 2002), which results in 
increased financial performance (Coccia, 2016; Kyriakopoulos et al., 2016; 
Rubera & Kirca, 2012; Sorescu et al., 2003) and competitive advantage 
(O’Connor, 2008). While a vast amount of research suggests such positive 
outcomes, radical innovation should, however, not thought as a magic cure for 
all kinds of situations. First of all, the development of radical innovations can 
be very costly and take a long time (Leifer et al., 2000). Combined with the fact 
that their success rate tends to be very low, investments in radical innovation 
may as well have negative returns. Second, introducing competence-destroying 
innovations may be profitable as, for example, a new product line takes over 
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markets. At the same time, the introduction of such innovations is likely to lower 
the value of the company’s existing resources and competences and decrease 
demand for its prior products (Maine & Garnsey, 2006). This kind of radical 
innovations, unlike most competence-enhancing innovations, destabilize 
incumbent companies, including the ones who introduce them (Gatignon et al., 
2002). Third, some radical innovations, especially disruptive ones which target 
emerging markets, may initially address the needs of a small group of customers 
(Danneels, 2004). Before a radical innovation matures enough to break through 
from niches to the mainstream market, its benefits may remain modest, and this 
process may take a long time (Schot & Geels, 2007). 
2.3 Managerial challenges associated with radical innovation 
Despite their benefits, radical innovations of different types have been found 
difficult to develop. Radical innovation has been associated with requirements 
that differ substantially from those of incremental innovations (Bessant et al., 
2005; Ettlie et al., 1984; O’Connor & DeMartino, 2006; O’Reilly & Tushman, 
2008). Table 3 introduces some of the key differences between the management 
of radical and incremental innovations from several viewpoints. The differences 
presented in the table are generalizations of multiple studies and should be 
understood as “archetypes” (McLaughlin et al., 2008), rather than strict rules 
or definitions, but they nevertheless indicate major discrepanices between what 
is needed of an organization if it wishes to develop incremental compared to 
radical innovations.  
Many authors refer to high levels of uncertainty when explaining why radical 
innovation requires particular management approaches. Uncertainty refers to 
situations where the outcomes of actions are not known (Melander & Tell, 
2014). In the case of high uncertainty, the probability of success of different 
actions may be impossible to evaluate (Knight, 2006). Uncertainty can also be 
considered as the difference between the amount of knowledge required to 
perform a certain task and the amount of knowledge already possessed (Mullins 
& Sutherland, 1998).  
While some uncertainty is always associated with innovation, it has been 
proposed that different conditions of uncertainty may necessitate different 
approaches to innovation management (Bstieler, 2005). The novelty inherent 
in radical innovation brings about levels of uncertainty that are significantly 
higher than in incremental innovation (Cabrales et al., 2008; Kennedy et al., 
2016; Song & Thieme, 2009). Radical innovation projects are often 
characterized by a lack of knowledge needed to finish them and by a limited 
understanding of what kind of knowledge would be valuable in the first place 
(Vanhaverbeke et al., 2003). Both the available options and the potential 
outcomes may be unknown in radical innovation development, which may 
create a context of “extreme” uncertainty  (Packard et al., 2017). Uncertainty 
related to the development of innovations can take many forms. It can be related 
to technological aspects, markets, organization, resources, or social impacts 
(Hall & Martin, 2005; O’Connor & Rice, 2013a). Based on a review of the extant 
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literature, several dimensions of uncertainty are found to be relevant for radical 
innovation. 
Table 3. Key differences between the management of radical and incremental innovations, 
adapted from McLaughling et al. (2008) (the first seven differences) and Leifer et al. (2000) (the 
last nine differences). 
Dimension Incremental Radical 
Procedures Formalized, centralized, systematic Contingent, decentralized, loosely 
structured 
Structure Functional, efficiency-oriented Facilitating knowledge gathering, 
supporting risk taking and 
experimentation 
People Homogeneous, older and experienced Heterogeneous, younger and 
entrepreneurial, technical, questioning 
Organizational 
aspects 
Mature, high inertia, focus on efficiency 
and team-working, continuous 
improvement 
Entrepreneurial; focus on discovery; 
individual cooperation; frame-breaking 
improvement 
Focus Cost reduction, feature addition, 
efficiency improvement 
New methods and technologies; 
experimentation; new ideas; creation 
Products/ 
technologies 
Mostly existing Mostly new 
Learning aims Exploitation Exploration 
Project timeline Short term: six months to two years Long term: usually ten years or more 
Trajectory Linear and continuous path from 
concept to commercialization 
Sporadic with many stops and starts. 
Trajectory changes in response to 
unanticipated events. 
Idea generation 
and opportunity 
recognition 
Occur at the front-end, critical events 
are largely anticipated 
Occur throughout the project 
Process Formal approved process through all 
stages 
Formal process has value only at the 
later stages 
Business case Prepared in detail at the beginning of 
the process 
Evolves through discovery-based 
technical and market learning 
Team Cross-functional team with clearly 
specified individual responsibilities 
“Cross-functional individuals” and large, 
informal networks 
Organizational 
structures 
Project team within a business unit Starts in R&D, migrates into an 
incubation organization, and transitions 
into a project organization 
Resources and 
competencies 
Project team has sufficient skills for the 
project. Project is subject to standard 
resource allocation process 
Creativity and skill in resource and 
competency acquisition from a variety 
of sources are critical for success 
Operating unit 
involvement 
Tight involved from the beginning Loose informal involvement at early 
stages 
 
Technological uncertainties are related to understanding the scientific basis of 
new technologies and their applications (Green et al., 1995). Often there are 
alternative technologies for achieving certain functionalities and managers need 
to choose between them. To make this decision, they need to be convinced of 
the technologies’ feasibility (Lynn & Akgün, 1998). There may also be ambiguity 
about which technological features are important and how the specifications of 
new products should be determined (O’Connor & Rice, 2013a). Further 
uncertainty is related to finding the right approach to develop technologies 
towards selected goals and finding the best methods to manufacture the final 
product (Sheasley, 1999). Radical innovation projects often include working 
with new technologies which increases the level of technological uncertainty. 
The performance of the technologies may be hard to assess, and the evaluation 
of how quickly new products based on them can be developed may be difficult 
(Herrmann et al., 2007). Especially at the beginning of a radical project, it is 
almost impossible to foresee all the technical issues that should be considered 
(Chiesa et al., 2009). Therefore, technical specifications are difficult to set (Rice 
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et al., 2002). New technologies are also likely to demand changes in 
manufacturing, which brings about further uncertainties (Brettel et al., 2011). 
Market uncertainties relate to estimating the future demand for innovations. 
A key issue in innovation management is deciding which ideas should be 
invested in and which should not. There may be many potential markets, value 
propositions, and business models from which to choose (O’Connor & Rice, 
2013a). Managers may not be sure who the customers are and what they want 
(Jaworski & Kohli, 1993; Lynn & Akgün, 1998). Furthermore, the process of 
finding answers to these issues is challenging: which market analysis methods 
are likely to provide the most relevant information (O’Connor & Rice, 2013a)? 
Bringing highly novel products to the market or creating altogether new markets 
both imply high uncertainty about whether the customers will accept the 
innovation (Brettel et al., 2011; Ritala & Sainio, 2014). Customer requirements 
for the new product may be unclear (Herrmann et al., 2007) and conventional 
market research methods may be unsuitable (Frishammar et al., 2016). Hence, 
predicting the business impact is extremely challenging (Chiesa et al., 2009), 
even more so if the innovation is associated with new business models (Rice et 
al., 2002; Ritala & Sainio, 2014). Furthermore, innovations may produce 
unanticipated outcomes that may influence their acceptance and the reputation 
of the developing company. For example, in Brazil, innovations related to 
biofuel technologies have raised concerns over poor working conditions and 
environmental impacts (Hall et al., 2011). 
There may also be organizational and resource uncertainties. They concern 
the management potential changes within innovation projects, tensions 
between the project teams and various project interfaces, and the availability of 
resources. Managers should be able to create and lead project teams which 
incorporate all the necessary capabilities for reaching the desired outcomes and 
finding suitable processes for putting them into practice (Fox et al., 1998). Often 
the team composition needs to be adjusted when the project advances. Another 
issue concerns the project’s status within the organization. Changes and 
inconsistencies in expectations and commitment produce uncertainties of a 
project’s future status (McLaughlin et al., 2008; O’Connor & Rice, 2013a). This 
issue may be critical if the project’s budget and schedule are not nailed down 
(Huchzermeier & Loch, 2001). There should also be knowledge of which 
resources are needed for the development process, which are currently 
available, and how to acquire the missing ones (O’Connor & Rice, 2013a). 
Because of the high technological and market uncertainties, radical innovation 
is associated with high risk (Sorescu et al., 2003), which generates challenges 
related to how to deal with changes in management support and acquiring 
resources and competencies (Leifer et al., 2000; Rice et al., 2002). Obtaining 
continuous management support is difficult and radical innovation projects are 
often neglected or terminated before they are completed (Gassmann et al., 2012; 
Gemünden et al., 2007). Uncertainty about management support often goes 
together with uncertainty about funding and competencies for projects (Leifer 
et al., 2001). Incumbent companies, in particular, tend to prefer to initiate more 
certain projects (Kennedy et al., 2016) because, under high uncertainty, the 
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probability of making poor decisions is increased (Day, 1994) and it is easy to 
find arguments to play it safe and focus on incremental initiatives (Bessant et 
al., 2011). 
As there is variety within the concept of radical innovation, the levels of the 
uncertainties and related managerial challenges are not the same across all 
radical innovation projects (O’Connor, 2008). Radical innovations which 
include novel technologies are naturally associated with higher technological 
uncertainty and those which target new markets will face higher market 
uncertainty. Some disruptive innovations, for example, may have relatively low 
technological uncertainty but very high market uncertainty (Govindarajan et al., 
2011). Organizational and resource uncertainties are typically emphasized in 
competence-destroying innovations because such innovations will compete 
with companies’ existing products and resources (Chandy & Tellis, 1998). It is 
easier to find support for the development of innovations which is compatible 
with a company’s existing assets than for those that would make them 
dispensable. Despite of these differences, it can be argued that the development 
of radical innovations is associated with various managerial challenges related 
to technological, market, and/or organizational and resource uncertainties, and 
that the presence of these challenges is a key divider between the development 
of incremental and radical innovations. 
2.4 Overcoming the challenges 
Radical innovations are widely studied, which has resulted in extensive 
knowledge of the challenges related to their development and how companies 
can overcome them (Assink, 2006; O’Connor, 2008; Sandberg & Aarikka-
Stenroos, 2014; Slater et al., 2014). The extant literature on what companies 
should do to increase their chances of introducing radical innovations has been 
categorized in different ways.  
Chang et al. (2012) propose that companies need four capabilities to improve 
their radical innovation performance: 1) openness capability, 2) autonomy 
capability, 3) integration capability, and 4) experimentation capability. 
Openness capability refers to the ability to harvest ideas and competencies from 
a wide array of sources. Autonomy capability refers to the firm’s ability to 
encourage and tolerate risky, ambiguous, unsuccessful radical ideas. 
Integration capability is about integrating and aligning radical innovation with 
the mainstream business. Finally, experimentation capability is the ability to 
probe, experiment with, test, and commercialize radical ideas and concepts, 
across R&D, manufacturing and marketing disciplines. 
O’Connor (2008) proposes an alternative categorization and argues that a 
management system for radical innovation should include seven elements: 1) a 
clearly identified organizational structure, 2) internal and external linkages 
mechanisms, 3) exploratory processes, 4) requisite skills, 5) appropriate 
governance and decision-making mechanisms and criteria, 6) appropriate 
metrics, and 7) suitable cultural and leadership context. 
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Table 4. Managerial categories needed for the development of radical innovations. 
Category Definition Related categories in the literature 
Processes Systematic ways of governing 
radical innovation projects from 
early idea stages to 
commercialization. 
? Experimentation capability (Chang et 
al., 2012) 
? Appropriate governance and decision-
making mechanisms and criteria 
(O’Connor, 2008) 
? Appropriate metrics (O’Connor, 2008) 
? Suitable innovation processes (Slater et 
al., 2014) 
? Product launch strategy (Slater et al., 
2014) 
Organizational 
structures 
The allocation of responsibilities 
and resources for radical 
innovation development within 
the organization and the 
integration of radical innovation 
development with other 
organizational functions. 
? Integration capability (Chang et al., 
2012) 
? A clearly identified organizational 
structure (O’Connor, 2008) 
? Internal linkages (O’Connor, 2008) 
? Requisite skills (O’Connor, 2008) 
? Organizational characteristics (Slater et 
al., 2014) 
Culture Shared concepts, values, and 
beliefs within the organization 
that support radical innovation. 
? Autonomy capability (Chang et al., 
2012) 
? Suitable cultural and leadership context 
(O’Connor, 2008) 
? Suitable organizational culture (Slater et 
al., 2014) 
? Senior leadership (Slater et al., 2014) 
External linkages Search for radical innovation 
opportunities from outside the 
organization. 
? Openness capability (Chang et al., 
2012) 
? External linkages (O’Connor, 2008) 
Organizational characteristics (Slater et 
al., 2014) 
 
Slater et al. (2014) propose another set of components needed for the capability 
to develop radical innovations: 1) suitable innovation processes, 2) suitable 
organizational culture, 3) senior leadership, 4) organizational characteristics 
such as cross-functional integration, reliance on partners, and suitable 
structure, and 5) product launch strategy. 
These categorizations have evident similarities, and for the purposes of this 
dissertation, these insights are combined to a set of four managerial categories 
that are proposed to be necessary for the development of radical innovations: 
processes, organizational structures, culture, and external linkages. Table 4 
introduces these categories and illustrates their linkages to the categorizations 
in the extant literature. Next, the first three categories, processes, organizational 
structures, and culture are shortly introduced. Finally, the fourth category is 
reviewed in a separate section (section 3) with a more extensive discussion of 
external linkages under the concept of open innovation.  
2.4.1 Processes 
Formal process models, such as the widely diffused Stage-Gate systems 
(Cooper, 1990), rely on extensive planning so that the development process can 
be predicted and divided into discrete steps (Eisenhardt & Tabrizi, 1995). They 
have, however, been noted to be poorly suitable for radical innovations (Benner 
& Tushman, 2003; Veryzer, 1998). Because of the high uncertainties in radical 
innovation projects, such planning is extremely difficult, if not impossible. First 
of all, their development trajectories may be nonlinear and include unexpected 
changes of direction (Rice et al., 1998; Robbins & O’Gorman, 2015) and are 
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hence characterized by serendipity and chance (Godoe, 2000). Forcing them 
into linear process models may therefore be harmful. Second, especially when 
aiming for new markets, formal market analyses may provide misleading 
results, as the ultimate uses and relevant markets for radical ideas may be 
unknown (O’Connor & Rice, 2013a; Sandberg, 2008) or they may disrupt 
existing markets (Markides, 2006). Therefore, market size and customer 
behaviour are difficult to estimate (Kim & Wilemon, 2002; Verworn et al., 
2008) and a focus on existing markets and customers may lead to 
underestimating their potential (O’Connor, 1998). 
Instead, radical innovations are considered to benefit from rapid iterations 
and experimentations (Chang et al., 2012; Koberg et al., 2003; McGrath, 2001). 
By testing intermediate products in practice, for example by building prototypes 
and testing markets with early versions, companies may reduce both 
technological and market uncertainties and be better equipped to reframe the 
development targets for the next iteration rounds (Lynn et al., 1996). In 
practice, radical innovation projects often include many unanticipated obstacles 
and challenges (Alexander & van Knippenberg, 2014; Day, 1994) which make 
changes of direction necessary (Leifer et al., 2000). Since reliable data may not 
be available due to high uncertainties (Cooper, 2013), project managers need to 
rely on trial and error and situation-specific competencies instead of rigorous 
planning (O’Connor & DeMartino, 2006; Phillips et al., 2006). 
O’Connor (2008) argues that the development of radical innovations cannot 
be reduced to sets of codifiable processes. It relies on boundary conditions and 
priorities instead of rigid processes and focuses on the continuous development 
of situation-specific knowledge instead of utilizing existing knowledge.  
2.4.2 Organizational structures 
As most incumbent companies strongly focus on incremental innovation, 
developing radical innovations at the same time may generate major tensions 
within the company and even paradoxical situations where different aims and 
methods are inherently incompatible (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009; O’Reilly & 
Tushman, 2004). Incumbents are typically found to have considerable 
organizational inertia which prevents them from adopting systems and 
processes which would allow them to seek and seize opportunities for radical 
innovations (Hill & Rothaermel, 2003; Teece, 2007). This is particularly true 
when a company seeks competence-destroying radical innovations as they often 
undermine the company’s other objectives.  
Because radical and incremental projects are found to have different goals and 
time scales (Leifer et al., 2000) and require different culture and procedures 
(McLaughlin et al., 2008), they are often in conflict with each other, which 
creates tensions (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009). Structural separation of radical 
and incremental development has been widely proposed as a solution (Chandy 
& Tellis, 2000; Herrmann et al., 2007; O’Connor, 2008; O’Connor & 
DeMartino, 2006; O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008; Slater et al., 2014). It is suggested 
that radical innovation activities should be separated from the mainstream 
organization by establishing dedicated organizational units such as a radical 
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innovation hub (Leifer et al., 2001), exploratory unit (O’Reilly & Tushman, 
2008), corporate venturing program (Chesbrough, 2000), or independent 
business unit (Christensen & Raynor, 2003). 
The units may take care of one or more of the following tasks: i) discovery of 
new opportunities and ideation, ii) cultivating ideas and experimenting with 
them, and iii) commercialization (Markovitch et al., 2015; O’Connor & Ayers, 
2005). Sometimes separate units may be responsible for all the tasks, but more 
often the projects are integrated into business units at some point. While there 
is a wide support for such arrangements, there is some anecdotal evidence that 
they tend to be quite short-lived, lasting on average around five years (Hisrich 
& Peters, 1986; O’Connor & Ayers, 2005). 
While structural separation may have benefits, it may not be needed in every 
case. McDermott & O’Connor (2002) report that radical innovation projects 
may sometimes find their home in existing business units. They suggest that 
such fit may be achieved if the projects do not threaten existing operations and 
if they do not pose significant financial burden to the business unit. Other 
authors suggest that with the right kind of leadership, conflicting goals may be 
strived for within the same business unit. If the context of the business unit is 
such that it is rich in support, trust, ambition, and commitment, it might be able 
to both be efficient in current business and seek radically new opportunities 
(Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004). Such arrangements may also benefit from top 
management that works well together as a truly integrated team (Lubatkin et 
al., 2006). 
When structural separation is implemented, radical projects should not be 
developed in isolation. Cross-functional and cross-disciplinary knowledge 
sharing and collaboration is argued to be one of the most important factors for 
successful outcomes from radical projects (Aagaard & Gertsen, 2011; Büschgens 
et al., 2013; Slater et al., 2014). Cross-functionality reduces conflicts and allows 
the efficient combination of diverse knowledge from many functions (Atuahene-
Gima, 2005). Cross-functional interfaces may in fact be responsible for the 
success of radical innovation units, since they may facilitate the creation of 
informal ties and improve the operational business units’ receptiveness to 
radical projects (Gassmann et al., 2012).  
While cross-functional integration is typically treated as a one-dimensional 
variable in the literature, some have elaborated it in more detail. Brettel et al. 
(2011) point out that cross-functionality may take many forms. R&D may be 
connected with different functions, the integration may take place at different 
phases of the development process, and it may increase the effectiveness or 
efficiency of radical and incremental projects. They find that the R&D unit’s 
integration with marketing and manufacturing is found especially important in 
the commercialization phase of radical projects. O’Connor (2008) remarks that 
the integration may consider i) roles, ii) strategy, iii) resources, networks, and 
administrative systems, or iv) learning processes. Therefore, it is not fully clear 
which kinds of integration across functions are optimal for different situations. 
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2.4.3 Culture 
Organizational culture comprises shared concepts, values, and beliefs within an 
organization (Schein, 2010). The extant studies have suggested that a different 
kind of culture is needed for developing radical, rather than incremental, 
innovations. The optimal culture for radical innovation is suggested to have a 
long-term orientation (Herrmann et al., 2007), promote curiosity (Bessant et 
al., 2005) and thinking beyond what currently exists (McLaughlin et al., 2008), 
and to value entrepreneurship (Slater et al., 2014) and new ideas (Green & 
Cluley, 2014). A persistent obstacle in radical innovation development is that 
company members get attached to their current products and do not wish to 
replace them, even in the case of an inevitable decline in demand. Sunk 
investments and previous successes make managers unwilling to cannibalize 
their existing assets until it is too late (Assink, 2006). While it is, in a way, logical 
to avoid competing with the company’s own products and services rather than 
those of competitors (Cravens et al., 2002), breakaway from current 
investments is often necessary for introducing new ones (Chandy & Tellis, 1998; 
Nijssen et al., 2005). 
It has been suggested that radical innovation development requires the 
acceptance, or even encouragement, of risk taking (Herrmann et al., 2007; 
Kyriakopoulos et al., 2016). Radical innovation is inherently risky due to high 
uncertainties and significant unanticipated challenges throughout the 
development processes (Alexander & van Knippenberg, 2014). Risk-avoidance, 
which may be beneficial for incremental innovations, can be a significant barrier 
to radical innovations (Assink, 2006; McLaughlin et al., 2008). Since engaging 
in high-risk projects is bound to result in occasional failure, attitudes towards 
failure are important. Employees should not fear for their careers when 
proposing new ideas (Aagaard & Gertsen, 2011; Koen et al., 2005). In their study 
of radical innovation in incumbent US firms, O’Connor and McDermott (2004, 
p. 24) were told that “The origin of the breakthrough success is often forgotten, 
but an R&D effort that does not succeed is never forgotten.” Hence, rewards and 
risks in participating in radical projects should be in balance (Burgelman, 1985; 
Leifer et al., 2001).  
In general, radical innovation seems to be poorly suitable with bureaucracy 
and formality which are likely to decrease creativity and risk taking (Benner & 
Tushman, 2003; Ekvall, 1997; Martinsuo & Poskela, 2011). Instead, high 
autonomy for the development teams is proposed to benefit it (Chiu et al., 2016; 
Leifer et al., 2000).  To increase the performance of the developers, managers 
should give them room for experimentation and allow them to challenge 
existing strategy (Hill & Rothaermel, 2003; Reid & de Brentani, 2004).
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3. Openness and radical innovation 
The last of the four radical innovation management categories discussed in the 
previous chapter was about the external linkages of companies. The utilization 
of external linkages for innovation has been studied under the concept of open 
innovation (Chesbrough, 2003). In the following pages, the idea of open 
innovation and its relation to radical innovation are introduced. 
3.1 What is open innovation? 
In recent years, researchers have responded with growing interest to the 
question of how to leverage the innovation potential outside the boundaries of 
the focal firm (Brem, 2010; Gassmann et al., 2010; West & Bogers, 2014). Since 
the seminal book by Henry Chesbrough in 2003, the utilization of external 
sources for innovation has been studied under the concept of open innovation. 
Chesbrough (2003, p. xxiv) defines open innovation as “a paradigm that 
assumes that firms can and should use external ideas as well as internal ideas, 
and internal and external paths to market, as the firms look to advance their 
technology.” In 2006, a new definition that emphasizes inter-organizational 
knowledge flows was proposed by Chesbrough et al. (2006, p. 1). According to 
them, open innovation can be understood as “the use of purposive inflows and 
outflows of knowledge to accelerate internal innovation, and expand the 
markets for external use of innovation, respectively.” Chesbrough and Bogers 
(2014, p. 17) link business models to open innovation when they define it as “a 
distributed innovation process based on purposively managed knowledge flows 
across organizational boundaries, using pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
mechanisms in line with the organization’s business model.” Finally, 
Lichtenthaler (2011, p. 77) emphasizes different knowledge activities and uses a 
definition according to which open innovation is “systematically performing 
knowledge exploration, retention, and exploitation inside and outside an 
organization’s boundaries throughout the innovation process.” What is 
common for all these definitions is that they emphasize connections that span 
the boundaries of the focal company and their benefits for innovation. 
Open innovation is by no means a new phenomenon, neither in academia nor 
in practice. Companies have collaborated for a long time before the publication 
of Chesbrough’s book in 2003 and academics have studied related phenomena, 
such as the not-invented-here syndrome (Katz & Allen, 1982), complementary 
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assets (Teece, 1986), absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), inter-
organizational knowledge sharing (Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000), technology 
sourcing (Veugelers, 1997), and R&D spillovers (Audretsch & Vivarelli, 1996). 
Open innovation has emerged as an umbrella concept which brings together a 
variety of related discussions. 
Extant studies have reported of a significant number of different partners that 
companies collaborate with for innovation. Among the most important ones are 
customers (Cohen et al., 2002; Fang et al., 2008; Wong et al., 2016), users 
(Baldwin & von Hippel, 2011; Bogers et al., 2010; Chatterji & Fabrizio, 2014; 
Schemmann et al., 2016), suppliers (Song & Di Benedetto, 2008; Wagner & 
Bode, 2014; Winter & Lasch, 2016), and universities (Laursen & Salter, 2004; 
Perkmann & Walsh, 2007; Veugelers & Cassiman, 2005; Walsh et al., 2016). 
Other parties that have been addressed include competitors (Ritala & Sainio, 
2014), consultants (Bianchi et al., 2016), research centres (Tether & Tajar, 
2008), and public institutions (Pilav-Velić & Marjanovic, 2016). Also, the 
innovation potential of communities has gained attention (Fleming & 
Waguespack, 2007; Füller et al., 2007; Levine & Prietula, 2013; Martinez-Torres 
& Olmedilla, 2016), especially in the context of open source software (Belenzon 
& Schankerman, 2015; Dahlander & Magnusson, 2005; Henkel, 2006; 
O’Mahony & Bechky, 2008; von Krogh et al., 2003). 
Studies on open innovation have increased at a rapid rate in the recent years 
(Randhawa et al., 2016) and open innovation practices have been reported as 
having diffused to more companies (Chesbrough & Crowther, 2006) and being 
used more intensively than before (Chesbrough & Brunswicker, 2014). This has 
been explained by the fact that many high-tech companies have undergone 
major changes in how they do research, moving from a closed and introverted 
paradigm to an extroverted, open one (Christensen et al., 2005). Also, the major 
trends of globalization, technology intensity, technology fusion, new business 
models, shorter innovation cycles, increasing industrial R&D costs, high 
product modularity, and the scarcity of the required resources have been argued 
to increase the benefits from openness (Enkel & Gassmann, 2008; Gassmann et 
al., 2006; Geum et al., 2013). As products, processes, and services become 
increasingly complex, companies need to rely more on external resources in 
developing innovations (Bercovitz & Feldman, 2007; Chesbrough, 2003).  
If companies are too internally focused, they may miss opportunities for 
innovation (Laursen & Salter, 2006). According to the literature, the benefits of 
open innovation are extensive. Adopting open innovation practices may 
facilitate different phases of the innovation process: problem identification 
(Dahlander & Piezunka, 2014), front-end (Thanasopon et al., 2016), idea 
generation and selection (King & Lakhani, 2013; Schemmann et al., 2016), 
solution finding (Dahlander & Piezunka, 2014), and commercialization (Walsh 
et al., 2016). These benefits are reflected in performance improvements at the 
level of the R&D function (Cassiman & Valentini, 2016; Cheng & Shiu, 2015; 
Chiesa et al., 2009; Laursen & Salter, 2006). Open innovation may increase 
R&D productivity by providing cost and time savings (Chesbrough, 2007) and 
innovation quality (Cheng & Huizingh, 2014; Laursen & Salter, 2006; Walsh et 
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al., 2016), boosting both its efficiency and effectiveness (Alexy et al., 2016), and 
is thus likely to lead to enhanced new product success (Cheng & Huizingh, 2014; 
Rohrbeck et al., 2009), project financial performance (Du et al., 2014), and 
more attractive sales figures from new products (Love et al., 2014).  
At the company level, open innovation is associated with profitability (Noh, 
2015), stock value (Noh, 2015), decreased production costs  (Noh, 2015), 
increased sales volume (Noh, 2015), new revenues (Chesbrough, 2007), 
financial performance (Cheng & Huizingh, 2014; Sisodiya et al., 2013), overall 
firm performance (Hung & Chou, 2013), and the ability to adapt to changing 
market conditions (Dittrich & Duysters, 2007). Open innovation may also 
improve customer satisfaction and loyalty (Cheng & Huizingh, 2014; Wagner, 
2010). 
Open innovation can take several different forms reflected in the arrows in 
Figure 2. Gassman & Enkel (2004) propose that the variety of different open 
innovation arrangements can be described with three main archetypes: inbound 
(or outside-in), outbound (or inside-out), and coupled processes. Inbound 
processes refer to the ability to acquire knowledge from external sources, 
whereas outbound processes consist of activities where the focal firm uses 
external partners to exploit internally generated knowledge, i.e., by the means 
of licensing out, selling, or spin-offs (Cheng & Huizingh, 2014). In coupled 
processes, both the creation and exploitation of new knowledge is conducted in 
collaboration with one or more external partner. Such joint development and 
commercialization arrangements can occur, for example, in joint ventures or 
alliances (Cheng & Huizingh, 2014). 
 
 
Figure 2. Open innovation processes, adapted from Chesbrough (2012). 
Open innovation is often understood as collaboration between two parties. It 
can, however, take forms beyond traditional dyadic relationships, within triads 
(Chesbrough & Appleyard, 2007), value chains (Zobel et al., 2016), networks 
(Pittaway et al., 2004), and ecosystems (van der Borgh et al., 2012). Dahlander 
and Gann (2010) point out that not all knowledge needs to be paid for. Some 
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relevant knowledge is bound to be available through market mechanisms, e.g., 
by licensing. However, often companies may have free access to external 
knowledge based on their relationships with other companies. In other cases, 
knowledge may be made freely available to all (Huizingh, 2011). Examples of 
such knowledge include basic research conducted by universities (Perkmann & 
Walsh, 2007) and open-source software (von Hippel & von Krogh, 2003). 
3.2 How can open innovation benefit radical innovation? 
Previously, it has been argued that many of the challenges associated with 
radical innovation arise from a high level of uncertainty. Taking this assumption 
as a starting point, open innovation can be analysed based on its ability to 
reduce uncertainties. Many authors point out that when development teams 
face technological uncertainty, they tend to react by seeking external knowledge 
(Kim et al., 2015). Ritala & Sainio (2014) propose that, because radical 
innovations are so risky and uncertain they require extensive usage of different 
types of external relationships. Partnerships may hence be used to reduce risk 
and in multiple dimensions (Bessant et al., 2010; Lettl, 2007; McDermott, 
1999). Radical innovations may also have significant social impacts that are 
hard to predict (Hall & Martin, 2005) and communication with different 
stakeholders may help in this. According to Bessant et al. (2014), radical 
innovation takes place in a complex and highly uncertain search and selection 
space, where the market needs coevolve with stakeholders. They suggest that 
the optimal strategy in such environments is to work with new and diverse 
networks to be receptive to weak signals and access a range of different 
knowledge bases. High uncertainty is hence associated with a more open 
approach to innovation (Gianiodis et al., 2010). If firms face a lot of obstacles in 
their development processes, they are more likely to value collaboration and 
look for established solutions from other industries (Barge-Gil, 2010; Enkel et 
al., 2009). Indeed, many types of openness have been proposed to be beneficial 
for radical innovation: participating in industrial networks, inviting experts to 
predict the future, and cooperation with universities and research centres to 
develop new ideas (Chang et al., 2012). The integration of external knowledge is 
considered to help companies break free of path-dependency and hence enable 
radical innovation (Coombs & Hull, 1998) as open innovation practices may 
expand a company’s view of market and technology opportunities and help 
them to execute tasks within the radical innovation processes (Zang et al., 2014). 
There is empirical evidence for the proposition that firms which intensively 
source new knowledge and technologies from external partners will be more 
likely to introduce radical product innovations (Knudsen et al., 2017) and 
process innovations (Pilav-Velić & Marjanovic, 2016). The logic behind these 
benefits is that a single company is unlikely to be able to develop all the 
capabilities required for radical innovation (Geffen & Rothenberg, 2000). 
Therefore, many radical innovation projects make use of other’s technology 
development efforts (Kelley et al., 2013) and capabilities (Kim et al., 2015), by 
e.g. relying on joint ventures, mergers and acquisitions, and alliances (Stringer, 
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2000). Open innovation practices may also reduce the risk associated with 
radical innovation, as collaborative ventures often include risk-sharing 
agreements between the parties (Kennedy et al., 2016). There are, however, also 
some findings which suggest that the uncertainties related to radical innovation 
might reduce the benefits of some forms of open innovation. Collaboration with 
competitors, for example, is found to suffer from risks of knowledge leakages 
and opportunism, which may be especially harmful in the case of radical 
innovation (Bouncken et al., 2017; Ritala & Sainio, 2014). 
3.3 Challenges associated with open innovation 
While open innovation may help reduce technical and market uncertainties it 
may bring about its own challenges. Enkel et al. (2009) report that 43% of the 
companies that they studied have difficulties in finding the right open 
innovation partners. 48% of the same set of companies identified high 
coordination costs as a risk that hinders them from benefiting from open 
innovation. According to Chesbrough (2003), adopting open innovation 
practices requires significant organizational changes in companies. Moving 
from closed to open innovation requires changes in how external relationships 
are managed and how external knowledge is integrated into internal 
development processes. Due to the complexity in making this transition, not all 
companies are able to reap the benefits that open innovation has to offer 
(Chesbrough & Brunswicker, 2014; Gassmann et al., 2010). Next, three 
challenges related to the management of open innovation are presented to 
provide background for the remaining research questions of the dissertation 
which address the use of open innovation to promote radical innovation: 1) 
evaluating potential partners and their knowledge, 2) transferring and 
integrating external knowledge, 3) managing collaborative relationships. 
First, acquiring valuable knowledge from external sources is difficult because 
companies have limited means to evaluate the new technologies and 
opportunities that are generated externally (Chiaroni et al., 2010; Hu et al., 
2015). Many open innovation endeavours are bound to fail (Lopez-Vega et al., 
2016; Love et al., 2014) or advance very slowly (Wallin & Von Krogh, 2010; 
Wong et al., 2016) because of the difficulties in detecting and transferring 
valuable knowledge. First, there is the challenge of choosing the right knowledge 
sources. Partnerships with suppliers, customers, universities, and competitors 
are an efficient way to gain access to external knowledge (Un et al., 2010). 
Choosing the best partners for open innovation is, however, difficult, since there 
is high uncertainty of their competencies – especially so if no previous 
collaboration has taken place (Badir & O’Connor, 2015; Enkel et al., 2009; 
Laursen & Salter, 2006). There is likely to be considerable information 
asymmetry about the capabilities of the potential partners, which makes it 
difficult to predict the outcomes of open innovation collaborations (Saebi & 
Foss, 2015). Also, within existing partnerships there may be difficulties in 
locating relevant knowledge as there needs to be understanding about “who 
knows what and where critical expertise resides within each firm” (Dyer & 
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Singh, 1998, p. 665). Therefore, it is suggested that companies should develop 
capabilities to evaluate external innovation sources and the value of external 
knowledge and technologies (Cassiman & Valentini, 2016; Winter & Lasch, 
2016). 
In addition to locating and evaluating external knowledge, it needs to be 
transferred and integrated within the organization (Kogut & Zander, 1992). This 
may be challenging as the knowledge that is sought for may vary in where it 
resides and how it may be transmitted. A key distinction which helps 
understand the management of relevant knowledge in an open innovation is 
that between explicit knowledge and tacit knowledge setting (Nonaka & 
Takeuchi, 1995; Polanyi, 1967). While explicit knowledge is transmittable in 
formal, systematic language, such as text, tacit knowledge entails action, 
commitment, and involvement (Nonaka, 1994; Polanyi, 1967). Tacit knowledge 
may reside in individuals’ plans, skills, and habits, or collectively in the firm’s 
culture, past collaborative experiences, and routines (Cavusgil et al., 2003; 
Inkpen & Dinur, 1998). It is acquired by means of personal experience and is 
difficult to express and observe, whereas explicit knowledge may be observed, 
articulated, and documented in formal language, print, and electronic media 
(Inkpen & Dinur, 1998; Smith, 2001). Due to these differences, particular 
attention should be paid to the methods that can be used to codify, store, 
transfer, and apply different kinds of knowledge in organizations (Alavi & 
Leidner, 2001; Davenport & Prusak, 1998). If a company is unable to transfer 
and utilize explicit and tacit knowledge from its partners, collaborative 
innovation activities are likely to result in modest outcomes (Azadegan, 2011; 
Colombo et al., 2011; Roy et al., 2004; Sjoerdsma & van Weele, 2015). 
Finally, companies must learn to manage their open innovation relationships. 
For example, in joint development projects, it is challenging to evaluate if the 
other party puts in the maximum effort and there is considerable risk of 
opportunism (Lakemond et al., 2016; Oxley & Sampson, 2004). Especially in 
highly innovative projects, precise project goals cannot always be defined in 
advance (Kloyer & Scholderer, 2012) and to manage the partners’ opportunistic 
behaviour, companies often invest in promoting trust in the relationship 
(Lawson et al., 2009; Ragatz et al., 1997) or in monitoring the other parties’ 
behaviour (Melander et al., 2014; Oxley & Sampson, 2004). Another issue 
considers decisions about intellectual property that may result from the 
collaboration. The literature is somewhat conflicted in how important it is to 
protect new knowledge, for example by patents, in an open innovation setting 
(Laursen & Salter, 2014). On the one hand, opening up to external partners for 
value creation may have the downside of spillovers of valuable knowledge, 
which weakens the company’s ability to capture value (Arora et al., 2016). 
Strong intellectual property rights are hence often considered necessary when 
adopting open innovation practices (Chesbrough, 2003; West, 2006). In 
technology-intensive industries, there is evidence that patenting may actually 
increase the subsequent number of open innovation relationships of new 
entrants (Zobel et al., 2016). On the other hand, some authors argue that 
companies are overly protective of their knowledge (Laursen & Salter, 2014). 
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Protecting internal knowledge may limit knowledge exchange and enforcing 
protective measures can be quite costly (Baldwin & von Hippel, 2011). Some 
companies have, in fact, started to reveal some of their intellectual property to 
increase the overall development pace in the field (Henkel, 2006), which might 
eventually turn out to be beneficial for their business (Henkel et al., 2014). In 
addition, companies should pay attention to the alignment of goals and 
expectations in the relationship (Fliess & Becker, 2006; Yan & Dooley, 2013). 
Conflicts are likely due to the inherent nature of collaborative development 
(O’Sullivan, 2006) and mechanisms should be established for managing 
potential disagreements (Blome et al., 2013; Lam et al., 2007; Wu & Wu, 2015). 
3.4 Absorptive capacity 
It is proposed that for open innovation activities to result in better innovation 
performance, organizational learning capabilities are needed (Cheng & Shiu, 
2015). Perhaps the most studied of such capabilities is absorptive capacity, 
which is defined as the “ability to identify, assimilate, and exploit knowledge 
from the environment” (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989, p. 589), and is considered a 
key construct for explaining the success of inbound open innovation activities. 
It is a competence which enables the access to and benefits from knowledge, 
ideas, and technologies from external sources (Christensen et al., 2005). 
Therefore, it can be used to explain how some organizations are able to benefit 
from external knowledge sources better than others. Absorptive capacity fits 
well with the overall idea of open innovation (Lichtenthaler & Lichtenthaler, 
2009) and it has been linked to open innovation performance in multiple 
studies (Bianchi et al., 2016; Enkel & Gassmann, 2008; Randhawa et al., 2016; 
Saebi & Foss, 2015; West & Bogers, 2014). Investigations into absorptive 
capacity may increase understanding about how companies are able to respond 
to the challenges of identifying and evaluating new opportunities, and 
transferring and integrating external knowledge, and hence turn the potential 
of operating in an open environment into increased innovation performance. 
Originally, Cohen and Levinthal (1989, 1990), who formulated the theory, 
considered absorptive capacity to be a byproduct of internal R&D investments. 
According to them, internal R&D, not only creates new knowledge but also 
improves an organization’s ability to assimilate and exploit existing knowledge. 
The connection between absorptive capacity and internal R&D has been so 
strong that the level of absorptive capacity has frequently been measured by 
looking at measures such as a company’s R&D expenditures or R&D intensity 
(Bianchi et al., 2016; Lane & Lubatkin, 1998; Rothaermel & Alexandre, 2008; 
Stock et al., 2001; Tsai, 2001). The reasoning behind this is that internal R&D 
efforts are considered to enhance the learning capacity of the members of an 
organization (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). If the individuals within an 
organization have wide knowledge bases, it is easier for them to understand 
various kinds of new knowledge (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Prior related 
knowledge can therefore lower the costs of recognizing and acquiring new 
knowledge and increase the organization’s ability to understand and apply it 
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(Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Lenox & King, 2004). Moreover, internal R&D work 
enhances employees’ problem-solving and learning skills. These factors help 
employees make novel associations and relate new knowledge to what they 
already know (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). These associations between a 
company’s existing knowledge base and its ability to absorb new knowledge 
have led researchers to assume that openness may complement internal R&D, 
but that internal R&D cannot be replaced by external inputs (Dahlander & 
Gann, 2010).  
A major advance in the development of the concept of absorptive capacity was 
the identification of sub-capabilities of absorptive capacity which resulted in a 
more nuanced process view of how the absorption process takes place (Zahra & 
George, 2002). Today, absorptive capacity is typically conceptualized by 
dividing it into four sub-capabilities: acquisition, assimilation, transformation, 
and exploitation (Todorova & Durisin, 2007; Volberda et al., 2010; Zahra & 
George, 2002) as illustrated in Figure 3. Acquisition refers to identifying and 
gaining access to external knowledge and may vary according to speed, 
intensity, and direction (Zahra & George, 2002). If an organisation’s search 
scope is limited, it is unable to benefit from many knowledge sources. 
Acquisition capability reflects openness towards the environment of a company 
(Camisón & Forés, 2010) and its ability to detect new opportunities (Noblet et 
al., 2011). 
After acquisition, new knowledge has to be analysed, processed, interpreted, 
and understood, that is, assimilated. Companies with high assimilation 
capability can successfully leverage their employees’ knowledge, experience, 
and competency for integrating new ideas and discoveries (Forés & Camisón, 
2016). Often, the acquired knowledge challenges existing ways of thinking 
(Noblet et al., 2011) and the organization’s existing knowledge base needs to be 
adjusted or reinterpreted to ensure compatibility (Forés & Camisón, 2016). 
Transformation capability addresses this process of combining new knowledge 
with existing knowledge structures. There is some debate about whether 
assimilation and transformation are both necessary elements of absorptive 
capacity (Zahra & George, 2002) or actually alternatives. Todorova & Durisin 
(2007) propose that when new knowledge fits into existing cognitive structures 
well enough, it can be assimilated, but that transformation is needed when the 
knowledge sets are incompatible to the extent that new cognitive structures have 
to be built via combination. 
Finally, exploitation stands for the incorporation of the new knowledge into 
the company’s operations (Zahra & George, 2002). The outcomes of 
exploitation may be, for example, patents (Camisón & Forés, 2010; Forés & 
Camisón, 2016), new products (Todorova & Durisin, 2007), or the achievement 
of other organizational goals (Noblet et al., 2011). 
Zahra & George (2002) further distinguish between potential absorptive 
capacity and realized absorptive capacity. Potential absorptive capacity is about 
being receptive to acquiring and assimilating new knowledge, whereas realized 
absorptive capacity concerns the transformation and exploitation of the 
assimilated knowledge. Imbalance between these two explains how a company 
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may have significant knowledge base (high potential absorptive capacity) 
without any performance increase (low realized absorptive capacity). New 
knowledge has to be exploited, for example by developing new product 
innovations, to reap the benefits. 
 
 
Figure 3. Absorptive capacity model. Modifided from Zahra & George (2002). 
Besides individual-level absorptive capacities, mechanisms to ensure 
knowledge flows within the company are needed to develop organizational-level 
absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Zahra & George (2002) propose 
social integration mechanisms to work towards this purpose. They describe 
social integration mechanisms as formal and informal mechanisms which 
enhance sharing and integrating new knowledge within the organization by 
overcoming barriers to knowledge flows and facilitating interactions among the 
organizational members. Van den Bosch et al. (1999) divide social integration 
mechanisms into three categories: coordination mechanisms, socialisation 
mechanisms, and systems mechanisms. Table 5 reviews extant studies on social 
integration mechanisms and their effects on absorptive capacity capabilities.  
Socialisation mechanisms facilitate the creation of common codes of 
communication and reduce the amount of conflicting goals within a group 
(Jansen et al., 2005) by specifying tacit rules for appropriate action and 
structuring social experiences (Van den Bosch et al., 1999). Teaching new 
employees unit-specific languages, values, beliefs, and norms creates strong 
links between them which facilitates communication and comprehension and 
reduces conflicts (Jansen et al., 2005; Lewin et al., 2010). Connectedness, that 
is the density of networks, is noted to govern interactions within the 
organization (Jansen et al., 2005). Strong and extensive ties within a specific 
group promote the creation of trust, improve cooperation, and facilitate 
knowledge exchange (Ebers & Maurer, 2014; Jansen et al., 2005; Todorova & 
Durisin, 2007). Despite of their benefits, socialisation mechanisms may also 
sometimes inhibit absorptive capacity as they increase reliance on a specific set 
of knowledge sources which may result in myopia and inertia due to “group 
think” (Jansen et al., 2005; March, 1991; van Lancker et al., 2016). 
Coordination mechanisms facilitate knowledge transfer between 
organizational members across disciplinary and hierarchical borders (Jansen et 
al., 2005). Communication interfaces connect employees and increase the scope 
of knowledge absorption since individuals with various backgrounds and 
expertise can be utilised. They also help integrate new knowledge into existing 
knowledge bases, create shared interpretations of problems, and overcome 
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differences. Cross-functional interfaces also facilitate decision making and help 
develop commitment that is needed in implementing new knowledge. The role 
of well-connected and socially adept individuals in linking acquired and 
assimilated knowledge to those who can transform and exploit it has been 
recently acknowledged (Ebers & Maurer, 2014; Jones, 2006; Tortoriello, 2015). 
Gatekeepers, boundary spanners, and change agents may promote formal and 
informal communication across and within companies and drive changes at the 
levels of organization, routines, and strategy (Jones, 2006). 
Table 5. Social integration mechanisms. 
Category Social integration mechanism Absorptive capacity capability 
Socialisation 
mechanisms 
Connectedness (Jansen et al., 2005) Assimilation, transformation, 
exploitation 
Connectedness (Roberts, 2015; Todorova & 
Durisin, 2007) 
Acquisition, assimilation, 
transformation, exploitation  
Social networks (Todorova & Durisin, 2007) Acquisition, assimilation, 
transformation, exploitation 
Social networks (Zahra & George, 2002) Assimilation, transformation 
Trust and strong ties (Ebers & Maurer, 2014) Acquisition, assimilation, 
transformation, exploitation  
Shared values and norms (Lewin et al., 
2010) 
Acquisition, assimilation, 
transformation, exploitation  
Unit-specific language, values, and beliefs  
(Jansen et al., 2005) 
Transformation, exploitation 
Coordination 
mechanisms 
 
Formal social integration mechanisms, e.g. 
organizational structures, coordinators 
(Zahra & George, 2002) 
Assimilation, transformation 
Structures and routines for knowledge 
transfer (Matusik & Heeley, 2005) 
Acquisition, assimilation 
Informal hall talk, cross-functional 
communication (Roberts, 2015) 
Not defined 
Cross-functional interfaces and job rotation  
(Jansen et al., 2005) 
Acquisition, assimilation, 
transformation 
Participation in decision making (Jansen et 
al., 2005) 
Acquisition, transformation 
Relational learning (e.g. knowledge sharing 
routines, joint teams, face-to -face meetings) 
(Leal-Rodríguez et al., 2014) 
Linking potential absorptive capacity 
(acquisition and assimilation) and 
realised absorptive capacity 
(transformation and exploitation) 
Cross-functional interactions, participatory 
leadership (Hotho et al., 2012) 
Not defined 
Boundary spanners (Ebers & Maurer, 2014) Acquisition, assimilation, 
transformation, exploitation 
Boundary spanners (Tortoriello, 2015) Not defined 
Gatekeepers and boundary spanners (Jones, 
2006) 
Acquisition, assimilation 
Change agents (Jones, 2006) Transformation, exploitation 
Systems 
mechanisms 
Formalisation  (Jansen et al., 2005) Transformation, exploitation 
Routinisation (Jansen et al., 2005) (Negative effects) acquisition, 
assimilation, transformation 
Data integration (Roberts, 2015) Acquisition, assimilation, 
transformation, exploitation 
Information systems capabilities (Cepeda-
Carrion et al., 2012) 
Linking potential absorptive capacity 
and realised absorptive capacity 
 
Finally, systems mechanisms such as manuals, policies, and procedures are 
formal and explicit methods to control organizational behaviour. They provide 
organizational memory for handling recurring events and establish patterns of 
organizational action (Jansen et al., 2005). Formalisation, routinisation, and 
the use of information systems may facilitate the knowledge flows and help 
maintain a consistent view of the firm’s knowledge base (Cepeda-Carrion et al., 
2012; Jansen et al., 2005; Roberts, 2015). Systems mechanisms may, however, 
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have some downsides as codified rules do not allow changes of plans when new 
unexpected ideas or events arise (Jansen et al., 2005). 
The value of connecting the absorptive capacity construct to the open 
innovation literature is in that it provides a general framework that can be used 
to assess an organization’s readiness for open innovation. By investigating the 
four capabilities and social integration mechanisms, it is possible to analyse how 
a company is able to find, integrate, and use external knowledge for innovation.
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4. Research gaps 
In the following sections, four specific areas of interest, within the topic of using 
open innovation to promote radical innovation, are introduced for the purpose 
of motivating the four research questions in this dissertation. 
4.1 Gap 1: Customers and users in radical innovation 
One of the most active research streams which draws from both radical 
innovation and open innovation literatures investigates whether interacting 
with customers and users is beneficial for radical innovation or not. Despite of 
the vast amount of research that has been conducted, opposing views persist 
(Agostini et al., 2016; Nicholas et al., 2015). 
According to one group of studies, customers and users are important sources 
of ideas and knowledge about market needs for radical innovation (e.g. Chatterji 
& Fabrizio, 2014; Lettl et al., 2006). This is a very logical position considering 
that the benefits of interacting with customers and users for the development of 
products, services, and processes have been reported over several decades 
(Cavaye, 1995; Gassmann et al., 2006; Markus & Mao, 2004; von Hippel, 1976). 
These interactions have been considered very important for reducing market 
uncertainties (Martinez-Torres & Olmedilla, 2016). Customers and users may 
have insight into which product characteristics are the most important, what 
the market size is, and which factors influence consumer demand (Chatterji & 
Fabrizio, 2014). A strong user perspective and a deep understanding of user 
needs are considered especially valuable in the early stages of the innovation 
process, when most of the design decisions are still open (Schemmann et al., 
2016). Strong orientation towards customers and users may also increase 
companies’ priority placed on radical innovation as learning from them may 
induce a shift away from imitating their competitors (Baker & Sinkula, 2007). 
The issue is, however, not so straightforward. There are studies which find 
suggest that customer and user involvement may actually be harmful for radical 
innovation (Kohli & Jaworski, 1990; Menguc et al., 2014; O’Connor, 1998). 
These results may arise from the fact that most customers and users are too 
familiar with existing products to be able to vision radically new ones (Enkel et 
al., 2005). Consequently, they might not be able to assess the value of radical 
ideas, which may give the developing companies misleading signals (Nicholas 
et al., 2015). 
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To solve this discrepancy, several explanations have been proposed. Lettl et 
al. (2006) argue that companies tend to give users only a passive role, such as 
involving them in the evaluation of new concepts or prototypes that the 
companies have developed. They propose that in order to be valuable for radical 
innovation, users should be treated as active contributors of new ideas and 
concepts. This is, however, often difficult due to companies’ poor ability to 
integrate external inputs in their innovation processes (Katz & Allen, 1982). 
It has also been proposed that companies focus too strongly on their 
customers’ and users’ expressed needs and disregard their latent needs 
(Sandberg, 2007). Latent needs are defined as the needs of which a customer or 
user is unaware of; needs which are not in their consciousness (Narver et al., 
2004). They cannot be articulated and therefore alternative methods should be 
used to learn from them (Slater & Narver, 1998). Such methods may include 
such as applied ethnography and emphatic design (Janssen & Dankbaar, 2008; 
Verganti, 2008). The logic is that by understanding the latent needs of their 
customers and users, companies may pursue future market opportunities that 
are not evident to their competitors (Slater et al., 2014). 
A third explanation considers the type of customers and users that are chosen. 
Von Hippel (1986, p. 796) writes that “the related real-world experience of 
ordinary users is often rendered obsolete by the time a product is developed or 
during the time of its projected commercial lifetime.” What he calls ordinary 
users may therefore be of little use for radical innovation. Instead, lead users 
are proposed as an important source of insights for radical ideas or even 
prototypes of new products. Lead users are users whose present needs will 
become mainstream in the future and who would benefit significantly by 
obtaining a solution to those needs (von Hippel, 1986). They have been 
suggested to be valuable for radical innovation as they may recognize the 
relevance of new solutions earlier than their peers or the innovating companies 
themselves (Lettl et al., 2006, 2008; von Hippel, 1986).  Along the same lines, 
it is suggested that for disruptive innovations companies should be interested 
in small but emerging customer segments whose needs will become mainstream 
in the future (Govindarajan et al., 2011; Yu & Hang, 2010). 
A major shortcoming of the extant research is that it rarely distinguishes 
between customers and users. It is very common that authors use the terms 
interchangeably within a same study (Callahan & Lasry, 2004; Fuchs & 
Schreier, 2011; Kaulio, 1998; Nijssen et al., 2012; Sánchez-González et al., 
2009). This may reflect a focus on consumer markets: a consumer who buys, for 
example, a bicycle is likely to be the one who ends up riding it. This is, however, 
not always the case. There are studies which address what Bogers et al. (2010, 
p. 859) refer to as intermediate users: “users such as firms that use equipment 
and components from producers to produce goods and services.” Such 
intermediate users include physicians (Chatterji & Fabrizio, 2014), surgeons 
(Lettl, 2007), library staff (Morrison et al., 2000), firms that use machine tools 
(Lee, 1996), and construction companies (Slaughter, 1993). Here lies a danger 
since the the process of involving a cyclist is likely to be significantly different to 
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collaborating with machining shops and insights from one context may not be 
transferable to significantly different ones. 
The difference between customers and users becomes apparent when thinking 
of large manufacturing companies operating in B2B environments. For 
companies that build and innovate complex products such as ships, airplanes, 
or power plants, customers and users are two distinct entities. The customer 
organizations typically have purchasing departments which are involved in 
making such major purchasing decisions in conjunction with top management 
(Van Weele, 2010). The ones who use the products (e.g. ship captains, airplane 
staff, and power plant operators) are often distinct from customers who make 
the purchasing decisions.  
Recently, new digital technologies such as sensors, radio-frequency 
identification tags, and cloud computing have diffused into B2B manufacturing 
industries. This diffusion can be understood as a trigger of discontinuity 
(Bessant et al., 2005) that creates opportunities for radical innovation (Nylén & 
Holmström, 2015; Yoo et al., 2012). The digital technologies may be embedded 
in existing non-digital products and services to provide them new properties 
which may result in significant benefits for the developing company and major 
restructurings of entire industries (Nambisan et al., 2017; Nylén & Holmström, 
2015; Yoo, 2010, 2013). The literature refers to these new combinations of 
digital and physical components as digital innovations (Yoo et al., 2010). B2B 
manufacturing industries, which are affected by the diffusion of digital 
technologies, provide a good setting to study differences between the 
contributions of customers and users to companies’ radical innovation 
processes for two reasons: i) the industry setting is associated with 
opportunities for radical innovation, and ii) it emphasizes the difference 
between customers and users. The research opportunities provided by such a 
context and the gaps in earlier research considering the potential of customers 
and users for radical innovation motivate the first research question of this 
dissertation: 
 
RQ1: How do B2B manufacturing firms leverage customers and users for the 
purposes of radical digital innovation? 
4.2 Gap 2: Requirements for the level of internal R&D 
The dominant view within the open innovation literature is that companies may 
use external knowledge sources to complement their internal R&D (Dahlander 
& Gann, 2010). This implies that in order to benefit from inbound open 
innovation companies need to make significant investments in internal 
innovation activities (Hung & Chou, 2013). This view is strongly influenced by 
the studies on absorptive capacity as they suggest that internal R&D not only 
helps companies generate new innovations by themselves but also facilitates 
their exploration and exploitation of new knowledge from outside the firm’s 
borders (Cohen & Levinthal, 1989, 1990). Investing in internal R&D creates 
absorptive capacity which in turn promotes inbound open innovation (Bianchi 
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et al., 2016; Enkel & Gassmann, 2008; Randhawa et al., 2016; Saebi & Foss, 
2015; Veugelers, 1997; West & Bogers, 2014). 
It is proposed that understanding the ideas and technologies of the other party 
is not possible without some overlap in in competences and knowledge bases 
(Hung & Chou, 2013; Mowery et al., 1996; Nooteboom et al., 2007). 
If intensive internal R&D is a necessary condition for leveraging external 
sources of innovation, the open innovation paradigm, as stated by Chesbrough 
(2003), faces severe limitations. It is suggested that drawing too strongly from 
external knowledge sources should be considered as a weakness as it may limit 
an organisation’s ability to explore new knowledge domains (Kim et al., 2016). 
Neglecting internal R&D may also eventually lead to the diminish of the 
company’s core competences (Rothaermel & Alexandre, 2008). This line of 
thought suggests that companies with low internal R&D intensity are poorly 
able to benefit from openness. 
At the same time, there are studies which suggest that collaboration for 
innovation would be particularly important for companies with low R&D 
intensity3 (Barge-Gil, 2010). It is quite straightforward to assume that 
companies which are lacking resources needed for innovation have the greatest 
need for external resources (Bayona et al., 2001). In the same fashion, 
companies which already have high technological procifiency may have less 
need for forming innovation networks (Pittaway et al., 2004). While high R&D 
investments and the resulting absorptive capacity may increase the benefits 
from collaboration it also enables companies to assimilate and use freely 
available knowledge which may lower their incentives to collaborate 
(Abramovsky et al., 2009). 
Given the potential value of inbound open innovation for companies with low 
R&D intensity, the question of whether (and how) such companies may 
substitute their internal R&D efforts with inbound open innovation has been 
surprisingly poorly studied (Dahlander & Gann, 2010; Tanskanen et al., 2017). 
The open innovation literature has mostly focused on high-tech industries 
where high investments in internal R&D are common (Vanhaverbeke et al., 
2014). Of the few studies on low-tech industries, Chesbrough & Crowther 
(2006) present preliminary evidence on that companies which start adopting 
open innovation practices maintain or increase their R&D investments, which 
suggests that they do not use open innovation to replace internal R&D. 
Spithoven et al. (2011) find that companies, which lack absorptive capacity, may 
still benefit from inbound open innovation with the help of technology 
intermediaries. This suggests that companies with low R&D intensity might be 
able to find alternative ways to engage in inbound open innovation.  
While there is a lot of evidence which suggests that significant internal R&D 
investments are important for absorptive capacity and inbound open 
innovation, due to the limited number of studies which investigate low R&D 
contexts, it can be argued that the question of whether and how open innovation 
can replace internal R&D is still unresolved (Dahlander and Gann, 2010). In 
investigating these questions, the absorptive capacity model is likely to prove 
                                                          
3 R&D intensity refers to the company’s R&D expenditure divided by its sales. 
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useful as it is one of the standard models on how external knowledge may be 
turned into innovations. The literature suggests that the four capabilities of 
absorptive capacity – acquisition, assimilation, transformation, and 
exploitation – are necessary for the absorption process to succeed (Zahra & 
George, 2002). Thus, examining those four capabilities may be helpful in 
analysing how the substitution of internal R&D with external knowledge may 
take place.  
For many companies suppliers are the most important source of innovative 
technologies (Ellis et al., 2012; Un et al., 2010). Among potential open 
innovation partners, suppliers are particularly attractive as they are often 
familiar with their customers’ needs, and they occupy a position where 
mechanisms for knowledge transfer are may be already in place (Un et al., 
2010). Collaboration with supppliers has also been noted to benefit companies’ 
radical innovation development (Phillips et al., 2006; Song & Di Benedetto, 
2008). This has generated an active research stream which addresses the 
innovation potential of suppliers and methods for tapping into supplier 
innovations (Brem, 2010; Sjoerdsma & van Weele, 2015; Wagner, 2012; Yan et 
al., 2017). Concentrating on the context of suppliers provides a good 
opportunity for providing findings that are applicable to a specific domain. The 
lack of research of the absorption processes of supplier innovations in low R&D 
intensity motivates the second research question of this dissertation: 
 
RQ2: How do the capabilities of acquisition, assimilation, transformation, and 
exploitation manifest themselves in substituting internal R&D with supplier 
innovations? 
4.3 Gap 3: Extending to new idea sources 
In order to introduce radical innovations, companies need to be able to acquire 
radical ideas and develop them (Cooper, 2013; Frishammar et al., 2016; 
Sergeeva, 2016). While such ideas may emerge from within a company, many 
seek also externally generated ideas that they may further develop and 
commercialize internally (Chesbrough, 2003). It is suggested that to ensure the 
acquisition of radical ideas, in particular, companies should collaborate with a 
wide range of different partners. Birkinshaw et al. (2007) argue that incumbent 
companies often have a stable set of partners that are focused on improving 
existing systems, rather than innovating radically new ones. In time, the 
diversity of knowledge embedded in the partner network is likely to diminish, 
which reduces its innovation potential (Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000). Too similar 
partners may hence limit the scope of the search for new opportunities by 
reducing differentiation, which may be harmful for radical innovation (Cui et 
al., 2015; Day & Schoemaker, 2004; Yan & Dooley, 2013). Furthermore, it may 
be difficult to break out of existing networks and establish new ones, which is 
considered a significant barrier for radical innovation (Birkinshaw et al., 2007).  
The majority of the extant studies suggest that radical innovation requires a 
broad and explorative search for a variety of knowledge inputs that can then be 
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combined (Laursen, 2012; Zang et al., 2014). Since over-reliance on internal 
R&D and trusted and geographically close partners may lead to an emphasis on 
incremental innovation (Birkinshaw et al., 2007; Bunduchi, 2013; Chang et al., 
2012; Stringer, 2000), experimenting with new partners is suggested as a best 
practice. This basic idea has been repeated in many forms in the extant 
literature. There are suggestions that companies should develop peripheral 
vision (Day & Schoemaker, 2004) and weak ties (Phillips et al., 2006), reach out 
beyond current relationships (O’Connor & McDermott, 2004), combine over 
multiple knowledge domains (Schoenmakers & Duysters, 2010), increase 
search breadth (Cai et al., 2014), and foster linkages with heterogeneous 
populations (Bessant et al., 2005).  
Obtaining radical ideas from external parties and developing them into 
market-ready products is, however, not without challenges. First, the properties 
of radical ideas make them difficult to develop for many companies. Incumbent 
companies typically have mechanisms in place which make them favour 
incremental ideas over radical ones (Bessant et al., 2005; Chang et al., 2012; 
O’Reilly & Tushman, 2008). As radical ideas tend to be highly creative and 
original, they may challenge existing power dynamics and vested interests 
within organizations which may manifest in opposition to them (Ekvall, 1997; 
Lempiala, 2010; Magnusson, 2009; Sijbom et al., 2015). Furthermore, radical 
ideas may be difficult to comprehend and evaluate, which often leads to their 
rejection (Bessant et al., 2014, 2011; Ekvall, 1997; O’Connor & Rice, 2013b; 
Sandberg & Aarikka-Stenroos, 2014). 
Secondly, companies often suffer from the not-invented-here syndrome 
(Antons & Piller, 2015; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; de Araújo Burcharth et al., 
2014; Katz & Allen, 1982), i.e. the tendency to reject external ideas and 
knowledge. The combination of these two challenges that arise from the 
radicalness of an idea, on the one hand, and the external source of an idea, on 
the other, may create a particularly demanding situation which may prevent 
companies from following the recommendations to promote their radical 
innovation by collaborating with new partners. Radical ideas are uncertain to 
start with and if they originate from unfamiliar sources they may be perceived 
as even more risky (Chesbrough, 2006). The context where radical ideas are 
acquired from unusual idea sources is, however, poorly understood as there is 
an absence of studies that focus on it. 
The literature on absorptive capacity suggests that the integration and 
exploitation of ideas can be investigated by looking at social integration 
mechanisms which facilitate knowledge sharing and utilization within an 
organization (Jansen et al., 2005; Todorova & Durisin, 2007; Zahra & George, 
2002). This approach is well in line with observations according to which radical 
innovation (Aagaard & Gertsen, 2011; Büschgens et al., 2013; Slater et al., 2014) 
and open innovation (Chiaroni et al., 2010; Foss et al., 2011) both benefit from 
well-working knowledge exchange systems within companies. To provide more 
understanding on the integration challenges that companies face when 
processing radical ideas from new kind of partners, the third research questions 
is defined as follows: 
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RQ3: How social integration mechanisms influence the absorption of radical 
ideas from unusual sources? 
4.4 Gap 4: Individual motivation towards radical innovation 
development 
The extant literature on radical innovation quite rarely analyses the effects of 
managerial actions at the level of individuals, and when it does, the issue of 
employee motivation is often completely missing. There are, however, reasons 
to believe that enhancing and maintaining individual motivation is particularly 
crucial when developing radical innovations. 
First of all, based on the radical innovation literature, it is known that there 
might be differences between incremental and radical innovations with respect 
to their origins. The seed of incremental innovations are suggested to originate 
top-down from internal strategy processes (Koen et al., 2005; Reid & de 
Brentani, 2004) or alternatively by gathering feedback from customers (Leifer 
et al., 2000). It has been proposed that radical ideas flow bottom-up in the 
organization: they are generated by individuals, move upward to small groups 
and then proceed to project-level (Reid & de Brentani, 2004). Top management 
becomes aware of them typically only after project formalization.  The bottom-
up approach which promotes radical ideas and their development is therefore 
highly driven by the initiative of individuals (Benner & Tushman, 2003; Day, 
1994; Leifer et al., 2000). 
A proposed explanation for the pronounced role of individuals in radical 
innovation development is that process management methods which are 
commonplace in incremental innovation development are of limited use due to 
the high uncertainties associated with radical innovations (Benner & Tushman, 
2003; O’Connor, 2008). Consequently, it has been suggested that when 
developing radical innovations managerial control should be eased and 
employees should be trusted to work on their own initiative quite freely 
(Alexander & van Knippenberg, 2014; Hill & Rothaermel, 2003; Koen et al., 
2005; McCarthy et al., 2006; McGrath, 2001; Poskela & Martinsuo, 2009). 
While it is often possible to identify highly motivated individuals that have 
managed to make use of their freedom behind successful radical innovations 
(Chakrabarti, 1974; Ettlie et al., 1984; Reid & de Brentani, 2004), their high 
levels of motivation are typically taken as granted and little attention has been 
paid to what motivates the developers and how managers could enhance and 
maintain their motivation (Poskela & Martinsuo, 2009). Radical innovation 
developers are often described as highly motivated, suitable for self-directed 
work and independent (Assink, 2006; Kelley et al., 2011; O’Connor & 
DeMartino, 2006) but it would be simplistic to assume that every developer 
working with radical innovations has superior intrinsic motivation which can be 
unleashed by reducing managerial control. 
In fact, there are arguments which suggest that maintaining motivation in 
radical innovation development may be remarkably challenging. Due to high 
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uncertainties, the employees need to work in a demanding environment where 
they need to endure ambiguous situations and decision-making tasks, navigate 
across diverse knowledge bases and still be able to propose creative ideas and 
solutions (Bessant et al., 2005; Day, 1994). Furthermore, unanticipated 
obstacles and challenges that are prevalent in radical innovation projects may 
be detrimental to their motivation (Alexander & van Knippenberg, 2014). Due 
to these challenges it is no surprise to find that several studies have identified 
lack of motivation as a key obstacle to radical innovation and emphasized the 
need to manage it (Alexander & van Knippenberg, 2014; Kelley et al., 2011; 
O’Connor & McDermott, 2004; Stringer, 2000). If there is an absence of 
individual motivation towards radical innovation development, the 
organization is likely to be unable to generate radical innovations internally or 
benefit from external inputs to its innovation processes. Methods for enhancing 
and sustaining motivation towards radical innovation are, however, poorly 
understood. To fill this gap in the research, the following research question is 
defined. 
 
RQ4: How may managers motivate individuals towards radical innovation 
work? 
 
While this research question does not focus on challenges that open innovation 
specifically poses to radical innovation management, it was deemed important 
to include as individual motivation is a critical enabler of radical innovation, 
and this viewpoint has been largerly ignored in both closed and open treatments 
of radical innovation. 
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5. Methodology 
The purpose of this section is to explain how the four studies that comprise the 
empirical part of this dissertation are conducted and why certain 
methodological choices have been made. The section begins with discussion 
about the philosophical considerations that characterize the research. Next, the 
case study research design is presented. Then, the individual studies are 
described and related to the overall research questions of the dissertation. 
Finally, the general data collection and analysis methods in use as well as 
methods to increase validity and reliability of the findings are reviewed.  
5.1 Ontological and epistemological foundations 
Conducting research always means adopting philosophical positions in terms of 
the nature of reality (ontology) and knowledge (epistemology). It is often argued 
that to be able to generate new understanding about social phenomena, there 
needs to be some idea of what the reality is like and how it is possible to acquire 
knowledge of it (Searle, 2008; Tsoukas & Chia, 2011). In practice, these 
questions are not always thought out thoroughly, but are instead implicitly 
assumed when following well-known research designs and methods. It can, 
however, be argued that to properly understand the implications and limitations 
of one’s research efforts, the philosophical foundations should be elaborated 
and made known at least to oneself. 
In the social sciences, and management studies particularly, there are four4 
common philosophical positions which are associated with certain ontological 
and epistemological assumptions (Christ, 2013; Lincoln et al., 2011; Martela, 
2015; Miller & Tsang, 2011; Tsang, 2016; Tsoukas & Knudsen, 2005; Wicks & 
Freeman, 1998). These positions are positivism, critical realism, constructivism, 
and pragmatism, of which the last is adopted in this dissertation. Next, these 
positions are briefly introduced and the reasoning behind the adoption of 
pragmatism is clarified. 
A key ontological dispute considers realism, that is, whether scientific theories 
and their concepts — including such things as atoms, viruses, values, 
competitive advantages, and knowledge transfer — describe entities that exist 
independently of the researcher or not (Devitt, 2008). Positivists and critical 
realists accept realism, which argues that the entities that theories discuss are 
                                                          
4 This is by no means an exhaustive list of available positions. See, for example, Tsoukas & Knudsen 
(2005) and Point et al. (2016) for further information. 
 52 
objective parts of  reality even though some of them cannot be directly observed, 
and that their existence is not dependent on anyone’s mental items, ideas, or 
sense data (Devitt, 2008). The aim of realist scientific inquiry is therefore to 
produce true and accurate descriptions of the world (Chakravartty, 2016; 
Martela, 2015). 
5.1.1 Positivism 
Positivism and critical realism differ in their views of the researchers’ ability to 
acquire knowledge about reality. Positivists assert that there are scientific laws, 
resembling those in natural sciences, that determine how organizations operate, 
and that these laws generally hold in all situations (Donaldson, 1996). 
Researchers are neutral observers who, using systematic methods, may find 
these laws. They may formulate hypotheses and collect objective data to test 
them (Wicks & Freeman, 1998) with the aim of achieving close correspondence 
between theory and reality (Boisot & McKelvey, 2010; Welch et al., 2011). Social 
sciences often address entities that are related to the “inter-subjective worlds” 
of the studied actors, for example organizational values and inner motivations 
of managers (Johnson & Duberley, 2015). Traditionally, positivism has 
excluded these interpretative entities as not belonging to proper science. The 
more recent versions (Glaser & Strauss, 2009) accept these social elements as a 
focus of social science research but maintain that the researchers are able to 
study these inter-subjective worlds objectively given proper research designs 
and methods (Glaser, 2002; Johnson & Duberley, 2015). Researchers often have 
biases but they may undertake rigorous measures to increase the validity and 
reliability of their findings (Gibbert et al., 2002; Winter, 2000). This way, their 
findings may be used to make generalizations about a larger population or 
theory (Welch et al., 2011). 
5.1.2 Constructivism 
Anti-realists, such as constructivists5, argue that the entities that theories 
describe do not exist independently. Instead, they are dependent on the 
cognitive activities and capacities of the researchers (Devitt, 2008). The reality 
is therefore not an object of neutral observation but constructed by the 
researchers that impose concepts and worldviews on it. Constructivists 
therefore argue in favour of subjectivity in science arising from values, 
languages, and politics (Tsang, 2016). Because subjective elements influence the 
way reality is constructed, there are bound to be multiple alternative realities. 
The goal for social sciences is to understand these realities and interpret them 
from the research subjects’ own frames of reference (Tsang, 2016). 
Furthermore, researchers do not only examine the realities of their research 
subjects. Their own past experiences, beliefs, biases, gender and historical and 
sociocultural setting also influence the results (Jonassen, 1991; Longino, 1990; 
Phillips, 1995). Data resulting from scientific inquiry is therefore considered to 
                                                          
5 There are also moderate forms of constructivism that are compatible with realism (Kwan & Tsang, 
2001). 
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be produced from the interaction between the researcher and the researched 
(Charmaz, 1995; Christ, 2013). There are hence no claims of objectivity and the 
aim for the research is to create informative representations of individual 
realities that might also be valuable in other contexts and empower 
marginalized voices (Christ, 2013; Hanson & Grimmer, 2007; Johnson & 
Duberley, 2015; Lincoln & Guba, 1985; Phillips, 1995). Whether there is an 
objective reality beyond all the interpretations remains unknown (Lincoln & 
Guba, 1985). 
A common criticism against the anti-realist constructionist position is that if 
the existence of independent reality is questioned, the epistemological status of 
research outcomes becomes unclear (Johnson & Duberley, 2015). If there is no 
objective reality that is the source of our observations, it makes no sense to talk 
about the truth of theories (Boisot & McKelvey, 2010). What could then be the 
basis for ranking competing theories and explaining scientific progress? Is the 
only option to settle for all interpretations being equal?  
5.1.3 Critical realism 
Critical realists, as the name would suggest, accept realism but, compared to 
positivists, are more sceptical of the researchers’ abilities to derive general laws 
that explain empirical observations (Bhaskar, 1998). It is based on the idea that 
knowledge of the world is always bound to be fallible and theory-laden (Sayer, 
1992). They agree with the constructivists on that social phenomena are shaped 
by interpretation, but maintain that theories do, to a large extent, describe 
something that is independent of the researcher (Sayer, 1992). According to 
critical realism, experiences are the immediate object of researchers’ 
observations (Bhaskar, 2008). To provide structure to the experiences, they are 
framed as events (Elder-Vass, 2007). For example, based on geocentric and 
heliocentric cosmological models, it is possible to construe two different events 
based on the experience of sunrise: either it’s the movement of the sun, or the 
rotation of the earth (Bhaskar, 2008). Through experimental activity, 
researchers may identify patterns of events, and ultimately gain understanding 
on the underlying mechanisms which form the basis of causal laws, which are 
about “things, not events” (Bhaskar, 2008, p. 41). Moving between the levels of 
observations, events, and mechanisms requires interpretation (Easton, 2010). 
The “real” world may not be directly observable but it is, in the end, connected 
to the levels of events and observations (Easton, 2010; Johnson & Duberley, 
2015). While scientific theories may not be able to depict reality in all of its 
complexity, they may provide quite accurate guides to the way processes work 
and produce particular outcomes (Ackroyd, 2010). Gradually, the science as a 
whole is likely to approach truth, as more data is collected by a community of 
diverse researchers and the best theories are identified among the alternatives 
(Easton, 2010). 
Realist positions can be criticized on the grounds of under-determination. It 
can be argued that for every set of empirical evidence for a theory, an alternative 
theory can be found that is supported by it (Devitt, 2008). We may find theories 
that are at odds with each other but that are both supported by the same data 
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(Quine, 1970). Realists therefore need to clarify how theories should be 
prioritized if looking at the empirical evidence is not sufficient. If it cannot be 
argued that some theories are more true than others, how should scientific 
progress be evaluated? Furthermore, according to the so-called Duhem-Quine 
thesis, theories can never be tested in isolation. Instead, they are inseparable 
from auxiliary hypotheses such as background assumptions, methodological 
arguments, and theories on scientific instruments (Harding, 2012; Stanford, 
2016). Even if a piece of evidence emerges that is incompatible with a specific 
theory, we cannot be sure if that is the weakness of the theory itself or of some 
auxiliary hypothesis. Accepting these arguments leads to a difficult position: 
despite the assumption of an independent reality, there seems to be no easy way 
to evaluate the merits of scientific theories based on their objective truth 
(Martela, 2015). Consequently, it becomes unclear what difference it makes for 
scientific inquiry whether we accept realism or not. While realism perhaps 
“makes obvious sense” (Mir & Watson, 2000, p. 946), building scientific 
methodology based on common sense and intuition may not be the most 
convincing way to proceed (Devitt, 2008). 
5.1.4 Pragmatism 
Recently, pragmatist philosophy has gained attention among management 
scholars. Similar to critical realism, it is considered to avoid the naïve ideas of 
easily accessible reality that positivists advocate and difficulties related to the 
epistemological status of findings that constructivism suffers from (Wicks & 
Freeman, 1998). Pragmatism accepts the researcher’s role as an active 
interpreter but does not agree on the search for truth as a guiding principle of 
science (Martela, 2015). Instead, science is considered to serve instrumental 
purposes. The concepts of truth and reality should be conceived by considering 
what practical effects they may have (Hookway, 2016). Theories are always 
bound to be incomplete and biased, but they may be evaluated by their practical 
utility: how they help serve human purposes (Wicks & Freeman, 1998). Science 
should hence be considered no different than other crafts that help people in 
dealing with their experiential worlds (Martela, 2015). As Kivinen & Piiroinen 
(2004, p. 244) put it: “All scientific work is always done in the context of some 
or another research problem, and all the things considered relevant for it are 
considered relevant from some actor’s point.”  
In contrast to critical realism, which considers alternative theories as 
competing against each other, pragmatists may argue that they complement 
each other by emphasizing different aspects and thus being useful for different 
purposes (Martela, 2015). This way, the under-determination argument may be 
resolved. This also allows for variety in methodological approaches: various 
forms of data and methods may be blended to create useful theories (Christ, 
2013). Similarly, studies with different ontological and epistemological 
positions may be used, presuming that they have pragmatic value (Creswell, 
2013). In their defence of pragmatism, Kivinen & Piiroinen (2004) reject the 
idea proposed by philosophers such as Searle (2008) that scientific inquiry 
needs to be founded on ontological commitments. They argue that researchers 
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should drop ontological debates and concentrate more on methodological 
issues. This is, however, not the only possible conclusion. In practice, theories 
and their development may be inseparable from ontological and 
epistemological considerations and these constellations may have pragmatic 
value. By investigating the explicit and implicit ontological assumptions of 
theories and explanatory frameworks, it may be possible to develop better 
methodologies (Lohse, 2017). 
Based on these considerations, pragmatism is adopted as the foundation of 
this dissertation, and provides grounds that its implications and limitations can 
be evaluated on. 
5.2 Case study research design 
The empirical studies in this dissertation all follow case study research design. 
Case study design is based on gathering rich data to acquire in-depth 
understanding of a case in its natural setting (Ridder et al., 2014). Since social 
phenomena are infinitely complex, researchers may arrange empirical evidence 
into cases to focus attention on specific aspects of them (Ragin, 2009). Case 
studies often combine different data sources with the goal of providing detailed 
descriptions of the studied phenomenon (Yin, 2009). The high level of detail is 
considered to be particularly suitable for answering “how” and “why” questions 
(Yin, 2009).  
In management research, case study methodologies proposed by Eisenhardt 
(1989) and Yin (2009) have been widely adopted and, consequently, the goals 
of case research are often thought to be the identification of generalities and 
formulation of cause-effect propositions (Welch et al., 2011). These 
methodologies are often considered to have implicit positivistic assumptions 
(Ridder et al., 2014; Welch et al., 2011) and alternative interpretations have 
been proposed. The constructivist approach, proposed by Stake (2005) for 
example, considers the purpose of case study to increase understanding of a 
particular case by providing experiential knowledge of it — not generalizing the 
case to a population. Critical realists seek to understand the causal mechanisms 
beyond experiences and events, but consider the explanations to always be 
tentative: “By the time the research is complete, both the cases and their casing 
may have shifted substantially” (Ragin, 2009, p. 524). The ontological and 
epistemological foundations of pragmatism do not rule out any approaches to 
case studies in advance. Researchers should choose the combination of methods 
and procedures that work best for answering their research questions 
(Johansson, 2003), regardless of whether their logic is to generalize or 
particularize. 
5.2.1 Theory generation, testing, and elaboration 
Traditionally, case studies have been mostly associated with theory generation 
in the “early phases of a new management theory, when key variables and their 
relationships are being explored” (Gibbert et al., 2008, p. 1465). The role of case 
studies has been considered to formulate propositions that can then be tested 
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in other studies (that typically use surveys or secondary quantitative data) 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). This view has, however, been contested. Ketokivi & Choi 
(2014) argue that case studies may be used for three purposes: 1) theory 
generation, 2) theory testing, and 3) theory elaboration, and both qualitative 
and quantitative data are applicable for each of them. According to them, the 
defining characteristics of case research are that it is situationally grounded and 
seeks a sense of generality. Being situationally grounded includes paying 
attention to contextual idiosyncrasies and collecting data which addresses how 
contextual factors are related to the findings. A sense of generality does not 
mean making generalizations about a population but rather whether the 
findings provide insights to general theory in one way or another. 
Theory generation aims for inductive reasoning based on empirical data 
without strong guidance from existing theory. In contrast, theory testing uses 
deductive reasoning to derive propositions from existing theory and seeks 
empirical support for them. In theory elaboration, researchers are interested in 
how a general theory appears in a specific context (Ketokivi & Choi, 2014). It 
may be used if a particular context is not known well enough to derive testable 
propositions, or if there is a desire to examine it in more detail. Elaboration may 
result in changes or additions to general theory by introducing new concepts, 
defining relationships between the concepts, or identifying boundary conditions 
(Ketokivi & Choi, 2014; Whetten, 1989). Theory elaboration is often thought to 
be based on abductive reasoning, where the tasks of collecting new empirical 
data and finding relevant existing theories proceed in parallel (Dubois & Gadde, 
2002, 2014). In an abductive research process, empirical findings may bring 
about a need to redirect the existing theoretical model and similarly theoretical 
insights may guide data collection. Findings hence emerge through the 
systematic combination of theory and data. 
5.3 Empirical studies 
The empirical part of the dissertation comprises four studies referred to as 
Article 1, 2, 3, and 4, which address the topics of radical innovation and open 
innovation from distinct viewpoints. In Figure 4, the articles and the respective 
research questions of this dissertation are positioned with respect to the 
managerial categories needed for the development of radical innovations that 
were introduced in section 2.4. For the sake of clarity, the figure shows only 
which category an article has the strongest connection to. As can be seen from 
the figure, the research questions primarily address external linkages (RQs 1–
3) and culture (RQ4). The articles may, however, touch on multiple categories. 
Article 1 looks into three companies which leverage their users and customers 
as knowledge sources for digital innovation. The context of the study is the 
digitization of the B2B manufacturing industry, where the diffusion of new 
digital technologies is considered to create opportunities for radical innovation. 
As the article focuses on interactions with external partners, its most direct 
connection is to the category of external linkages. In addition, it discusses 
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practices related to the acquisition, distribution, and use of customer and user 
knowledge and therefore has links to the category of processes. 
 
 
Figure 4. Categories of radical innovation management and their relations to the research 
questions of the dissertation. 
Article 2 can be considered an embedded case study. In embedded case studies, 
the investigation of a single case comprises the examination of multiple of its 
sub-elements (Scholz & Tietje, 2002; Yin, 2009). It investigates how an energy 
company collaborates with its suppliers to introduce radical innovations 
without significant investments into internal R&D. The case is studied through 
four collaborative innovation projects, each case with a different supplier. The 
main focus is on external linkages: collaboration with suppliers. The study also 
touches on the topic of processes by discussing product launch strategies and 
describing different innovation process phases in the projects. 
Article 3, similarly adopts the embedded case study design. In Article 3, the 
absorptive capacity of a single company is studied by looking at two of its radical 
innovation projects. The analysis focuses on the company’s R&D unit’s ability 
to integrate and exploit radical ideas. Furthermore, it discusses how external 
sources of ideas, particularly those that have no existing relations with the R&D 
unit, may influence the ideas’ absorption. The study has a strong focus on 
external linkages, and it also discusses organizational structures in terms of how 
interactions between different parts of the organization may influence the 
development or radical ideas. Furthermore, it discusses decision-making 
mechanisms at different project phases which links it to the category of 
processes. 
Article 4 addresses the management of individual motivation when 
developing radical innovations. The study develops and tests a theoretical 
model on individual motivation which combines the literature on innovation 
management and work psychology and elaborates the model by linking its 
elements with managerial methods. The study adopts a multi-level perspective 
by investigating the elements at organization, project team, and individual 
levels. Besides cultural issues, which are typically associated with employee 
motivation, the study also touches on the topics of processes and organizational 
structures and their links to motivation. 
Internal organization
Radical innovation
Processes and methods
Culture
Organizational structures
External linkages 
(open innovation)
Article 1
RQ1: How do B2B manufacturing 
firms leverage customer 
knowledge and user knowledge 
for the purposes of radical digital 
innovation?
Article 2
RQ2: How do the capabilities of 
acquisition, assimilation, 
transformation, and exploitation 
manifest themselves in 
substituting internal R&D with 
supplier innovations?
Article 3
RQ3: How do social integration 
mechanisms influence the 
absorption of radical ideas from 
unusual sources?
Article 4
RQ4: How may managers 
motivate individuals towards 
radical innovation work?
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Table 6. Descriptions of the empirical studies. 
 Article 1 Article 2 Article 3 Article 4 
Research 
question as stated 
in the article 
How do B2B 
manufacturing 
firms leverage 
customer 
knowledge and 
user knowledge 
for the purposes 
of digital 
innovation? 
How do the 
capabilities of 
acquisition, 
assimilation, 
transformation, 
and exploitation 
manifest 
themselves in 
substituting 
internal R & D 
with supplier 
innovations? 
How do social 
integration 
mechanisms 
influence the 
absorption of 
radical ideas from 
unusual sources? 
How may 
managers 
motivate 
individuals 
towards radical 
innovation work? 
Theoretical 
background 
Information 
systems, 
innovation 
management 
Absorptive 
capacity, 
innovation 
management 
Absorptive 
capacity, 
innovation 
management 
Work motivation, 
innovation 
management  
Research 
approach 
Theory 
elaboration 
Theory 
elaboration 
Theory 
elaboration 
Theory testing, 
theory elaboration 
Case study type Multiple case 
study 
Embedded case 
study 
Embedded case 
study 
Multiple case 
study 
Data collection 
method 
Semi-structured 
interviews, 
company 
materials 
Semi-structured 
interviews, 
company 
materials 
Semi-structured 
interviews, 
company and 
project materials 
Semi-structured 
interviews 
No. of companies 3 1+4 1 4 
No. of projects N/A 4 2 4 
Industry Marine products, 
automation and 
systems 
technologies, 
plant and 
component 
technologies 
Energy Steel Technological 
components and 
systems, steel, 
pulp and paper, 
broadcasting 
No. of interviews 30 18 21 57 
Interviewees R&D managers, 
R&D directors, 
product 
managers, design 
Managers, sales 
managers, IT 
managers 
Project managers, 
supply managers, 
sales managers, 
technology 
managers, 
purchasing 
managers 
Inventors, R&D 
directors, R&D 
managers 
R&D managers, 
R&D developers, 
top managers 
 
Whereas all of the studies adopt the case study approach, there are differences 
in how the individual studies were designed and conducted (Table 6). All of the 
studies aim for theoretical contribution by elaborating existing theories. They 
are guided by existing theory and seek to elaborate them by investigating 
relationships among concepts and examining boundary conditions (Ketokivi & 
Choi, 2014). The studies cannot be considered as instances of theory generation 
because key concepts and frameworks are adopted from previous studies. 
Article 4 contrasts the other studies in that a significant part of it is devoted to 
theory testing: propositions are generated based on extant theory and empirical 
support for them is assessed. It should be noted that the research question of 
Article 1 is slightly different to the research question 1 of this dissertation. The 
modification was made to focus on the study’s results that are relevant for 
informing the management of radical innovation. 
5.4 Case selection 
Case studies, particularly those with theory generation or elaboration goals, 
typically rely on theoretical sampling, where the cases are selected based on 
Methodology 
59 
theoretical, not statistical, reasons (Eisenhardt, 1989). Information-rich cases 
are sought to provide a good fit with the questions under study (Patton, 2002). 
Cases may be informative for several reasons. They may be “extreme cases”, 
which are interesting because they are unusual or special in ways that provide 
valuable learning opportunities (Patton, 2002). In management research, 
companies which have performed extremely well, such as Toyota (Dyer & 
Nobeoka, 2000), have been considered valuable. In a like manner, dramatic 
failures can offer important lessons. An example of such a case is the 
investigation of Nokia’s rapid downfall from a leadership position in mobile 
phones (Vuori & Huy, 2016). Intensity sampling is an alternative approach 
which seeks informative-rich cases that are not extremely unusual but still 
reflect the phenomenon under study intensively (Patton, 2002). Including 
multiple cases in the same study provides further alternatives for sampling. The 
cases may be chosen to maximize variety in order to describe central themes 
that apply across diverse settings or to minimize variety to describe a particular 
setting in depth (Patton, 2002; Yin, 2009). Other sampling approaches include, 
for example, choosing typical cases, selecting all cases that meet predefined 
criteria, or purposely using random sampling (Patton, 2002). All of these 
strategies can be useful as long as they fit the purpose of the study. 
All the empirical studies in this dissertation adopt intensity sampling as the 
main guiding principle in case selection. Knowledge about potential cases is 
gathered by reading public company documents and having discussions with 
company representatives. The cases are selected based on their being 
informative of the management of radical innovation (Article 3, Article 4), 
digital innovation (Article 1), and open innovation in a low R&D context (Article 
2), and hence match the respective research questions. In some studies, the aim 
is also to focus on a particular setting in more depth. This applies to Article 1, 
which concentrated on B2B companies that produce complex technical 
products, and Article 4, where companies of relatively large size were chosen. 
Furthermore, Article 3 takes a step towards extreme sampling logic as it focuses 
on the steel industry, where the emergence of radical innovations is particularly 
rare. The studied projects in Article 3 are also chosen to contrast each other: one 
of the projects was successful and one failed and they also had different origins.  
5.5 Data collection 
Interviews are the primary data collection method used in all of the studies. The 
interviews were semi-structured (open-ended), which means that lists of 
themes to be explored were prepared to guide the interviews. In semi-structured 
interviews, detailed lists of interview questions are not always present and the 
interviewers are allowed to adjust their questions or add new questions based 
on the interviewees’ answers. The advantage of this approach is that it allows 
the researcher to advance to new topics based on the interviewee’s responses, 
which enables flexibility and openness to unexpected findings (Patton, 2002).  
Intensity sampling was used for locating informative interviewees (Patton, 
2002). In practice, this means locating individuals with previous experience of 
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the investigated topics and/or positions in the organizations that make them 
sufficiently knowledgeable to inform the research process. In Article 1 and 
Article 3, intensity sampling was complemented with snowball sampling. 
Snowball sampling is a sampling strategy where the initial sample is expanded 
by asking the interviewees to suggest new information-rich informants (Patton, 
2002). The procedure may then be repeated by asking the new informants new 
suggestions. Snowball sampling is particularly valuable when the suitable 
informants are difficult to identify based on predefined criteria (Hennink et al., 
2010). In addition to interview data, various documents, such as internal 
correspondence, process diagrams, and organizational charts (Article 3), as well 
as public strategy documents, annual reviews, and company presentations 
(Article 1; Article 2) were used to gain wider support for the findings and 
increase contextual understanding of the cases.  
Some authors propose that data collection should be continued until 
theoretical saturation is reached, that is, until no new insights arise from the 
data (Glaser & Strauss, 2009; Hennink et al., 2010). In the studies in this 
dissertation, the aim was to acquire data until the research themes were 
explored thoroughly and in detail. The concept of theoretical saturation is, 
however, ambiguous and the point where a sufficient amount of data is collected 
is difficult to define (Bowen, 2008; Guest et al., 2006). Moreover, case studies 
may include moving back and forth between different research phases (Dubois 
& Gadde, 2002). Therefore, a sample which was initially thought to be saturated 
may need to be supplemented if new perspectives arise in the analysis phase. 
This was the case in Article 2, in which an additional interview was conducted 
after the initial analysis. 
Several measures were taken to make the most of the interviews (Patton, 
2002). The interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim. This is 
beneficial, as it ensures that the interviewee’s perspective is captured as fully 
and fairly as possible and helps overcome the limits and biases of the 
interviewer’s attention and memory. Notes were taken during the interviews to 
help formulate new questions based on the interviewee’s earlier responses and 
stimulate early insights. Immediately after an interview, the interviewers shared 
their observations with each other and discussed ideas and interpretations that 
emerged. This was also valuable for reflecting and evaluating the suitability of 
the interview questions used and the need for more interviews. On some 
occasions, the interviewees were later contacted by e-mail or telephone to clarify 
areas of ambiguity. 
5.6 Data analysis 
The data analysis phase included two distinct tasks: within-case analysis and 
cross-case analysis. First, the cases were analysed individually, and then cross-
case patterns were identified (Eisenhardt, 1989). Within-case analyses started 
with thorough reading of the interview transcripts and other data for the 
purposes of becoming familiar with each case. In Article 2 and Article 3, which 
included project-level analysis, detailed project descriptions were written. Then, 
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the data was coded using the Atlas.ti computer program. Coding is a process 
where the data is selected, separated, sorted, and labelled to define what it is 
about (Charmaz, 2006). Computer-assisted qualitative data analysis enables 
the systematic use of the whole data set by forcing the researcher to be explicit 
in defining the codes and categories and making the links between codes and 
data more transparent (Kelle, 2004). 
The analysis in Article 3 began with data-driven coding (Gibbs, 2008), in 
which events, actions, outcomes, and mechanisms were identified and labelled 
during the analysis. The goal was to find important elements from the case 
without applying a predefined framework. The reason was that, at that time, the 
eventual theoretical framing of the study had not been decided. Understanding 
of the cases was increased to direct the search for a framework (Dubois & Gadde, 
2002). 
Theory-driven coding was a key analysis method in all studies. It is based on 
a predefined set of codes that are derived from the literature and applied to the 
data (Gibbs, 2008). The advantage of theory-driven coding is that it provides a 
transparent way of moving from data to theoretical constructs (Yin, 2009). 
When the goal is to elaborate or test existing theory it is important to ensure 
that the data is actually related to the frameworks and constructs used. In all 
studies, transparency was further increased by presenting direct quotations 
from the interviews to show evidence that the findings are grounded in data. 
Theory-driven coding does not rule out the inclusion of inductive elements in 
the coding process (Gibbs, 2008). In all studies, new codes were created during 
the analysis to allow the emergence of new ideas and ways of categorizing the 
data. 
Next, cross-case analysis was conducted. In cross-case analysis, similarities 
and differences between different cases are searched to identify patterns and 
boundary conditions (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2009). Comparison between cases 
is valuable for building explanations and testing them in systematic ways (Miles 
& Huberman, 1994). A common way of conducting the comparisons is to build 
tables in which the cases are arranged based on chosen variables (Miles & 
Huberman, 1994). For example, the analysis in Article 1 included building tables 
where the rows were determined by different types of management practices 
and evidence from each case was collected in separate columns. From such a 
table, it is easy to identify commonalities between the cases on which the 
findings of a study may be based. In Article 3, a similar approach allowed the 
identification of differences in the use of specific social integration mechanisms 
between the two studied projects. 
Theoretical (and practical) contributions may be formulated by comparing the 
results of the analyses to existing theory. It is important to ensure that the 
findings reflect the data accurately. During the formulation of the contributions, 
the findings should be iteratively compared to the data (Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007) and new data collected if needed (Dubois & 
Gadde, 2002). Particular attention was paid to this issue in all studies, and the 
data was revisited multiple times to ensure that the findings are supported by 
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data. Next, more details about the methodologies of the individual articles are 
presented. 
5.7 Summary of the methodology of Article 1 
In Article 1, the selection of the case companies started by defining an empirical 
context which would provide a fruitful setting in which to investigate the 
emerging practices of digital innovation. Consequently, B2B companies that 
produce complex technical products and are concerned with digital innovation 
were chosen from the heavy manufacturing industry. This setting was 
considered suitable because of the recent diffusion of new digital technologies 
in the industry (Lasi et al., 2014; Radziwon et al., 2014; Xu, 2012). Based on 
these criteria, three companies were chosen that are referred to as Company 1, 
Company 2, and Company 3 for reasons of confidentiality (see Table 7 for an 
overview). The companies are all multinational manufacturing companies with 
headquarters in Europe. Radical innovation in the context of this study refers 
primarily to competence-destroying innovations targeted to existing markets. 
Radical digital innovations were considered to have the potential to change the 
industry’s business models, create major leaps in performance, and/or 
transform how the products are used. While such radical innovations had high 
technological novelty the companies’ main concern was dealing with market 
uncertainty related to the demand for radical innovations by the existing 
customers. 
To ensure the companies’ interest towards digital innovation, their attitudes 
toward and current positions related to digital innovation were evaluated by 
reviewing public strategy documents, annual reviews, and public presentations 
by key innovation and strategy managers, and by means of discussions with firm 
representatives. The companies were found to differ in terms of the maturity of 
their digital innovation processes: Company 1 had not yet launched any large-
scale digital innovation projects but was experimenting with digital 
technologies and building a future vision for taking advantage of the 
opportunities digital innovation offers. Company 2, on the other hand, had 
chosen digital innovation as a key strategic element, as manifested in its high 
level of investment in digital innovation projects of significant size and 
restructuring of innovation practices to support digital innovation processes. 
Company 3 was involved in digital innovation but was hindered by unresolved 
challenges related to customers’ privacy concerns and access to users. Managers 
in Company 3 were also concerned that, because of the company’s large size, it 
will not be sufficiently flexible to adapt to the changing needs of the market. 
They perceived digital innovation in the form of virtual simulation processes as 
crucial for their product development process, for enhancing their products’ 
digital capabilities and for creating interfaces between manufacturers and 
customers with the vision of creating a digital factory.  
Company 1 develops a wide range of marine systems and components related 
to power and propulsion, automation, and control. At the time of the study, the 
company was envisioning how to use digital technologies to provide new 
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features for ships, such as remote control, intelligent bridge control, and lower 
power demand. Their customers include ship companies that own and operate 
freight, passenger, fishing, and military ships. Users include ship captains and 
the technical personnel who operate the technologies. Company 2 provides 
automation and control systems and processing technologies for industrial 
customers that operate in industries like chemical, oil, pulp and paper, power 
generation, and mining. Typical users of Company 2 are production plant 
operators and power plant operators. Company 3’s offering is a diverse product 
portfolio in the B2B sector, ranging from large-scale plants and component 
technologies to marine systems. The firm’s customers are large organizations, 
and users are employees working in the customers’ organizations. Typical users 
are operators of production plants.  
Table 7. Article 1 data set. 
Company pseudonym Company 1 Company 2 Company 3 
No. of interviews 9 12 9 
Industry Marine products Automation and systems 
technologies 
Plant and component 
technologies 
Employees 12 000 16 000 157 000 
 
The main data collection method was semi-structured interviews with thirty 
experts. The interviews with Company 3 were conducted by phone, while those 
for Company 1 and Company 2 were conducted face-to-face. The interview 
themes were based on the investigation of the potential of using customer 
knowledge and user knowledge in developing digital innovations. The first 
interview guide was open-ended so the research themes could be explored 
without being structured too tightly. After the first round of interviews, the 
interview guide was refined to deepen the discussion of emerging topics and to 
increase the findings’ reliability (Yin, 2009). The refined interview guide is 
presented in Table 8. All interviews were recorded and transcribed verbatim. 
Multiple sources of evidence, such as public strategy documents, annual 
reviews, and public presentations, were used to generate more robust findings. 
The first interviews were conducted with managers who had a good overview 
of the innovation activities in the companies. Then, employees who were 
involved with digital innovation in the company were identified. Selecting 
interviewees in advance based on their departments or job titles was an 
unsuitable approach for several reasons: innovation often relies on cross-
functional collaboration to reach shared goals (Luca & Atuahene-Gima, 2007), 
and the ownership of digital innovation activities varies from company to 
company (e.g., between IT and R&D departments) (Ashurst et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, not all employees in a particular department are knowledgeable 
about the roles of customers and users in digital innovation. Therefore, snowball 
sampling was used to identify the appropriate informants (Patton, 2002). The 
primary contacts were asked who would be the best people to talk with about 
relevant topics, thereby adding new informants to our sample. Data collection 
was continued until additional data resulted only in minimal new information. 
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Table 8. Refined interview guide used in Article 1. 
Interview theme Questions 
Details about 
the interviewee 
 
? What is your position and area of responsibility? 
? What is the product your business unit is offering? 
? How long have you worked in this position? How have you worked in the 
company? 
? What is your educational background? 
? Who do you work with within the company? 
? Do you have direct user/customer contact? 
? Which stages of the innovation process does your area of responsibility cover? 
Can you shortly describe the process? 
Users and 
customers 
? Who are the users of the product?  
? Who are the customers of the product? 
? What kind information/knowledge do you need from users/customers in your 
innovation processes? 
o How is it currently made available? Is there a link to operations? 
? How do you utilise the user/customer knowledge from operations of a previous 
project in the innovation process? / What do you do with the information you got 
from users/customers? 
o What format does the user/customer knowledge need to have to be 
useful for you to apply it in the innovation process? 
o When would you need user/customer knowledge? Are there specific 
times in the innovation process when you would need the information? 
o Do the information requirements change throughout the projects?  
? What kind of tools and/or structured ways are used to access user/customer 
knowledge? (e.g. a database) 
? Where and how is user/customer knowledge stored or documented? 
? How is user/customer information is distributed in the organisation? 
? What attributes would a user/customer knowledge system need to have to 
include user/customer knowledge in the innovation process?  
Digitization ? How do you understand digitization in the manufacturing industries? 
? How does increasing digitization in the manufacturing industries change your 
firm’s way of doing business? 
o Does digitization create new opportunities for innovation? 
? What kind of innovation? Incremental vs radical? 
o Does digitization pose threats to your business? 
? What kind of strategies can be used to overcome the threats? 
? How does digitization help or promote innovation activities? 
? How digitization will/has change(d) your innovation processes? 
? How does digitization affect your own work? 
? How does digitization change the role of users/customers in the innovation 
process?  
? Does utilisation of user/customers knowledge in increasing digitization lead 
towards new opportunities? 
o If yes, how? 
 
In Company 1, most of the informants were design managers and design 
specialists who performed development work but were not in contact with 
customers or users themselves. Their responsibilities, that is, to renew their 
product offerings to meet market demand, were similar to those of R&D 
managers in the other companies. In Company 2, most of the data was collected 
from two R&D teams. The first team focused on hardware, while the second 
team focused on software. The interviewees, who had titles like R&D manager 
and R&D director, were suggested based on their wide view of the firm’s digital 
innovation activities. Employees in R&D who were knowledgeable about 
customer knowledge or user knowledge were also interviewed based on 
suggestions. The first couple of interviews revealed that the firm was in the 
process of implementing a new company-level strategy in which digital 
innovation is a significant element. This information led to interviews with two 
top managers who were closely involved in formulating the new strategy. 
Whereas digital innovation was primarily the R&D/design teams’ responsibility 
in Company 1 and Company 2, the IT department had a bigger role in Company 
3. The primary contact person, a senior IT manager who served as the entry 
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point into the organization, suggested suitable employees who were concerned 
with digital innovation in the organization, which covered the developed 
products from the IT and R&D perspectives.  
Following a replication logic (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; Yin, 2009), 
qualitative data analysis programs and a coding scheme deduced from the 
interview guide were used to analyse each case individually. The research team 
members discussed the findings of each case, and emergent topics led to an 
iteration of the coding scheme. With this updated coding scheme, the caseses 
were analysed again. The coded data formed the base for cross-case analyses, 
during which the data was revisited in an iterative process and emerging 
findings collected into tables. Thus, the analysis process focused on matching 
patterns across the cases and building explanations for what occurred in the 
data. 
5.8 Summary of the methodology of Article 2 
For the purposes of the study, a company which introduces innovative products 
and services and relies on its suppliers instead of internal R&D in doing so was 
sought in Article 2. Fortum, a multinational energy utility company was selected 
on the basis that it is innovative, has low R&D intensity, and puts a high priority 
on collaborating with suppliers for innovation. Fortum can be described as a 
scale intensive company (Trott, 2005), whose assets mainly consist of process 
technology and whose internal capabilities involve design, engineering, and 
operations, rather than intensive R&D. New products and services typically 
emerge through the commercialisation of technologies developed by suppliers. 
The competitive advantage of a scale intensive company is derived from lower 
operating costs compared to competitors. According to the OECD definition 
(IPTS, 2015), Fortum qualifies as a low R&D intensive company on the basis of 
having R&D expenditures of less than 1% of sales (0.9% in 2014). In general, 
high R&D intensive companies may invest well over 10% of their sales in R&D. 
The R&D intensity of Google, for example, was as high as 14.9% in 2014 (IPTS, 
2015). 
Fortum produces and markets energy and heat for consumers and business 
customers, the main market being in the Nordic countries. Its production 
portfolio utilises several energy sources, hydropower, nuclear power, and it runs 
combined heat and power plants. Fortum aims at improving its competitiveness 
in climate issues and reductions in CO2 emissions. The company’s strategy is to 
strengthen and streamline its core businesses, but at the same time it has a 
strong need to find new business areas based on various emerging technologies 
and energy sources, pressured by environmental legislation and international 
agreements. The company actively searches for ways to build new 
environmentally-benign power generation based on renewable energy sources: 
solar, wind, and wave power.  
Fortum has chosen to maintain internal technology development in one of the 
core business segments but new business development relies solely on 
suppliers’ technological solutions. The corporate R&D unit focuses on designing 
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and piloting new product types and business models instead of developing new 
technologies. Fortum considers open innovation as a means to introduce 
innovations at a rapid pace without major investments into internal R&D. 
Table 9. Case selection in Article 2. 
 Technological novelty Strategic importance Supplier involvement   The case should concern an 
innovation project with 
technological innovation 
with commercial targets. 
The case should be of 
strategic importance to 
Fortum. 
The case should involve a 
supplier with a significant 
innovator role. 
Case Heat New technology that 
reduces customers’ energy 
costs. 
New business area 
connected to the energy 
consumption of households. 
Supplier Bravo was the 
sole technology provider 
and has patented the 
solution. 
Case 
Solar  
New technology that lowers 
the threshold to apply solar 
power. 
New business area, 
connected to utilising solar 
energy in households. 
Supplier Charlie 
developed the actual 
technological solution, the 
original idea and need for 
it came from Fortum. 
Case Bio New technology that refines 
a side stream of a raw 
material into a saleable 
product. 
Core business area, 
connected to power plant 
efficiency. 
Supplier Delta developed 
the refining process.  
Case 
Carbon 
New technology that saves 
the environment and lowers 
EU emission trading costs. 
Core business area, 
connected to power plant 
emissions. 
Supplier Echo developed 
a process to cut the 
emissions. 
 
The selection of the cases was initiated through discussions with the Vice 
President of Procurement, Chief Technology Officer, and other personnel 
related to innovation and supply management. First, an initial list of 50 major 
collaborative innovation projects with suppliers during the years 2009–2015 
was gathered from public sources, such as company stock exchange releases. 
The projects were then reviewed with the company representatives and 
shortlisted based on three criteria: technological novelty, strategic importance, 
and supplier involvement (Table 9), to fit the topic of substituting internal R&D 
with supplier innovation. Four case projects were selected, two of which aimed 
at the renewal of the company’s core businesses (Cases Bio and Carbon) with 
radical technological competence-enhancing innovations and two (Cases Heat 
and Solar), which aimed at the introduction of new business areas with Fortum 
and provide their existing customers novel products with potentially disruptive 
effects on the energy markets (McDowall, 2017). In all cases new technology 
developed by a supplier, was applied. Two of the cases (Case Heat and Case 
Solar) address the development of new-to-the-market products and two of them 
(Case Bio and Case Carbon) new-to-the-world products. They all therefore fulfil 
the definition of radical innovation as defined in this dissertation.  
Multiple data collection methods were combined. Informal meetings, 
presentations, and company reports were used to ground the research. 
Interviewing was the main data collection method; the main data consists of 
qualitative data from 18 interviews (Table 10). Informants were selected using 
a purposive sampling technique — i.e. identifying key people related to the 
innovation projects. Typically, these people were located in the case company’s 
R&D and procurement units. Furthermore, the informants were asked to 
identify subsequent informants from the supplier companies, who were also 
interviewed. This was considered important since the literature on open 
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innovation with suppliers is dominated by studies which consider only the 
buyer’s perspective (Chung & Kim, 2003) and one-sided investigations may 
result in limited or biased understanding about the impact of the buyer’s 
actions. The positions of the interviewees vary from case to case due to different 
compositions of the project teams of a) Fortum and b) of the suppliers, and c) 
varying levels of access to the suppliers.  
Table 10. Article 2 data set. 
Company name Fortum 
No. of interviews Case Heat interviews: 3 
Case Solar interviews: 4  
Case Bio interviews: 3 
Case Carbon interviews: 3 
General interviews: 5 
Total interviews: 18 
Industry Energy 
Employees 8 000 
 
The interviews were semi-structured and four researchers participated in data 
collection. Data collection instruments included the following sections: 
interviewee information, case background, and semi-structured questions 
about the collaborative innovation project. The interview guide covered 
questions about the novelty of the innovation and its significance to Fortum’s 
strategy, the capabilities of each party, and how each phase of the projects was 
managed (Table 11).  
Table 11. Interview guide in Article 2. 
Interview theme Questions 
Interviewee 
profile 
? Name, title, and organisation  
? Position in the organisation during the case project  
? Work history  
Case profile ? Describe the innovation project. 
? What business area and supply management category does this project belong 
to?  
? Who is the primary customer for this innovation?  
? Who was (were) the primary supplier(s) for this innovation?  
? What was the origin of the innovation idea (e.g. internal party, existing supplier, 
new supplier)  
? Describe the novelty of this innovation 
? How did this innovation effort relate to the company’s technology strategy?  
? Who at your organisation and your supplier’s organisation were involved in 
establishing the business relationship?  
? How was the process of supply market intelligence conducted? 
? What tools/processes were used with suppliers in creating and evaluating the 
business case?  
? What kind of formal contracts were in place before a formal investment decision?  
? When and how was final investment decision made?  
? Who at your organisation and your supplier’s organisation were involved in the 
project? 
? What did each party bring to the project?  
? What was the contractual model used for this project?  
? How was IPR managed, and what was the role of IPR in the case?  
? How the supplier relationship was managed?  
? How did the level of technical competence in your company affect the 
collaboration?  
? How systematic was the collaboration between the project and the supply 
management employees?  
? How useful was supply management knowledge regarding the innovation case?  
? How much did the collaboration with a supplier affect the outcome of the project?  
? How did your company culture affect the collaboration? 
? How would you evaluate the success of the project?  
? What could have been improved in this collaboration?  
The same questionnaire in a modified form was used when interviewing the supplier companies.  
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The data analysis proceeded in three phases. First, a within-case analysis was 
conducted based on the interview data and supplementary material. The cases 
were processed into the form of detailed case study write-ups. The aim was to 
understand different phase of the innovation processes, what the innovations 
were about, how they were managed, and what each party’s role was. 
After the initial analysis, the attention was shifted back to the literature and 
theory which would explain our emerging findings was looked for. 
Consequently, the the absorptive capacity process framework was adopted 
(Zahra & George, 2002). The view of what our cases are, therefore, evolved 
throughout the process as understanding of the empirical context and its 
compatibility with theoretical concepts increased (Dubois & Araujo, 2007; 
Dubois & Salmi, 2016). At this point, an additional interview was conducted to 
find answers to questions that had arisen during the process. This interview 
focused particularly on Fortum’s capabilities and how they might be utilised 
differently in cases when internal R&D is substituted with supplier innovations 
compared to areas where Fortum has strong internal R&D. The case 
descriptions were then revisited and the initial findings were matched to the 
four capabilities related to the absorptive capacity process. Existing 
operationalisations were relied on to link the interview data and themes which 
emerged from the interviews with corresponding capabilities (Table 12). In this 
manner, the analysis process moved back and forth between theory and data 
and thus resembled the abductive process of inquiry (Dubois & Gadde, 2002, 
2014). 
Table 12. Indicators of absorptive capacity capabilities and related interview themes. 
Indicators proposed in the literature Interview themes 
Acquisition 
? Ability to detect opportunities in the environment 
(Noblet et al., 2011). 
? Openness towards the environment (Camisón & 
Forés, 2010) 
? Proactive discovery of new opportunities to be 
exploited (Forés & Camisón, 2016) 
? Supply market intelligence. 
? Technology scanning. 
? Identifying and evaluating external 
technologies. 
Assimilation 
? Ability to use employees’ knowledge, experience and 
competency in the assimilation and interpretation of 
new knowledge  (Forés & Camisón, 2016) 
? Integration of external knowledge (Noblet et al., 2011) 
? Individuals that are highly capable at understanding 
external technologies (Nemanich et al., 2010) 
? Internal technical competences. 
? Sharing of technological knowledge. 
? In-depth learning about new 
technologies. 
Transformation 
? Firm’s capability to adapt technologies designed by 
others to its particular needs (Forés & Camisón, 
2016) 
? Ability to understand the consequences of changing 
market demands in terms of new products and 
services (Jansen et al., 2005; Leal-Rodríguez et al., 
2014) 
? Ability to challenge established thinking or practices 
(Noblet et al., 2011) 
? Formulating a business model. 
? Agreeing on a commercial vision. 
? IPR ownership. 
? Contract negotiations. 
Exploitation 
? Application of external knowledge (Noblet et al., 2011) 
? Achievement of organisational goals (Noblet et al., 
2011) 
? The project has clear division of roles and 
responsibilities (Popaitoon & Siengthai, 2014) 
? Product introductions. 
? Project success. 
? Operational roles and responsibilities. 
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In the third phase, the findings were compared across cases. The focus was on 
the four capabilities derived from the framework, and technique of pattern 
coding was used to enable cross-case comparisons (Miles et al., 2013). The 
coding was based on spreadsheets, tables, and graphical presentations, where 
the cases were compared according to the selected categories to create in-depth 
understanding of each case and their similarities and differences. Four 
researchers participated in the coding and analyses of the cases. The analyses 
were a highly interactive collaborative effort among multiple researchers with 
frequent discussions to reach consensus in coding and in drawing conclusions. 
5.9 Summary of the methodology of Article 3 
Article 3 investigates Steel Inc., which has a steady market position, a successful 
track record in introducing incremental innovations, and some experience in 
developing radical ideas into innovative products and processes. It was selected 
for the study for several reasons. First, it is an incumbent company interested 
in developing radical innovations, which allows investigation of tensions 
between core capabilities and renewal (Leonard-Barton, 1992). Second, it 
provided access to two radical innovation projects originating from unusual idea 
sources enabling the investigation of a novel context. The ideas can be 
considered as competence-enhancing technological inventions. They were also 
associated with high market uncertainties related both to existing markets and 
new market segments. Third, the case comprises one successful and one failed 
project which diminishes survivorship bias that could arise from focusing only 
on success stories. Fourth, the industry context is considered to be very 
challenging for the development of radical innovations. Studying such extreme 
circumstances is likely to provide novel insights (Yin, 2003). 
Table 13. Article 3 data set. 
Company pseudonym Steel Inc. 
No. of interviews Project 1 interviews: 7  
Project 2 interviews: 6  
General interviews: 8 
Total interviews: 21 
Industry Steel 
Employees 7 000 
 
The main data collection method was semi-structured interviews with involved 
employees and the inventors (Table 13). In selecting the interviewees, the first 
step was to ask a senior R&D Director to identify relevant employees. To ensure 
that all relevant informants were found, snowball sampling was also used 
(Patton, 2002). After the end of each interview, the interviewees were asked who 
else is knowledgeable about the development of the ideas, thereby adding new 
informants to the sample (Lewis-Beck et al., 2004). The interview guide (Table 
14) covered the treatment of ideas from external sources, details of the projects, 
and general questions about the innovation management system in use. It 
should be noted that the word “project” is here used in a broad sense including 
events that occurred both before and after official project statuses were granted 
for the development of the ideas. This covers informal and formal activities from 
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the fuzzy front-end (Koen et al., 2005) to new product development and 
commercialization. 
Total of 21 interviews, lasting typically between 1 and 2 hours, were conducted, 
recorded, and transcribed verbatim. At least two researchers participated in all 
interviews. The company also provided access to additional data (total amount 
of ~100 sheets) which included internal memos and e-mail correspondence 
which increased understanding about the projects, as well as process diagrams 
and organizational charts which illustrated the innovation management system 
in use.  
The projects were first analysed individually as suggested by Yin (2009). 
Descriptions of them were written to create coherent representations of the 
chains of events. Both the interview transcripts and relevant documents were 
coded. At first, the data was coded inductively in a data-driven fashion (Namey 
et al., 2008). An important guiding principle at this stage was to identify events, 
actions, and their outcomes in the idea journeys and the interviewees’ 
explanations of their driving forces and inhibitors.  
Table 14. Interview guide used in Article 3. 
Interview theme Questions 
Details about 
the interviewee 
? How long have you worked at Steel Inc.? 
? What is your role in the company? 
Ideas from 
external sources 
? How often do you receive ideas from outside the R&D unit? 
? What are the ideas typically like? 
? How do the ideas find their ways to the unit? 
? How are the ideas treated? 
? How are they evaluated? 
? Which factors affect whether the ideas are further developed? 
? What are the strengths and weaknesses of the current methods? 
? Can you give concrete examples related to such ideas? 
? In what ways are external ideas treated differently from internal ideas? 
? Why are they treated differently? 
? What is the general attitude towards external ideas? Why? 
Project-specific 
questions 
? What was the origin of the idea? 
? When did you became aware of the idea? 
? What was your first impression of the idea? 
? What has been your role in the project? 
? What has happened to the idea in the organization?  
? What has been done right? Is there room for improvement somewhere? 
? How has the idea been evaluated? 
? How would you evaluate the idea’s fit with the company’s portfolio? 
? Who has made decisions about the idea? 
? Who have you discussed about the idea? 
? Was the idea representative of external ideas that you receive? 
? Was there motivation to develop the idea in the organization? 
? What was the status of the project compared to other innovation projects? 
? How novel was the idea? How high was its potential? 
? How did the novelty influence its reception? 
? What kind of risks were associated with the idea? 
? Were potential applications for the idea searched for? By whom? If not, why? 
? How did the origin of the idea influence its reception? 
Innovation 
management 
system 
Open-ended questions on aspects of the company’s innovation management 
system: 
? Organizational structures 
? Cross-functional collaboration 
? External relationships 
? Innovation strategy  
? Innovation processes 
? Organizational culture 
? Measurement 
? Management practices 
? Human resources 
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Selective coding (Strauss, 1987) was used to understand the data in light of the 
existing frameworks of absorptive capacity capabilities and social integration 
mechanisms. The analysis proceeded by matching different events in the 
projects with the four absorptive capacity capabilities and assessing the levels 
of the absorptive capacity capabilities. This phase was strongly guided by extant 
literature. Studies on absorptive capacity capabilities were investigated to 
generate a list of indicators which suggest high capability levels. These 
indicators helped operationalize the capabilities and identify elements in the 
projects that could be used to evaluate capability levels in the context of this 
study. Table 15 shows how literature on absorptive capacity capabilities was 
used to interpret the interview data. To understand how different absorptive 
capacity capabilities performed in the projects their levels were assessed by 
looking for comments which indicated high or low success in key elements 
associated with each capability. If multiple informants argued that, for example, 
the managers were not initially interested in the proposed ideas (Cegarra-
Navarro & Sánchez-Polo, 2008; Cepeda-Carrion et al., 2012; Forés & Camisón, 
2016; Hurley & Hult, 1998) this was considered to support the evaluation of low 
acquisition capability in the project. If there were both positive and negative 
assessments of a capability in the context of a specific project without a clear 
majority towards either direction, the capability level was considered to be 
medium. 
Table 15. Examples of identified social integration mechanisms with illustrative quotations. 
Social 
integration 
mechanism 
Category Illustrative quotations 
Shared 
language, 
background, 
and 
education 
Socialisation 
mechanisms 
“Those who tinker around in their garage are better equipped to interact 
with this kind of person than those who have spent their career in a 
laboratory looking through a microscope.” 
 
“They have been interested but I don’t always know how to validate my 
idea. Many times there’s a language barrier, they speak a different 
language than us. I haven’t had a formal education of any kind so I have a 
different way of expression.” 
Practices for 
knowledge 
transfer 
Coordination 
mechanisms 
“It’s amazing how well our coffee room discussions advance the 
development projects. There’s several ongoing discussions all the time, and 
that’s how the knowledge is transmitted. Of course some of the knowledge 
is irrelevant but some of it is extremely valuable.” 
 
“We have an ongoing informal meeting procedure, like a brainstorming 
session for current topics. When people have ideas, thoughts, problems, or 
technical stuff there’s the whole group advising and supporting them.” 
Boundary 
spanners 
Coordination 
mechanisms 
“The kind of person who can really set things in motion in the organization. 
By being at halfway between us and the management he has a position 
with good opportunities to influence others. He uses slogans and simplifies 
and exaggerates things a bit so that everybody understands him.” 
 
“He is capable of winning people over and getting things done. It’s 
important to know your way around the informal organization hierarchies 
and know who might be sympathetic for the idea and should be invited to 
meetings.” 
Formalisation Systems 
mechanisms 
“The strict non-disclosure agreement is a problem for our organization since 
we can’t discuss almost anything with our colleagues. Usually we talk and 
speculate about the projects openly. It promotes them and generates 
theories and shared understanding. If we have to be silent, that doesn’t 
happen.” 
 
“Non-disclosure agreements don’t fit to our culture. If we aren’t allowed to 
discuss ideas, a major innovation factor is wasted. Also, it doesn’t motivate 
since for me and many others it is very inspiring to discuss with colleagues 
and pour out problems to them.” 
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Table 16. Indicators, key project elements, and illustrative quotations of absorptive capacity 
capabilities 
Indicators proposed in the literature Key elements in the case 
projects 
Illustrative quotations and 
related capability 
assessments 
Acquisition 
? Ability identify and quickly acquire 
knowledge (Ritala & Hurmelinna-
Laukkanen, 2013; Roberts, 2015) 
? Ability to detect opportunities in 
the environment (Noblet et al., 
2011) 
? Effective routines to identify, 
value, and import new knowledge 
(Roberts, 2015) 
? Effort to increase the number of 
our information sources (Ritala & 
Hurmelinna-Laukkanen, 2013) 
? Innovation is readily accepted in 
programme/project management 
(Cepeda-Carrion et al., 2012; 
Hurley & Hult, 1998) 
? Management that actively seeks 
innovative ideas (Cepeda-Carrion 
et al., 2012; Hurley & Hult, 1998) 
? Management that has tried to 
initiate projects and introduce 
innovations (Cegarra-Navarro & 
Sánchez-Polo, 2008; Cepeda-
Carrion et al., 2012) 
? Managers that are open to new 
ideas and new ways of doing 
things (Cegarra-Navarro & 
Sánchez-Polo, 2008; Cepeda-
Carrion et al., 2012) 
? Openness towards the 
environment (Camisón & Forés, 
2010) 
? Proactive discovery of new 
opportunities to be exploited 
(Forés & Camisón, 2016) 
? Gaining access to radical 
ideas from different 
sources. 
? Managerial interest in 
radical ideas at different 
hierarchical levels. 
? Recognizing the initial 
value of radical ideas. 
“I proposed my idea to the 
managers but was outright 
rejected with references to 
metallurgy theory and the 
latest advances in the 
industry. It became clear to 
me that I was wrong and the 
idea was unfeasible.” 
(indicates low acquisition 
capability) 
 
“Our CEO received a letter 
from the inventor and took 
the idea seriously from the 
very beginning. He then sent 
a couple of specialists to 
visit him and discuss 
potential collaboration.” 
(indicates high acquisition 
capability) 
Assimilation 
? Ability to quickly understand new 
opportunities to serve clients 
(Jansen et al., 2005) 
? Ability to use employees’ 
knowledge, experience and 
competency in the assimilation 
and interpretation of new 
knowledge (Forés & Camisón, 
2016) 
? Assimilation of the external 
knowledge and its intrinsic value 
(Noblet et al., 2011) 
? Capability to assimilate new 
technologies and innovations that 
are useful or have proven potential 
(Forés & Camisón, 2016) 
? Human resources (Camisón & 
Forés, 2010) 
? Involvement in spreading 
knowledge (Camisón & Forés, 
2010) 
? Managers that recognize the value 
of new information, assimilate it 
and apply it (Cegarra-Navarro & 
Sánchez-Polo, 2008; Cepeda-
Carrion et al., 2012) 
 
? Investigating technological 
and commercial aspects of 
the idea. 
? Conducting manufacturing 
tests.  
? Leveraging relevant 
knowledge, experience 
and competency in 
understanding the idea. 
“We had to conduct the first 
manufacturing test in secret 
because we couldn’t get a 
permission for it. Others 
explicitly opposed the idea: if 
it was possible someone 
else would have invented it 
already.” (indicates low 
assimilation capability) 
 
“We examined the material 
samples to see if some 
special properties emerge 
through heat treatment. The 
thing is, however, that these 
metallurgical studies rarely 
reveal anything that we don’t 
already know from the 
literature. We could of 
course outsource 
manufacturing tests to our 
partners with suitable 
equipment but that approach 
is not very attractive as it 
requires more resources and 
is risky.” (indicates low 
assimilation capability) 
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Transformation 
? Ability to challenge established 
thinking or practices (Noblet et al., 
2011) 
? Ability to quickly recognize the 
usefulness of new external 
knowledge to existing knowledge 
(Jansen et al., 2005; Leal-
Rodríguez et al., 2014; Popaitoon 
& Siengthai, 2014) 
? Ability to understand the 
consequences of changing market 
demands in terms of new products 
and services (Jansen et al., 2005; 
Leal-Rodríguez et al., 2014) 
? Awareness of the firm’s 
competencies in innovation, and 
the capability to eliminate obsolete 
internal knowledge which 
stimulates the search for 
alternative innovations (Forés & 
Camisón, 2016; Noblet et al., 
2011) 
? Capability to co-ordinate and 
integrate all phases of the R&D 
process and its inter-relationships 
with the functional tasks of 
engineering, production and 
marketing (Forés & Camisón, 
2016) 
? Firm’s capability to adapt 
technologies designed by others 
to its particular needs (Forés & 
Camisón, 2016) 
? Informal conversations in the 
organization that involve 
commercial activity (Jiménez-
Barrionuevo et al., 2011) 
? Periodical meetings to discuss the 
consequences of market trends 
and NDP (Jansen et al., 2005; 
Leal-Rodríguez et al., 2014; 
Popaitoon & Siengthai, 2014) 
? Renewal capability (Camisón & 
Forés, 2010) 
? Rethinking the company’s 
scope. 
? Finding new application 
areas. 
“Since it’s such a novel thing 
it competes with other 
projects which have more 
data available to support 
them, are closer to our own 
process, and can be 
implemented with our 
current equipment or with 
just small changes.” 
(indicates low transformation 
capability) 
 
“After we acquired hard 
proof from the first 
manufacturing tests, things 
started slowly progressing, 
but even then we struggled 
to do more tests. When we 
found some customers and 
more people started to be 
convinced of what we were 
doing we still had to fight to 
get money for the needed 
investments. To put it 
bluntly, we wasted a lot of 
time by arguing with each 
other.” (indicates low 
transformation capability) 
 
 
Exploitation 
? Achievement of organizational 
goals (Noblet et al., 2011) 
? Application of the assimilated 
external knowledge (Noblet et al., 
2011) 
? Capability to put technological 
knowledge into product and 
process patents (Camisón & 
Forés, 2010; Forés & Camisón, 
2016) 
? Capability to use and exploit new 
knowledge in the workplace to 
respond quickly to environment 
changes (Forés & Camisón, 2016) 
? Constant considerations how to 
better exploit knowledge and 
technologies (Jansen et al., 2005) 
? Degree of application of 
knowledge and experience 
acquired in the technological and 
business fields to the firm’s 
strategy that enables it to stay at 
the technological leading edge in 
the business (Forés & Camisón, 
2016) 
? New knowledge exploitation 
(Camisón & Forés, 2010) 
? Introducing new products. 
? New market creation 
? Initiating operations. 
“At first, we delivered 
improved products to our 
existing customers, but then 
we realised that we can also 
make other kinds of 
products with the new 
process. We started to 
systematically look for 
markets for a new type of 
steel. This required close 
collaboration with sales, 
marketing, and technical 
support teams. There was 
not much domestic demand 
so we put effort to market 
the new products globally.” 
(indicates high exploitation 
capability) 
 
“From the point of view of 
our strategy, this isn’t a 
great fit. And we don’t feel 
it’s in our best interest to be 
involved in scaling up the 
production.” (indicates low 
exploitation capability) 
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As in Article 2, extant studies on absorptive capacity guided the analysis by 
providing lists of relevant social integration mechanisms which could be used 
to identify and categorize similar mechanisms from the projects (see Table 16). 
Typically, mentions of social integration mechanisms appeared in relation to 
key capability elements which made possible to link social integration 
mechanisms and absorptive capacity capabilities together. The codes and 
categorisations were constantly compared to the data to ensure their 
consistency. Finally, the projects were compared with each other by arranging 
them into tables and matching the identified patterns. Key informants were met 
several times to discuss the emerging findings and confirm their validity. 
Comparability of the findings from the projects is supported by the inclusion of 
the general interviews and documents, which enabled triangulation among 
different data at the project and organizational levels (Miles & Huberman, 
1994). 
5.10 Summary of the methodology of Article 4 
In Article 1, the companies were selected based on their involvement in radical 
innovation. The companies needed to have radical innovation activities and an 
interest in pursuing radical innovation. Furthermore, they were required to 
have ongoing radical innovation projects. Fulfilment of this criterion was 
evaluated in each organization, based on conversations with a senior R&D 
manager with a good overview of the organization’s innovative activities. All 
organizations were incumbent companies with between 3 000 and 20 000 
employees. The companies were chosen from different industries and with 
different emphasis and experience in developing radical innovations to identify 
contrasting patterns in data within the general context (Table 17). The scope of 
the study is broad in that it includes different types of radical innovations: both 
competence-enhancing and competence-destroying innovations, radical 
technical innovations, and radical innovations that target new markets. 
Interviewees were located with the help of a senior R&D manager in each 
company. They were asked to suggest managers and employees who have 
experience of radical innovation development in the organization. In addition, 
a recent radical innovation project was identified in each company and several 
employees working with the project were interviewed. These two samples were 
allowed to overlap, and the criteria resulted in 7–19 interviewees from each 
company. The interviews lasted typically between 1 and 1.5 hours. 
Table 17. Article 4 data set. 
Company 
pseudonym 
Process Inc. Steel Inc. Forestry Inc. Broadcasting Inc. 
No. of interviews 13 19 7 18 
Industry Technological 
components and 
systems 
Steel Pulp and paper Broadcasting 
Employees 16 000 7 000 20 000 3 000 
Primary 
innovation goal 
Cost cutting and 
efficiency focus 
Exploiting previous 
breakthroughs 
Burning platform 
– redirecting 
business  
Increasing focus 
on radical 
innovation 
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No detailed interview guide was relied on in the interviews as the goal was to 
gain understanding of the interviewees’ own experiences of the development of 
radical innovation. The role of the interviewers was to ask open-ended questions 
to access the interviewee’s perspective (Qu & Dumay, 2011). General themes 
related to the management of radical innovations, such as processes, 
organizational structures, knowledge transfer, and rewarding were often used 
to guide the conversation and some questions related to them were listed 
beforehand to support the interviews. The interviewers were allowed to react to 
topics that the interviewees brought up. The aim was to indirectly acquire 
knowledge about their attitudes towards and evaluations of radical innovation 
and associated tasks, how radical innovation is managed in the organization, 
and how they perceive related managerial actions. Also, the company strategy 
was discussed to acquire an understanding of the role of radical innovation in 
each organization. Interviewees associated with the projects were asked to 
describe the development process of the project, its challenges and successes, 
how the work environment and managerial actions influenced the project, and 
how the project compares to other radical and incremental innovation projects 
in the organization. Investigating a recent project has the benefit of acquiring 
understanding about the respondents’ experiences of concrete events from 
cognitive, affective, and behavioural viewpoints (Gremler, 2004). 
Article 4 has a strong emphasis on theory-testing and a central part of the 
analysis was to compare the collected data with propositions derived from the 
literature6. The analysis started with a within-case analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989), 
in which the interview transcripts were read multiple times to become familiar 
with each organization. Details of the management systems of the organizations 
and the employees’ perceptions were written down. After this, relevant passages 
of the data were coded. A passage is here defined as the entire segment of speech 
until the interviewer asks the next question. Coding was based on the 
propositions formulated based on extant literature. Table 18 reports how the 
codes were distributed among the companies and the propositions (P1–P11). 
The analysis then proceeded by the means of qualitative pattern matching 
between theory and data (Yin, 2003). Support for the propositions was 
evaluated by examining the coded transcripts and seeking instances where the 
interviewees explicitly or implicitly supported the propositions.  
Table 18. Frequencies of codes per company (shares of total number of codes). 
 P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 Total 
Steel 
Inc. 
4 
(3%) 
4 
(3%) 
8 
(5%) 
11 
(8%) 
4 
(3%) 
20 
(14%) 
7 
(5%) 
22 
(15%) 
46 
(32%) 
12 
(8%) 
8 
(5%) 
146 
(100%) 
Forestry 
Inc. 
5 
(4%) 
30 
(24%) 
15 
(12%) 
5 
(4%) 
12 
(9%) 
14 
(11%) 
21 
(17%) 
4 
(3%) 
7 
(6%) 
10 
(8%) 
4 
(3%) 
127 
(100%) 
Process 
Inc. 
2 
(2%) 
11 
(10%) 
 13 
(12%) 
12 
(11%) 
10 
(10%) 
7 
(7%) 
4 
(4%) 
15 
(14%) 
21 
(20%) 
5 
(5%) 
5 
(5%) 
105 
(100%) 
Broad-
casting 
Inc. 
26 
(16%) 
15 
(9%) 
19 
(12%) 
16 
(10%) 
13 
(8%) 
8 
(5%) 
19 
(12%) 
3 
(2%) 
13 
(8%) 
31 
(19%) 
0 
(0%) 
163 
(100%) 
Total 37 
(7%) 
60 
(11%) 
55 
(10%) 
44 
(8%) 
39 
(7%) 
49 
(9%) 
51 
(9%)  
44 
(8%) 
87 
(16%) 
58 
(11%) 
17 
(3%) 
541 
(100%) 
 
                                                          
6 A list of the propositions can be found in section 6.4 where the findings of the study are discussed. 
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The article also included a theory elaborating part, where the propositions were 
elaborated by reporting of managerial methods that the informants associated 
with the propositions. The identification of such concrete methods enriches the 
model by 1) increasing its practical relevance and 2) allowing the establishment 
of further linkages to existing management theory. 
5.11 Validity and reliability 
The soundness of qualitative research can be judged on certain criteria and 
methods to fulfil them. As an example, many authors emphasize the value of 
triangulation, where researchers search for convergence among multiple 
different data sources, use multiple methods, and include multiple researchers 
(Creswell & Miller, 2000). These methods have, however, different purposes 
depending on the philosophical position adopted. Whereas Eisenhardt (1989) 
and Yin (2009) argue that these methods are used to increase the objectivity of 
the findings, Stake (2005), as a constructivist, argues that they are needed to 
make the cases more understandable to others. Critical realists may argue that 
these methods are helpful in reaching a tentative epistemological closure 
(Easton, 2010).   
Table 19. Methods to ensure research quality. 
Criterion Method Applies to Article # 
Objectivity/ 
Confirmability 
Description of the data collection and analysis processes 1, 2, 3, 4 
Using multiple data sources 1, 2, 3 
Using multiple interviewers 1, 2, 3, 4 
Reliability/ 
Dependability/ 
Auditability 
Database with all available documents, interview 
transcripts, archival data, etc. 
1, 2, 3, 4 
The studied organization’s name is mentioned explicitly 2 
Matching patterns across cases 1, 2, 3, 4 
Internal Validity/ 
Credibility/ 
Authenticity 
Using multiple data sources 1, 2, 3 
Recording and transcribing interviews 1, 2, 3, 4 
Using multiple interviewers 1, 2, 3, 4 
Confirming the findings by the informants 2, 3 
Research framework explicitly derived from the extant 
literature 
1, 2, 3, 4 
External Validity/ 
Transferability/ 
Fittingness 
The underlying logic of case selection is explained 1, 2, 3, 4 
The case study contexts are described 1, 2, 3, 4 
The findings are connected to prior theory 1, 2, 3, 4 
Limitations on the transferability of the findings are 
discussed 
1, 2, 3, 4 
Multiple cases 1, 2, 3, 4 
Utilization/ 
Application/Action 
Orientation 
Practical implications are addressed in the articles 1, 2, 3, 4 
Interim or final results are presented to the members of the 
studied organizations 
1, 2, 3, 4 
 
In practice, the suggestions for conducting high-quality research are not too far 
from each other, regardless of the philosophical positions. For example, a 
positivist may be concerned with a study’s external validity, that is, to which 
domain its findings can be generalized (Patton, 2002; Yin, 2009). A 
constructivist would likely deny the idea that the findings could be generalized 
to a larger population, but put effort in ensuring their transferability (Lincoln & 
Guba, 1985). Transferability would allow other researchers to make judgements 
about whether the findings are valuable in their context without making claims 
about which contexts they are applicable to. Nevertheless, both the positivist 
and the constructivist would likely try to produce a detailed description of the 
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case study context in more or less similar ways (Gibbert et al., 2008; Lincoln & 
Guba, 1985) 
In line with the pragmatist approach adopted in this dissertation, no definite 
interpretations or criteria are derived from ontological and epistemological 
assumptions. However, the practical value of such criteria is acknowledged and 
the status of particular methods for ensuring research quality is considered to 
arise from their benefits in helping researchers create more useful theories 
(Wicks & Freeman, 1998). As a solution, a combination of positivist and 
constructivist perspectives on research quality, as proposed by Miles et al. 
(2014), is adopted. The research process is evaluated based on five broad 
criteria: 
? Objectivity/Confirmability: relative neutrality and reasonable freedom 
from unacknowledged researcher biases 
? Reliability/Dependability/Auditability: whether the research process is 
consistent and reasonably stable over time and across researchers and 
methods 
? Internal Validity/Credibility/Authenticity: whether the findings make 
sense and are credible to the research subjects and readers 
? External Validity/Transferability/Fittingness: whether the findings are 
transferable or generalizable to other contexts 
? Utilization/Application/Action Orientation: the impact of the study on 
researchers, research subjects, and readers 
Table 19 describes how these criteria were addressed in the individual studies. 
This section has introduced the philosophical and methodological positions of 
this dissertation and described the empirical studies that have been conducted. 
In the next section, the main findings of the dissertation are presented. 
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6. Findings  
The findings chapter is divided into four parts to answer the four research 
questions presented in the dissertation. Four studies have been conducted 
which each answer to one of the research questions. First to be presented are 
the findings that address the leveraging of customers and users for the purposes 
of radical digital innovation in the B2B manufacturing industry. The second part 
presents findings related to the substitution of internal R&D with supplier 
innovations. Next, the third part focuses on the absorption of radical ideas from 
unusual sources. Finally, the fourth part addresses individual motivation 
towards radical innovation work. 
6.1 Article 1: “The role of users and customers in digital 
innovation: Insights from B2B manufacturing firms” 
Article 1 studies a setting where new digital technologies, such as sensor 
technologies, radiofrequency identification tags, big data, cloud computing, and 
Internet of Things are increasingly adopted in B2B companies, such as power 
plant and ship manufacturers, that manufacture complex technical products. 
This creates a fluid phase of experimentation where the opportunities to 
revolutionize the existing product designs and business models increase 
significantly (Nylén & Holmström, 2015; Yoo et al., 2012). Products in the 
studied industry are typically very costly and have long product life-cycles, 
spanning even multiple decades (Griffin & Belliveau, 1997). Because of this, 
innovation has mostly focused on improving performance and reliability of the 
products and major changes in product and service designs have been rare. 
Furthermore, because of the complexity of the products, their development is 
also extremely costly. For these reasons radical innovations are difficult to 
develop in the industry. At the same time, digital technologies evolve fast and 
they are increasingly adopted from other industries, particularly from consumer 
sectors, where the demand for them is more elastic, creating pressure to embed 
them in existing products (Yoo et al., 2012). 
The roles of customers and users are easy to distinguish from each other in the 
B2B setting making it a suitable setting for investigating their contributions to 
radical innovation. Since the extant literature rarely makes the difference 
between customers and users this provides an opportunity to generate new 
insights on the issue of how they may influence radical innovation. In the study, 
interviews were conducted in three incumbent companies that produce complex 
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technical products and that are concerned with digital innovation because of its 
recent diffusion into the industry. Based on the interview data collected in the 
study, several observations about the differences between customers and users 
and how knowledge from them may influence innovation can be made. These 
observations that are collected in Table 20. 
Table 20. Differences between customer knowledge and user knowledge. 
 Customers Users 
Type of knowledge Mostly explicit Mostly tacit 
Knowledge sources Distributed Individuals 
Guidance for innovation Short-term changes in market 
needs 
Long-term vision for digital 
innovation 
Innovation goals Mostly incremental improvement 
of existing products and services 
Introducing radically new 
products and services and 
improving existing ones 
Examples of knowledge 
categories 
Feedback on ongoing projects, 
improvement suggestions, 
problems with existing products, 
new industry requirements 
Usability, user experience, 
understanding work contexts 
and practices, future needs 
Methods to acquire knowledge Feedback meetings, 
management meetings, sales 
meetings 
On-site user studies, use of 
front-line employees, prototyping 
Methods to distribute knowledge IT systems User-insight workshops, informal 
cross-functional interactions 
Methods to use knowledge Product specification lists, 
roadmaps 
Internal scenario work, 
collaborative research projects 
Challenges Convincing customers of the 
value of new innovations; rapid 
pace of changes in needs 
Difficulty in contacting users; 
restricted access to usage data 
because of privacy concerns 
 
To reduce market uncertainties and develop innovations with more demand, 
the companies studied are found to interact both with their customers and users 
to learn about their needs and priorities. Customers here refer to those making 
the purchasing decisions, such as managers from the purchasing function. Users 
are such individuals as ship captains and production plant operators. What is 
found is that these two sources differ in terms of the type of knowledge that can 
be received from them as well as knowledge contents. Customers are found to 
be an important source of knowledge on short-term changes in the market 
needs. This knowledge concerns feedback on ongoing projects, improvement 
suggestions, problems with existing products, and new industry requirements. 
Knowledge from customers is found to be mostly in explicit form, that is, 
codified in textual or numeral form and easily transmittable. Users, in contrast, 
are considered a source of tacit knowledge about usability, user experience, 
work contexts and practices, and future user needs. The tacitness implies that 
the knowledge resides in the individual users’ plans, skills, and habits or their 
work community’s culture, experiences, and routines. Since it is embedded in 
the users and their work practices, it is difficult to express in and explicit form 
or transfer from one person or group to another (Cavusgil et al., 2003; Nonaka, 
1994; Polanyi, 2012; Smith, 2001). 
Because of the differences in the knowledge types, different knowledge 
management methods are needed to interact with customers compared to users 
(see Table 21). This applies to different knowledge management tasks: 
acquisition of the knowledge, distributing the knowledge to relevant parts of the 
organization, and using the knowledge, that is, integrating it in the innovation 
process. Customer knowledge is acquired through meetings with 
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representatives at various levels of the customer’s organization, distributed via 
IT systems, such as CRM systems, and can be translated into product 
specification lists to guide development activities. Acquiring user knowledge, on 
the other hand, requires an approach that could be described as 
anthropological: studying how the users work by the means of observations and 
interviews and testing reactions to early prototypes. Since the knowledge is 
difficult to codify and distribute in IT systems, face-to-face interactions are 
important for spreading it. Furthermore, its benefits arise from building future 
scenarios and use cases, and providing good starting points for larger 
collaborative research projects. 
Since the customers are not able to help guide the development of radical 
innovations, the companies under study focus on the users. Although the 
limited numbers of users and restricted access to them make knowledge 
acquisition difficult, efforts to understand individual users are considered 
important. The companies aim to understand the users’ work context and latent 
needs. This knowledge is then translated to future scenarios, which helps 
provide long-term goals for innovation projects. These goals may help 
companies focus their innovation activities and seize the opportunities for 
radical innovation that the fluid phase of the industry offers. Therefore, when 
little relevant knowledge is available from the customers, effort is exerted to 
gain access to users, acquire knowledge from them, and distribute and use the 
knowledge in ways that promote the development of radical innovations. 
To conclude, the study reveals that in the context of digital technologies and 
B2B manufacturing industry, there are evident differences in how the studied 
companies leverage customers and users for innovation. Knowledge from 
customers is valuable for incremental improvements of existing products and 
services but their input does not help companies seize opportunities for radical 
innovation. The study contributes to discussion on customers and users in 
radical innovation by suggesting that in some contexts this distinction might 
explain why orientation towards downstream stakeholders may benefit the 
radical innovation processes of some but not all companies. It further explains 
these different effects by the knowledge type and contents available from 
customers and users and identifies managerial practices associated with the 
respective knowledge sources. 
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Table 21. Practices related to customer knowledge and user knowledge. 
Category 
 
From Practice Description Purpose Type of 
knowledge  
Acquiring 
knowledge 
Customers Feedback 
meetings 
 
Meetings with 
customers mid-
project to evaluate 
progress and 
confirm direction. 
Gathering feedback 
from customers on 
works in progress. 
 
More explicit 
 
Sales 
meetings 
 
Ongoing 
discussions with 
customers to keep 
up with their 
changing needs. 
 
Learning about new 
product 
requirements and 
problems with 
existing products. 
More explicit 
 
Management 
meetings 
 
Regular meetings 
with important 
customers’ 
management. 
Understanding the 
customer’s big 
picture and long-
term goals. 
More explicit 
 
Users Use of front-
line 
employees 
 
Using maintenance 
staff and field 
service engineers 
as knowledge 
sources; hiring R&D 
employees with 
user backgrounds. 
Understanding 
workflows and the 
usability of current 
products without 
involving the users 
themselves. 
 
More tacit 
 
On-site user 
studies 
 
Visiting users at 
their workplaces; 
interviewing and 
observing the 
users. 
 
Empathizing with 
users; identifying 
latent user needs; 
understanding work 
context and work 
practices. 
More tacit 
 
Prototyping Demonstrating new 
concepts with 
tangible prototypes. 
Demonstrating and 
discussing novel 
products and 
features. 
More tacit 
Distributing 
knowledge 
Customers IT systems Updating new 
customer 
knowledge into, for 
example, a CRM 
system. 
Bringing relevant 
parties up to date 
on changes in 
customer 
requirements.  
More explicit 
Users User-insight 
workshops 
 
Regular internal 
workshops to 
disseminate user 
knowledge 
throughout the 
company. 
Making the most of 
the limited access 
to user knowledge; 
sharing information 
about users. 
More tacit 
 
Informal 
cross-
functional 
interactions 
 
Encouragement for 
ad hoc discussions; 
open cross-
functional 
workspaces.  
Promoting the 
sharing of user 
knowledge across 
organizational 
functions. 
More tacit 
 
Using 
knowledge  
Customers Product 
specification 
lists and 
roadmaps 
Compiling customer 
requirements and 
user requirements 
into specification 
lists. 
Setting goals for 
new development 
projects. 
More explicit 
 
Users Internal 
scenario 
work 
Building future 
scenarios that 
describe trends and 
future use cases. 
Creating explicit 
goals and vision 
based on tacit user 
knowledge. 
More tacit 
 
Collaborative 
research 
projects 
 
Future-oriented 
research projects 
with research 
institutes and other 
firms on 
technologies and 
ways of working. 
Leveraging external 
organizations to 
help envision future 
scenarios. 
 
More tacit 
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6.2 Article 2: “Can supplier innovations substitute for internal 
R&D? A multiple case study from an absorptive capacity 
perspective” 
In Article 2, the interest is in how companies may substitute internal R&D with 
supplier innovations. It is often thought to that a company which engages in 
inbound open innovation needs to have significant internal R&D activities 
(Dahlander & Gann, 2010; Hung & Chou, 2013). It is argued that without 
internal R&D, external knowledge cannot be understood well enough to be 
exploited commercially (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Consequently, it would not 
be possible for companies with low R&D intensity to leverage their suppliers’ 
innovation potential in developing new products and services. There is, 
however, a lack of empirical studies which investigate inbound open innovation 
activities by low R&D intensity companies. Article 2 takes a step in filling this 
gap by studying how the components of a company’s absorptive capacity – 
acquisition, assimilation, transformation, and exploitation – manifest 
themselves in substituting internal R&D with supplier innovations. The main 
findings are expressed in the form of four propositions. 
Four radical supplier innovation projects managed by a multinational energy 
company, Fortum, were investigated. The projects are referred to as Case Heat, 
Case Solar, Case Bio, and Case Carbon. Each of the project included a supplier 
with a significant innovation role, referred to as suppliers Bravo, Charlie, Delta, 
and Echo, respectively. By interviewing relevant managers at both Fortum and 
the supplier companies, case descriptions of each project were formulated. The 
descriptions were then were matched with the four absorptive capacity 
capabilities. Particular attention was paid to the management methods and 
organisational capabilities used to promote the projects and overcome 
challenges, and the roles of Fortum and its suppliers in different project phases. 
Afterwards, the individual cases are shortly introduced. Next, the individual 
cases are introduced. 
Case Heat was about developing an intelligent heating control system, which 
reduces the heating costs of private households by giving the occupant the 
means to monitor and optimise their energy consumption and choose the 
desired heating methods. The system continuously monitors the price of 
electricity and compares it to heating oil prices, and chooses the cheapest way 
to heat the house. The project started at an initiative of Fortum who identified 
a business opportunity in the consumer market and was implemented in 
collaboration with a start-up who was proficient in relevant technological 
solutions.  
In the acquisition phase, Fortum was interested in extending its business in 
the in-home energy management market. Consequently, it scanned suppliers 
with relevant technological solutions from Europe and the US and ordered 
sample products for testing. Based on promising tests and geographical 
proximity, collaboration with Bravo was initiated. Fortum, however, was not 
proficient in the technology and therefore did not aim to assimilate it. Instead, 
Fortum put effort in reducing market uncertainties whereas Bravo continued to 
develop the technology.  
 84 
In the transformation phase, a couple of complications emerged. First, the 
parties had different visions of the customer needs which needed to be resolved. 
Second, Bravo, as a small start-up, was not able to process the complex contracts 
that Fortum put forward. Third, there were tensions over the division of risks, 
which were in the end resolved by agreeing on a close partnership model. In the 
end, the product was exploited successfully. It is marketed and sold under 
Fortum’s brand while Bravo is in charge of the installations and operations. 
Fortum is able to leverage the product in its other business areas by linking it 
with consumer electricity sales contracts. It was also agreed that Bravo was also 
allowed to commercialise the technology through Fortum’s competitors after a 
six-month head start. 
Case Solar was about a new turnkey solar power production solution, 
including a new electricity service contract. Following the contemporary trends 
to utilise renewable energy sources, Fortum was the first company in the market 
to offer turnkey solar kits including the needed technologies, consultation, and 
installation. The project was based on the technological solution developed by a 
start-up supplier, Charlie. 
Fortum had an interest in having a bigger role in the renewable energy sector. 
Therefore, in the acquisition phase of the project, it carried out internal pre-
studies to search for new technologies and created a technology roadmap for 
developing new products based on solar technologies. Based on a supplier 
search, Charlie was chosen based on its financial performance, technological 
capabilities, product and manufacturing quality, and sustainability. 
Fortum did not aim to build internal competences in solar technologies and 
therefore there was no need to assimilate the supplier’s technologies. Instead, 
Charlie’s existing solutions were packaged into products that could be marketed 
for Fortum’s electricity customers. There was a good fit between Fortum and 
charlied as Fortum focused on creating new products and Charlie was looking 
for credible marketing and sales partners. 
A key challenge in the transformation phase was agreeing on a business model 
for commercial exploitation of the technology. At first, a standard Fortum 
supply contract was used as a basis for commercialisation. Later, the contract 
was significantly modified several times to refine and resolve issues related to 
the business model. A significant size difference between the companies was 
suggested as an explanation for the difficulties as Charlie did not have much 
resources to invest in the contract negotiations. 
The technology was successfully exploited and Fortum was the first company 
to introduce such product in the market. After the first product a whole product 
family has been introduced and continuous development practices have been 
adopted to improve the products further. The capability to manage supplier 
relationships was considered to be crucial in ensuring successful collaboration 
with Charlie.  
Case Bio was related to Fortum’s sustainability agenda. The innovation was 
a new technology related to a power plant process that enables the refining of a 
sidestream of the plant’s raw material into an environmental-friendly new 
product. In the long term, the technology allows Fortum to increase its business 
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revenues through the sales of a new product in business-to-business markets 
without an increase in the operating costs. The technology originated in a 
research institute which further developed it with supplier Delta. The outcome 
of the project was a full scale pilot power plant which validated the feasibility of 
the technology. 
The technology in question was developed by several companies in the world 
but no ready solutions were available at the time Fortum became interested in 
it. In the acquisition phase, Fortum scanned for suppliers globally, and 
identified an ongoing research project formed by supplier Delta, a research 
institute, and a Finnish forest industry company. Fortum was not proficient in 
the technology and therefore it did not try to assimilate it. Instead, the project 
relied on complementary assets between the parties. 
A close partnership was agreed on to share the significant risks related to the 
development of the new-to-the-world technology. Nevertheless, the costs were 
significantly underestimated in the beginning which created stress between the 
partners as Fortum become doubtful of the project’s profitability in the 
transformation phase. Negotiation capabilities were needed to resolve the 
disagreements. 
The project was exploited in the form of a pilot project in a full power plant 
scale which demonstrated the technology’s feasibility. After the pilot project, 
Fortum went on to utilise the innovation also in other power plants but a wide-
scale introduction of the end product in the B2B markets is still a work in 
progress. 
Case Carbon aimed at implementing a new technology which captures a CO2 
sidestream from a power plant in order to reuse it. Therefore, it is a means for 
reducing carbon emissions. The technology was known to exist but it had not 
been commercialised so far and the project aimed to be the first full scale 
demonstration of it. 
In the acquisition phase, Fortum conducted internal research on the 
technology and hired a consultant to help with a request for information process 
which aimed to identify potential suppliers of the technology. Echo was chosen 
from a set of around ten potential suppliers based on its good reputation. 
Fortum considered internal technology development to be too challenging with 
its limited R&D resources and hence it established a joint venture with Echo so 
that both of the companies could contribute to the project with their 
complementary strengths, Fortum being in charge of charge of creating the 
supply chain needed for reusing the material and Echo of the development of 
the technology. 
The transformation phase proved challenging as Fortum demanded 
technology exclusivity, which Echo was not willing to grant. Also, existing 
contract templates could not be used and tailor-made contracts were required 
to acknowledge the particularities of the new-to-the-world solution. In the end, 
a compromise was reached where Echo granted a preferred customer status to 
Fortum to compensate for the absence of technology exclusivity. 
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Table 22. Case summaries. 
Case Case Heat Case Solar Case Bio Case Carbon 
Innovation 
description 
Intelligent home 
heating control 
system. 
Residential solar 
energy kit. 
Bio-oil production. CO2 emissions 
reduction in power 
plants. 
Business 
purpose 
New product to 
consumer markets. 
New product to 
consumer markets. 
New product to 
B2B markets. 
To radically 
reduce CO2 
emissions in 
Fortum’s power 
plants. 
Innovation 
novelty 
New-to-the-market 
product. 
New-to-the-market 
product. 
New-to-the-world 
application of an 
existing 
technology. 
New-to-the-world 
application of an 
emerging 
technology. 
Supplier size Small Small Large Large 
Acquisition Global supplier 
scanning. 
Ordering of sample 
products. 
Main selection 
criteria: technology, 
geographical 
location. 
No existing 
knowledge of the 
supply market. 
Internal pre-studies. 
Creation of a 
technology roadmap. 
Technology and 
supplier search. 
Main selection criteria: 
technology, 
sustainability, financial 
performance, 
production quality. 
Some existing 
knowledge of the 
supply market. 
Global supplier 
scanning. 
Main selection 
criteria: 
technology, 
familiarity. 
Some existing 
knowledge of the 
supply market. 
 
Internal research. 
Use of external 
consultants in RFI 
process. 
Main selection 
criteria: 
technology, 
partner qualities. 
No existing 
knowledge of the 
supply market. 
Assimilation No intensive 
technological 
knowledge 
exchange. 
Fortum’s current 
organisation has no 
expertise in the 
technology. 
Complementary 
roles of Fortum and 
the supplier. 
No intensive 
technological 
knowledge exchange. 
Fortum’s current 
organisation has no 
expertise in the 
technology. 
Complementary roles 
of Fortum and the 
supplier. 
No intensive 
technological 
knowledge 
exchange. 
Fortum’s current 
organisation has 
no expertise in the 
technology. 
Complementary 
roles of Fortum 
and the supplier. 
No intensive 
technological 
knowledge 
exchange. 
Fortum’s current 
organisation has 
no expertise in the 
technology. 
Complementary 
roles of Fortum 
and the supplier. 
Transformation Main issues: 
customer needs, 
suitable contracts, 
division of risks, 
partnership model. 
Specific challenges 
in negotiations: 
contract mode, 
division of risks. 
External and internal 
knowledge bases 
complemented each 
other, but 
technological 
knowledge was not 
combined. 
Main issues: suitable 
contracts, business 
model.  
Specific challenges in 
negotiations: supplier’s 
limited resources for 
negotiating, contract 
mode for companies of 
different sizes.  
External and internal 
knowledge bases 
complemented each 
other, but technological 
knowledge was not 
combined. 
Main issues: 
division of risks, 
partnership model, 
business 
exclusivity. 
Specific 
challenges in 
negotiations: 
increased 
commercial risk 
due to supplie’'s 
underestimated 
development 
costs.  
External and 
internal knowledge 
bases 
complemented 
each other, but 
technological 
knowledge was 
not combined. 
Main issues: 
suitable contracts, 
business 
exclusivity. 
Specific 
challenges in 
negotiations: 
creating a new 
contract template 
for a new 
business model, 
IPR ownership. 
External and 
internal 
knowledge bases 
complemented 
each other, but 
technological 
knowledge was 
not combined. 
Exploitation  Introduction of a new 
product. 
Close collaboration. 
 
Introduction of a new 
product. 
Close collaboration. 
Continuous 
development. 
Building a full 
scale pilot power 
plant. 
Cancellation 
before 
commercialisation. 
Close 
collaboration. 
 
IPR ownership Supplier Supplier Supplier Supplier 
Outcomes New business model 
and product sales to 
residential 
customers. New 
revenues, business 
model, and 
reference product for 
Bravo. 
New revenues, 
business model, and 
technology 
competence for the 
buying company. 
Supplier: new 
revenues, reference 
product, and business 
model.  
Successful pilot. 
Delivery project is 
delayed and still 
ongoing. Potential 
new revenues for 
Fortum; a 
reference product 
for Delta. 
Not 
commercialised. A 
new business 
concept for the 
whole value chain. 
New competences 
for the buying 
company. 
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The project was only partly exploited as it was cancelled before the 
commercialisation phase, due to a change in Fortum’s strategy. It was 
nevertheless considered successful by the interviewees, since it started from an 
internal small-scale research project and concluded with a mature business 
concept including the whole value chain for the new technology. 
Based on the interviewees’ responses about how the projects advanced, which 
management methods and capabilities were used to manage them, what kind of 
challenges were faced, and what the roles of Fortum and the suppliers were, an 
overview of how Fortum substitutes its internal R&D with supplier innovations 
can be constructed. Notable similarities are identified with respect to the 
manifestations of the four absorptive capacity constructs: acquisition, 
assimilation, transformation, and exploitation across the cases (Table 22). By 
comparing the manifestations of the capabilities in Fortum’s supplier 
innovation projects to the literature on absorptive capacity that has focused on 
high R&D intensity contexts, it is possible to formulate propositions on how 
supplier innovation projects may be managed in a low R&D intensity context. 
First, by looking at the acquisition phase it can be concluded that Fortum is 
able to identify and gain access to relevant external technological knowledge. 
While in two cases (Solar, Bio) there were some existing knowledge about the 
supply market and its opportunities, investments in learning about new 
technologies were an important antecedent of the open innovation processes of 
all four cases. Extant literature on absorptive capacity, however, suggests that 
without prior investments in related knowledge, the acquisition capability of 
organizations is limited (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). It is argued that without 
prior knowledge, organizations are not able to recognize the value of new 
knowledge (Todorova & Durisin, 2007). The cases, nevertheless, suggest that 
acquisition of external knowledge can take place even without extensive prior 
knowledge by the means of proactive efforts to scan potential suppliers for 
innovation opportunities. The ability to successfully carry out such efforts has 
previously been conceptualized as supply market intelligence (Handfield et al., 
2009; Zsidisin et al., 2015). Based on these thoughts, the first proposition is 
forumulated: 
Proposition 1: When the buyer firm has low R&D intensity, sufficient 
knowledge and understanding about the acquired technology need to be 
gained before starting the open innovation process. Supply market intelligence 
is an important capability for supporting this process. 
 
Much of the absorptive capacity literature takes it for granted that a capability 
to assimilate the external knowledge or technology is a prerequisite to exploiting 
open innovation (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Lane et al., 2006; Todorova & 
Durisin, 2007; Volberda et al., 2010). The logic is that assimilation requires in-
depth understanding of the technological area since without related 
competences new knowledge cannot be analysed, processed, and interpreted 
(Zahra & George, 2002). However, the projects examined in this study sharply 
contrast this assumption. Fortum did not aim to assimilate its suppliers’ 
technological knowledge in any of the four cases since maintaining and 
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developing the technology would have required significant investments in 
internal R&D. Fortum brought to the projects its knowledge of the target 
customers and markets, commercialization capability, and supply chain 
management capability. By combining these assets with the suppliers’ 
technological assets it was able to bring together complementary capabilities 
and resources that are needed to develop and launch new products. The assets 
were, however, kept in separate organizations. Intensive technology exchange 
was not required in any of the cases, Fortum did not develop internal expertise 
in the technologies, and complementarities played significant roles in their 
implementation, and thus the second proposition is formulated as follows: 
Proposition 2: When the buyer firm has low R&D intensity, joint innovation 
with suppliers is based on complementary assets and the buyer does not need 
to assimilate the supplier’s technology. 
 
The literature describes transformation as an internally-focused capability 
which aims to combine new acquired and assimilated knowledge with the 
organization’s existing knowledge base (Zahra and George, 2002). Because no 
assimilation took place in the studied projects it turned out that transformation 
relies on interorganizational abilities. The combination of new and existing 
knowledge, in this context, means the coordination of the interests and views of 
the two collaborating parties. In all four cases, Fortum and the suppliers carried 
out extensive and challenging contract negotiations for transforming the 
complementary capabilities into joint commercial business models. In the end, 
close partnerships were formed (in contrast to transactional arm’s length 
relationships) in all cases. Conflicts emerged related to the sharing of risks and 
rewards, agreeing on the commercial vision related to new products, and finding 
collaborative business models. The findings also suggest that small supplier 
companies may need help in the transformation phase as their ability to process 
heave contracts is limited. 
Although the manifestations of the transformation capability in the cases 
differ from what is typically described in the literature, there are nevertheless 
also significant similarities. The empirical findings are consistent with the 
descriptions which discuss transformation as the ability to create new business 
models (Vanhaverbeke et al., 2008) and to consider the “consequences of 
changing market demands in terms of new products and services” (Jansen et 
al., 2005, p. 1014). They are also in line with a recent suggestion that the 
transformation phase includes decisions on on the rules and objectives that 
govern the development of a market-ready product based on a new technology 
(Patterson & Ambrosini, 2015). As all four cases in the study demonstrate the 
importance of negotiating and contracting capabilities for transforming the 
complementary capabilities to joint commercial business models, the next 
proposition is formulated as follows: 
Proposition 3: When the buyer firm has low R&D intensity, agreements on 
commercial visions and business models need to be reached before a joint 
innovation with suppliers can be commercialised. In this process, negotiating 
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and contracting capabilities are important for promoting the resolution of 
conflicting views. 
 
Exploitation can be described as a firm’s internal effort for incorporating the 
new knowledge into the company’s business and for introducing new products 
(Zahra & George, 2002) and as the fine tuning of business models and 
expectations to adjust to market changes or new knowledge (Demil & Lecocq, 
2010; Poulymenakou & Prasopoulou, 2004). Similarly to the findings on the 
transformation capability, the findings on the exploitation capability suggest 
that when a buyer and its suppliers aim for different parts of the value chain, 
exploitation is a collaborative effort, which benefits from intensive collaboration 
in the form of close partner relationships. As Fortum does not have proficiency 
in the new technologies, the suppliers have a central role also in running the 
operations related to the new products. Close relationships are needed to 
motivate the suppliers to the continuous development of the products since 
Fortum is not able to further develop the technologies by itself. To conclude, in 
all cases, close collaborative relationships were considered important for the 
exploitation of the technologies because the utilisation of complementary 
capabilities required the tight integration of the operations and aligned 
interests. Therefore, it is proposed that: 
Proposition 4: When the buyer firm has low R&D intensity, the buyer and the 
supplier need to have congruent interests and collaborate closely in 
commercialising the innovation. In this process, supplier relationship 
management and collaboration capabilities are important for ensuring fluent 
operations. 
 
By comparing these four propositions with the well-known absorptive capacity 
model by Zahra & George (2002), it is possible to suggest what an absorptive 
capacity process might look like when a low R&D intensity company substitutes 
its internal R&D with supplier innovations (Figure 5). Based on the observations 
from the four cases of the study, it is proposed that in the low R&D context there 
are idiosyncrasies in all four capabilities of the absorptive capacity. Since the 
focal firm has limited prior knowledge of the acquired technology, major efforts 
are required for gaining the sufficient knowledge about the new field before 
starting the open innovation process. It is also found that introducing radical 
innovations based on suppliers’ technologies is possible without high 
assimilation capability making it possible for low R&D companies to benefit 
from radically novel external technologies. In the low R&D context, 
transformation does not include merging incompatible technological 
knowledge sets, but instead focuses on reaching an agreement on how the 
technologies should be commercialised. Exploitation, in turn, is more 
complicated in the low R&D context since it is a collaborative effort with the 
supplier. 
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Figure 5. The proposed absorptive capacity process in the low R&D intensity context. 
Furthermore, the results suggest that there are capabilities related to supply 
market intelligence, negotiating and contracting, and supplier relationship 
management and collaboration which are beneficial for managing such inbound 
open innovation processes with suppliers in a low R&D context. All of these 
capabilities fall into what has been called supplier management capabilities in 
the extant literature. In the past studies, it has been suggested that supplier 
management capabilities, such as the abilities to manage supplier relationships, 
supplier risks, and supplier development (Day & Lichtenstein, 2006; Foerstl et 
al., 2010; Reuter et al., 2010), are needed to establish and manage successful 
buyer-supplier relationships (Wagner & Boutellier, 2002). According to the 
empirical findings of this study, different supplier management capabilities are 
needed in different phases of the absorption process. Supply market intelligence 
capability is needed at the acquisition phase, negotiating and contracting 
capabilities in the transformation phase, and supplier relationship management 
and collaboration capabilities in the exploitation phase. The study therefore 
takes a step in filling the gap in the current understanding of the processes and 
policies that firms can use to manage the use of external knowledge sources in 
low R&D contexts (Lane et al., 2006). 
To conclude, it is often thought to be necessary that a company which engages 
in inbound open innovation has significant internal R&D activities (Dahlander 
& Gann, 2010). It is thought that without internal R&D, external knowledge 
cannot be understood well enough to be exploited commercially (Cohen & 
Levinthal, 1990). The findings of this study challenge this view and present an 
alternative approach to how open innovation may be used to introduce radical 
innovations, which does not depend on high levels of internal R&D. This 
approach is based on close collaboration with a supplier with valuable 
knowledge throughout the innovation life cycle — not merely at the beginning. 
The external knowledge is not fully integrated into the company and therefore 
modest levels of related knowledge are sufficient. Instead of integrating the 
knowledge, it is retained by the supplier, which is given high responsibilities in 
further developing the initial technology and participating in the day-to-day 
operations after the product launch.  
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6.3 Article 3: “Absorbing radical ideas from unusual sources – 
the role of social integration mechanisms” 
Article 3 investigates how radical ideas advance in an organization called Steel 
Inc. through different development phases from invention towards 
commercialization. It identifies social integration mechanisms which promote 
and hinder this process. It focuses two radical ideas that originate from unusual 
sources: a technical employee within the company and an external inventor. 
These sources can be considered unusual since practically all of the ideas in the 
studied steel company originate from its R&D unit or a stable set of partners 
such as universities and research centres. Insights from this research setting are 
potentially valuable for companies aiming to develop radical innovations as the 
literature suggests that incumbent companies rely too strongly on internal R&D 
and their usual partners in finding radical ideas (Birkinshaw et al., 2007; 
Bunduchi, 2013; Chang et al., 2012; Stringer, 2000). The radicalness of the ideas 
and the lack of familiarity with the inventors is considered to create a context of 
high uncertainty which may make their absorption difficult (Chesbrough, 
2006). This specific context is, however, poorly understood which motivates 
research on it. Next, the two projects (based on the ideas) are shortly introduced 
and the main findings of the study are presented. General information on the 
projects is collected in Table 23. 
Table 23. Project information. 
 Project 1 Project 2 
Inventor Engineer (internal idea) Entrepreneur (external idea) 
Innovation type Process innovation that enables new 
products 
Process innovation that enables new 
products 
Innovation novelty Radical (new-to-the-world) Radical (new-to-the-world) 
Outcome Successful adoption of a new process led 
to the introduction of multiple new 
products. 
Failure: rejected by the R&D unit 
 
The first idea was discovered by an engineer within Steel Inc. He had a long 
history within the company and consequently good contacts to a number of 
people in different functions, both to blue-collar workers and managers. At the 
time of the studied invention, he was working as a supervisor in the quality 
control function. The invention was about a new technique in steel 
manufacturing which he believed could lead to new products with greatly 
enhanced properties. He faced initial difficulties in convincing managers of the 
idea’s feasibility. Finally, after several dismissals, he managed to convince the 
head of the R&D unit to take a closer look. The head of the R&D unit made 
calculations based on the idea and concluded that while it might work it was too 
risky as the manufacturing equipment might be unsuitable for testing it. The 
inventor, nevertheless, persistently continued to promote the idea to other 
managers. After some time, he managed to arouse the interest of an R&D 
manager responsible of product design. Next, the manager started to contact 
others and eventually a team emerged to promote the idea in secret as it did not 
have an official project status. In addition to the abovementioned R&D manager 
the team included another R&D manager with long experience of working with 
a certain production line, and a product manager from the sales organization. 
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They decided to leverage their positions in the organization and conduct 
manufacturing tests in secret. The tests were promising and the idea started to 
get wider support within the organization. After this success, the product 
manager started campaigning for the idea to be acknowledged by the top 
management. Subsequently, it was granted a formal project status and 
development resources and the technique was further studied and developed. 
At first, the resulting new product was sold to existing customers as an improved 
version of an existing product. The new technique was able to improve product 
quality while lowering production costs. Finally, the project led also to the 
creation of multiple new products. To fully capitalize on them the company 
moved to new markets both in terms of industry and geography. 
The second idea was proposed by an entrepreneur who operates a small 
company that produces steel-based products. He had invented a new method of 
steel manufacturing that he considered to have high potential. He, however, 
understood that he would not able to exploit it by himself in a large scale. 
Therefore, he contacted the CEO of Steel Inc. who got interested in the idea and 
commissioned the R&D unit to investigate its potential. The initial reception of 
the idea was positive. Its potential was evident and applications could be found 
from many areas. An R&D director told that while it was apparent that the 
inventor did not have much education it was obvious that he knew what he was 
talking about. There were, however, doubts about the technology’s feasibility 
and fit into the company’s product portofolio. The idea did not get an official 
project status. Instead, it was at a pre-evaluation stage of the company’s 
innovation process. The idea was, however, not able to evoke much interest 
within the R&D unit. Nobody was personally committed and motivated to study 
it and it was overshadowed by other projects with clearer agendas and 
deadlines. Several academic studies were found which supported the inventor’s 
arguments but the R&D employees were suspicious that he might have 
exaggerated its potential. It was concluded that manufacturing tests would be 
likely to provide more information, but that they are too expensive to conduct. 
Tthere was no one to promote the idea within the R&D unit and no such tests 
took place. For some time, it remained at a pre-evaluation stage with low 
priority but, in the end, the investigations were shut down. 
The analysis of the projects includes two parts. First, the project phases are 
divided according to four absorptive capacity capabilities: acquisition, 
assimilation, transformation, and exploitation (Zahra & George, 2002). The 
level of each capability are assessed for both of the projects to evaluate how 
different aspects of the company’s absorptive capacity perform. Then, social 
integration mechanisms and their relations to the capabilities are identified to 
find potential connections between the mechanisms in use and the company’s 
absorptive capacity. 
The assessed capability levels are collected in Table 24. Based on the 
assessments, it seems that the absorptive capacity of the company does not fully 
support the integration and use of radical ideas from unusual sources. 
Especially assimilation and transformation capabilities seem to perform poorly.  
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While only the internally generated idea had problems in the acquisition phase, 
both ideas faced significant resistance in assimilation and transformation. High 
uncertainties over the feasibility of the technologies and their incompatibility 
with the company’s prevailing capabilities and business scope made 
assimilation very difficult. Assimilation attempts were nevertheless necessary 
for increasing understanding of the ideas and initiating company-wide 
transformation efforts as the interviewees considered concrete test results to 
play a key role in gaining wider support for the ideas.  Project 1 was, in the end, 
able to advance through these phases and achieve significant commercial 
success, whereas project 2 suffered from a lack of serious assimilation attempts 
and was not able to proceed beyond the pre-evaluation stage. While the study 
does not include explicit comparisons to other kinds of projects, the studied 
company has successful ongoing collaboration partners such as with 
universities and research centres and the interviewees suggested that there were 
idiosyncrasies in these two projects which explain difficulties in their 
absorption. 
Table 24. Absorptive capacity capability levels in the studied projects. 
Absorptive capacity 
capability 
Project 1 Project 2 
Acquisition Low 
The idea originated from within the 
company and was acknowledged 
after the persistent initiatives of the 
innovator. 
High 
An entrepreneur contacted the case 
company CEO with a new steel 
manufacturing method. There were 
no previous relations between the 
parties. 
Assimilation Low 
The unusual source of the idea and 
the inventor’s lack of technical 
expertise delayed its analysis. 
Uncertainties regarding the idea’s 
potential and feasibility hindered the 
use of manufacturing tests as an 
analysis method. 
Low 
Non-disclosure agreement limited 
informal discussions about the idea 
and impeded idea development. 
Because of low priority, only 
theoretical analysis was performed. 
Metallurgical analysis and 
manufacturing tests were not 
conducted.  
Transformation Medium 
Initially the idea was not able to 
challenge existing cognitive 
structures. Later, the organization 
was convinced by thorough analysis 
of the new manufacturing technique, 
the outcomes of the manufacturing 
tests, and the credibility of the project 
team. This generated a search of new 
application areas which transformed 
how the company saw its business 
scope and strengths. 
Low 
Existing perceptions of the company’s 
scope and capabilities remained 
dominant. The idea was considered 
incompatible with them and was 
rejected. 
Exploitation High 
The innovation was used to provide 
better quality products with lower 
costs in an existing product group. In 
addition, a new product group was 
established and a new market 
created around it. 
Low 
The case company did not try to 
exploit the idea. The inventor 
continued to work with the technology 
under his own small business.  
 
The second part of the analysis focuses on the role of social integration 
mechanisms in the absorption processes. All three categories of social 
integration mechanisms that have been identified in the literature (Van den 
Bosch et al., 1999) were found to influence the studied projects: 1) socialization 
mechanisms that create tacitly understood rules for appropriate action, 2) 
coordination mechanisms that facilitate knowledge exchange across 
 94 
disciplinary and hierarchical borders, and 3) systems mechanisms that control 
organizational behaviour via the means of manuals, policies and procedures 
(Jansen et al., 2005). A summary of these findings can be found in table 25. 
The literature suggests that socialization mechanisms such as shared work 
background, similar education, shared norms, values, and beliefs, and the use 
of specific technical language between the members of an organization are 
beneficial as they reduce conflicts, facilitate communication and 
comprehension, and increase trust, and hence improve its efficiency (Jansen et 
al., 2005; Todorova & Durisin, 2007; Zahra & George, 2002). Similar 
mechanisms were found to facilitate the operations of the R&D unit in the 
studied company. The findings, however, suggest that the same socialization 
mechanisms that make the R&D unit function efficiently may be responsible for 
its tendency to reject ideas from unusual sources. The interviews suggest that 
downside of a highly-socialized community is that it may induce a bias against 
ideas from outside of it. Members of the R&D unit may consider ideas from their 
close colleagues and contacts more credible because they originate from a 
source they trust and are formulated in a way that they understand well. This 
bias is widely called the not-invented-here syndrome in the literature (Antons 
& Piller, 2015; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; de Araújo Burcharth et al., 2014; Katz 
& Allen, 1982) and the empirical findings from the study trace its origins to 
strong socialization mechanisms. The interviewees also reported that the 
company’s organizational culture includes norms and values which do not 
support risk-taking, and therefore radical projects with high uncertainties may 
have a low likelihood of getting accepted. 
Systems mechanisms are found to negatively influence the absorption of the 
ideas. A non-disclosure agreement was signed to protect the idea in project 2 
and it eventually turned out to be a major reason behind its rejection. The non-
disclosure agreement limited discussions of the idea to a group of seven people 
and greatly restricted available expertise for its evaluation and development in 
the assimilation and transformation phases. Furthermore, strong formalisation 
increased the projects’ reliance on other social integration mechanisms. Strict 
requirements for project proposals were considered to fit poorly with the high 
uncertainties associated with radical ideas. According to a vice president in the 
company: ‘The dilemma is that if you have a technological idea without a 
sophisticated commercial vision, it is very difficult to mould it into something 
that would pass the decision gates.” The idea in project 1 did not fulfil the 
selection criteria until late in its development and did therefore not have official 
project status and development resources during its most critical stages. Project 
2 was in a pre-evaluation stage where it relied on the initiative of the R&D 
employees but was not governed by a time allocations or deadlines.  
Whereas socialization and systems mechanisms were found to hinder the 
absorption of the ideas especially in the assimilation and transformation phases, 
coordination mechanisms appear in a different light. The findings suggest that 
when integrating radical ideas from unusual sources, the company is reliant on 
coordination mechanisms. Knowledge transfer practices and cross-functional 
interfaces in use in the organization as well as project 1’s inventor’s job rotation 
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experience and links to individuals with boundary-spanning abilities seemed to 
have important roles in connecting employees from different parts of the 
organization. With the help of such mechanisms, a wide range of expertise could 
be leveraged to analyse the ideas. Furthermore, after successful manufacturing 
tests in project 1, the good news spread very quickly throughout the relevant 
organizational functions, such as R&D, production, sales, and marketing due to 
interfaces which promote cross-functional knowledge exchange, and this helped 
grow the coalition to promote the idea. A vital part of the team in project 1 was 
a product manager who acted as a boundary spanner across functional borders. 
He had deep understanding of the informal power structures within the 
organization and was able to formulate the message in appropriate terms for 
each recipient. He was important in facilitating interactions with associated 
functions after the manufacturing tests and was later mainly responsible for 
convincing top management of the idea, which contributed greatly to the 
transformation capability. 
Table 25. Social integration mechanisms in the studied projects. 
Social 
integration 
mechanism 
Project 1 Project 2 Related absorptive 
capacity capability 
Socialization mechanisms 
Connectedness Wide networks within the 
organization helped the 
inventor recruit supporters. 
Lack of connections between 
the inventor and the 
company prevented 
interactions. 
Acquisition, 
assimilation 
Shared 
language, 
background, 
and education 
Lack of shared technical 
language between the 
inventor and the R&D 
managers decreased trust 
and credibility and limited 
knowledge exchange on the 
idea. Shared backgrounds 
and language increased trust 
and facilitated knowledge 
exchange among the R&D 
employees. 
Lack of shared technical 
language between the 
inventor and the R&D 
managers decreased trust 
and credibility and limited 
knowledge exchange on the 
idea. 
Assimilation, 
transformation 
Values and 
norms 
Values and norms were dominated by conservativeness and 
risk aversion which were obstacles for uncertain ideas. 
Assimilation, 
transformation 
Coordination mechanisms 
Practices for 
knowledge 
transfer 
Open door policy and 
coffee room discussions 
promoted informal knowledge 
exchange across functions. 
Knowledge transfer practices 
could not be used due to 
privacy concerns. 
Assimilation, 
transformation 
Cross-
functional 
interfaces 
Strong links between 
organizational functions 
facilitated market launch. 
Idea development was 
conducted within the R&D 
unit. 
Transformation, 
exploitation 
Job rotation Helped the inventor form 
valuable links throughout the 
organization. 
No mentioned benefits from 
job rotation. 
Acquisition, 
assimilation 
Boundary 
spanners 
Project team member with 
good social skills and 
networks across functional 
borders helped create 
credibility for the idea. 
No boundary spanners. Assimilation, 
transformation, 
exploitation 
Systems mechanisms 
Formalisation Idea selection criteria 
disallowed highly uncertain 
ideas. 
Non-disclosure agreement 
prevented wide-scale 
knowledge exchange. 
 
Assimilation, 
transformation, 
 
The findings hence suggest that coordination mechanisms are valuable in 
benefiting from radical ideas from unusual sources. Coordination mechanisms, 
which were crucial for the integration of the idea in project 1, were unavailable 
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for project 2, which arguably influenced its rejection (Table 25). The findings 
suggest that well-working coordination mechanisms may be beneficial and help 
overcome some obstacles related to the acceptance and development of radical 
ideas from unusual sources. 
Interestingly, the findings emphasize the important role of manufacturing 
tests in reducing uncertainty in radical innovation projects. This is in line with 
studies on other process industries7 which suggest that in these industries 
manufacturing tests need to be conducted very early in the innovation process 
(Kurkkio et al., 2011; Pisano, 1997). Because of the high technological 
uncertainties associated with the investigated projects, theoretical studies and 
laboratory analyses were only of limited use. Conducting manufacturing tests to 
test a radical idea in practice was proposed as an effective, although costly, way 
to reduce uncertainty. Successful manufacturing tests were suggested to have 
an important role in the legitimization of radical projects across organizational 
functions, as they provide tangible evidence of the ideas’ feasibility. They are 
valuable both in understanding the ideas (assimilation) and transforming 
existing cognitive structures related to technologies and the company’s business 
scope (transformation). The difficulties related to manufacturing tests might 
partly explain why radical innovations have been found to be rare in the process 
industries (Utterback & Abernathy, 1975). 
 The findings on project 1 suggest that these difficulties can be overcome if a 
team emerges to promote the project in secret without official approval. Such a 
team is suggested to benefit from composition which includes members who 
have sufficient knowledge and resources in their control to advance the project, 
and a boundary-spanner who is able to convince relevant decision-makers in 
various parts of the organization. Dense connections between the inventor and 
the rest of the organization were considered beneficial in the formation of such 
team as the inventor was able to present the idea to multiple employees in R&D 
positions despite of many rejections. Some of the ties were strengthened by 
social relationships outside the work context. In contrast, the inventor in project 
2 had very limited contact points to the case company and hence there were no 
opportunities to influence the idea’s development. 
To conclude, this study contributes to the radical innovation and open 
innovation literatures by investigating the mechanisms which affect an 
organization’s ability to absorb radical ideas from unusual sources. This is 
highly relevant for many companies as extension to new idea sources is often 
suggested as a means to facilitate the development of radical innovations. The 
study examines social integration mechanisms – socialization, coordination, 
and systems mechanisms – in the absorption processes of two radical ideas. The 
findings suggest that radical ideas from unusual sources face high uncertainties. 
The radicalness of an idea brings about uncertainty as its technical feasibility 
may be difficult to determine and it may lack a refined commercial vision. 
Furthermore, if the R&D unit of a company typically relies on internally 
generated ideas and a stable set of external partners, the level of uncertainty of 
                                                          
7 Process industries include petrochemicals and chemicals, food and beverage, mining and metal, 
mineral and material, generic pharmaceuticals, forest, and steel industries (Lager et al., 2013). 
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ideas that are received from other sources is likely to be perceived high because 
the developers have limited means of evaluating the inventors’ credibility. This 
may reduce the R&D developers’ motivation to work on such ideas, hinder the 
availability of development resources, and sometimes lead to the outright 
rejection of the ideas. Consequently, many of the social integration mechanisms 
that are usually beneficial for innovation may be incompatible with such ideas 
and cannot be benefited from. Especially strong reliance on formalisation and 
socialisation within the R&D unit may work against ideas which are 
characterised by high uncertainty. In contrast, coordination mechanisms, which 
promote interactions between different parts of the organizations may promote 
their absorption. 
6.4 Article 4: “Going the extra mile: Managing individual 
motivation in radical innovation development” 
Article 4 investigates radical innovation management from the point of view of 
work motivation. Extant studies on radical innovation have noted the 
importance of employee motivation, but there has been few studies which 
address how managers may influence it (Alexander & van Knippenberg, 2014; 
Kelley et al., 2011; O’Connor & McDermott, 2004; Stringer, 2000). While there 
exists a rich literature on employee motivation towards work tasks, the question 
of how its insights may be applied to the context of radical innovation is not well 
understood. To address this research gap, propositions on how managers may 
influence the initial level of individual motivation and its effect on the success 
in development tasks is formulated and a research model is built based on them 
(Figure 6). The propositions are formulated by combining insights from work 
psychology literature and radical innovation literature. Especially two 
influential work psychology theories – goal-setting theory (Locke & Latham, 
1990) and social cognitive theory (Bandura, 1997) – are drawn from for building 
the foundation for the propositions and the model. To provide a rich 
understanding of the studied phenomenon, the model positions its elements at 
multiple levels: individuals, project teams, and the organization. The elements 
of the model include forms of goal-setting and organizational support, 
individual motivation, and success in radical innovation work tasks. 
The value of the model is that it brings together characteristics of radical 
innovation development that make it challenging for individual developers to 
maintain their work motivation. Because of the high levels of uncertainty, 
finding solutions to radical innovation problems is difficult. Based on the extant 
literature, several such difficulties are proposed. First, the developers are 
required to have extensive skills and maintain an intensive effort throughout 
the development processes. Developing radical innovations is therefore highly 
demanding both in terms of cognitive tasks and workload. Second, the high 
uncertainty that characterizes the development processes of radical innovation 
projects manifest itself in long project times and non-linearity. Therefore, the 
developers have to endure unanticipated findings, setbacks, and changes of 
direction, and therefore have to have a high tolerance for ambiguity. Third, 
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because radical innovation projects have a low success rate, the developers face 
frequent failures, which can be mentally stressful. The employees may also face 
organizational and resource uncertainties because of the dominance of 
incremental innovation goals in many incumbent companies. Radical 
innovation developers may therefore have difficulties in legitimizing their work, 
receiving sufficient resources, and gaining appreciation and respect from the 
rest of the organizations. These difficulties listed above thus concern both 
practical requirements for work and social status within the work community — 
both of which may have detrimental motivational effects.  
 
 
Figure 6. Model of managing individual motivation in radical innovation development. 
The model includes a total of eleven propositions: 
? Proposition 1. Moderately challenging goals relative to individual skills 
and abilities increase individual motivation for radical innovation. 
? Proposition 2. A moderate level of specificity in project goals increases 
individual motivation for radical innovation. 
? Proposition 3. Conflicting goals decrease individual motivation for 
radical innovation. 
? Proposition 4. The involvement of experienced and skilled executive 
innovation champions increases individual motivation for radical 
innovation. 
? Proposition 5. Breaking radical innovation projects into smaller sub-
goals increases individual motivation for radical innovation. 
? Proposition 6. Providing sufficient resources for radical innovation 
projects increases individual motivation for radical innovation. 
? Proposition 7. A project team composition with a variety of 
perspectives and expertise increases individual motivation for radical 
innovation. 
? Proposition 8. Bureaucracy decreases individual motivation for radical 
innovation. 
O
rg
an
iz
at
io
n 
Le
ve
l
Pr
oj
ec
t T
ea
m
 
Le
ve
l
In
di
vi
du
al
 
Le
ve
l
Organization 
goals (P3)
Project goals (P2)
Individual goals 
(P1) Motivational Hub
(Personal goals and 
Self-efficacy)
• Direction
• Effort
• Persistence
• Task Strategies
Organizational 
culture (P9, P10)
Executive 
champions (P4)
Project resources 
(P6)
Team composition 
(P7)
Reward system 
(P11)
Bureaucracy (P8)
Organizational 
support
Assigned goals
Success in RI 
development 
tasks
Iterative 
processes (P5)
Findings 
99 
? Proposition 9. An organizational culture which promotes risk-taking 
and tolerates failure increases individual motivation for radical 
innovation. 
? Proposition 10. A positive organization-wide view of radical 
innovation increases individual motivation for radical innovation. 
? Proposition 11. Rewarding developers for succeeding in radical 
innovation development tasks increases individual motivation for 
radical innovation. 
The model has four main elements: i) assigned goals, ii) motivational hub, iii) 
organizational support, and iv) success in radical innovation development tasks. 
In summary, it is argued that, by assigning goals, managers may influence the 
level of individual motivation towards radical innovation tasks, which translates 
into success in development tasks if there is sufficient organizational support. 
The first element, which covers propositions 1–3, reflects the idea that the way 
managers assign goals may influence the level of individual motivation for 
radical innovation development. These goals may be assigned at various levels. 
First, there may be goals which address the overall purpose of a company (P3). 
The challenge in defining these goals is that some of the goals may be in conflict 
with each other, which may put employees in a stressful position. Companies 
may, for example, aim both for radical renewal and for the improvement of their 
existing competencies. Motivational issues may arise if the priorities of these 
goals are not made clear for individual employees. At the project level, the goal-
setting challenge is how to define project goals when there is great uncertainty 
over how the project will progress and what its outcomes may look like (P2). If 
the project goals are defined in too much detail, the project teams may be unable 
to react to unanticipated findings and adjust their actions and the direction of 
the project based on new knowledge. Some goals are, however, necessary to 
support decision-making and prioritizing between alternative actions. Finally, 
managers can set goals for individual developers’ work performance (P1). The 
model proposes that special attention should be paid to the individual 
capabilities and stress tolerance of employees and set goals which are 
challenging but not overly demanding.  
Next, the second element in the model proposes that individual motivation for 
radical innovation tasks is determined by a so-called motivational hub, which 
comprises two factors: personal goals, that is, “Do I want to do this?”, and self-
efficacy beliefs: “Can I do this?”. To reach high levels of motivation, the 
developers hence have to be interested in the work tasks and believe that the 
costs of engaging in them do not exceed the rewards and enjoyment that they 
might generate. High interest levels may, however, not be realized in practice if 
the employees do not believe they have the abilities to reach their goals. Hence, 
both factors are needed. Personal goals and self-efficacy beliefs influence 
success in radical innovation tasks by i) directing attention to relevant activities, 
ii) determining the amount of effort, iii) influencing persistence, and iv) 
facilitating the search and use of task-specific knowledge and strategies. Based 
on the empirical data, it is found that all four of these mechanisms are valuable 
for success in radical innovation development tasks and that they are influenced 
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by goal assignment. Therefore, it may be concluded that personal goals and self-
efficacy beliefs, that is, the motivational hub, mediate the effect of goal 
assignment on performance outcomes. 
The third element of the model, which covers propositions 4–11, addresses 
organizational support, that is how much the organization values its employees’ 
contributions, rewards increased work effort, provides aid to help carry out job 
tasks, and meets the employees’ socioemotional needs (Rhoades & Eisenberger, 
2002). Different forms of organizational support are treated as boundary 
conditions, which moderate how the initial level of individual motivation affects 
the success in radical innovation development tasks. Without organizational 
support, the employees may feel that they do not have the means to carry out 
job tasks and that the organization does not value their contributions. At the 
organizational level, culture (P9, P10) and reward systems (P11) were found 
relevant. If the organizational culture values radical innovation, the developers 
may benefit from social image gains and have feel safe in their jobs. At the 
project level, it is proposed that sufficient resources — both in the form of time 
and money (P6) as well as diverse expertise (P7) —boost developers’ motivation 
as they strengthen the beliefs to successfully carry out the projects. Also, too 
bureaucratic management systems which do not acknowledge the 
characteristics of radical innovation projects may generate negative attitudes, 
as the employees feel that some procedures limit their opportunities to advance 
radical projects (P8). Linear stage-gate process models are an example of such 
a managerial element which is often associated with bureaucracy and 
inflexibility. Breaking the projects into smaller sub-goals is suggested to be 
beneficial for not only reducing technological and market uncertainties but also 
for providing the developers with experiences of success, thus solidifying their 
motivation (P5). By completing sub-goals, they may gain valuable feedback and 
become aware of their learning progress, which is important, as the goals in long 
projects may be otherwise too distant to be effective. At the individual level, 
experienced managers may be essential in providing socio-emotional support 
and reducing organizational barriers which hinder the development process 
(P4). Providing organizational support is therefore proposed as a way for 
managers to make sure that high levels of motivation actually translate into high 
job performance. 
Table 26. Summary of empirical support for the propositions. 
 P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 
Steel Inc. S s S S s s S S s Ss Ss 
Forestry Inc. S S S S S S S s S S S 
Process Inc. S s S s S s S S s s S 
Broadcasting 
Inc. 
S S S S S Ss S s Ss s 0 
S = The proposition is supported directly. 
s = The inverse proposition is supported by evidence. 
0 = The proposition could not be observed. 
 
In the empirical part of the study, the model described above is tested and 
elaborated by investigating four incumbent companies. The theory testing part 
includes finding instances from the interview data which suggest that the 
elements of the model can be found from the studied organizations and that the 
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propositions are supported. Table 26 shows that, except for proposition 11, 
support for all propositions was observed in all of the case companies. 
Table 27. Examples of managerial methods to motivate individuals for radical innovation 
development. 
Managerial action Working mechanisms 
Organization level 
Structural separation of radical and incremental 
innovation activities. 
Resolving goal conflicts helps focus efforts. 
Ensuring resources for radical innovation projects 
increases self-efficacy.  
Complementing monetary rewards with public 
acknowledgements. 
Rewards influence personal goals by 
strengthening extrinsic motivation, hence 
increasing the attractiveness of radical innovation 
development. 
Emphasizing past success stories. Emphasizing 
the learning aspects of failures. 
Reduces fear of negative outcomes and 
encourages risk-taking. 
Making radical innovation a strategic priority. Increases purposefulness, meaningfulness and 
social gains from involvement in radical innovation 
development. 
Project team level 
Assigning strategic goals to define a desired 
future vision. 
Balancing goal clarity and ambiguity increases 
self-efficacy and helps guide the development 
towards desirable directions. 
Iterative innovation processes. Allows employees to succeed in reaching 
intermediate goals, which strengthens self-
efficacy beliefs and helps maintain enthusiasm 
despite frequent failures. 
Cross-functional project teams. Diverse expertise and perspectives facilitate the 
search for suitable task strategies and increase 
self-efficacy. 
Reducing the amount of bureaucracy in radical 
innovation projects. 
Removing obstacles to radical innovation projects 
makes employees perceive themselves to be 
better equipped to succeed in their tasks. 
Transparency in radical innovation activities: open 
communication and presentation of interim 
results. 
Reduces goal conflicts within the organization, 
making it easier to direct development effort and 
resources. 
Individual level 
Defining development tasks and workload 
according to each developer’s skills and 
characteristics. Changing assignments according 
to the process phases. 
Encourages high effort but does not incapacitate 
the developers. 
 
The model is elaborated by investigating managerial actions, in use in the 
companies, which may be used to increase employee motivation for radical 
innovation development and ensure that the initial level of motivation 
materializes in increased job performance. These examples are collected in 
Table 27. These examples suggest that actions such as building separate 
organizational structures for radical and incremental innovation activities and 
implementing iterative innovation processes may influence individual 
motivation. While the value of most of these actions has been widely 
acknowledged in the literature on radical innovation (Assink, 2006; Leifer et al., 
2000; Slater et al., 2014), their effect on individual motivation has not been 
focused on before. 
In sum, the study contributes by formulating, testing, and elaborating a model 
that explains how managers may influence the initial level of individual 
motivation and its effect on the success in development tasks by assigning 
external goals and providing organizational support. Formulation of the model 
is based on a literature review on work motivation and radical innovation and it 
includes bridging these two research streams to present propositions that are 
then tested with empirical data from four incumbent companies. The study 
 102 
finds support for all of the formulated propositions. Also, based on the data, the 
model is elaborated by providing examples of managerial actions that have been 
adopted in incumbent organizations that may improve individual motivation to 
develop radical innovations. The identification of such concrete actions enriches 
the model by increasing its practical relevance by relating its elements to 
concrete managerial actions and allowing the establishment of further linkages 
to existing management theory. 
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7. Discussion 
The purpose of this section is to present the contributions of this dissertation to 
innovation management theory and practice. First an overview of the main 
findings of the articles is presented. Then, the contributions of each article are 
discussed individually. Then, the findings are combined to formulate a typology 
of managerial positions for promoting radical innovation with open innovation. 
Finally, the limitations of the study are addressed and recommendations for 
future research are presented. 
In section 2, a categorization of managerial areas needed for the development 
of radical innovations was presented (Table 4). The main findings of the studies, 
structured according to this categorization, are presented below in Table 28. 
The findings address each of the four managerial categories related to radical 
innovation: processes, organizational structures, culture, and external linkages. 
With regard to processes, Article 1 identified managerial practices for 
acquiring, distributing, and using knowledge from users that can be adopted to 
leverage users for radical innovation. Article 2 examined how a company may 
substitute its internal R&D with its suppliers’ technologies, and revealed how 
supplier management capabilities related to supply market intelligence, 
negotiating and contracting, and supplier relationship management and 
collaboration are beneficial for managing such innovation processes.  
Article 3 addresses the category of organizational structures in that it 
highlights the role of cross-functional interactions when absorbing radical ideas 
from unusual sources. According to the findings of the study, in such situations, 
a company’s ability to integrate and use radical ideas relies on coordination 
mechanisms, which facilitate knowledge flows across functional and 
hierarchical boundaries.  
The studies have three main findings related to external linkages in radical 
innovation management. First, in Article 1, it is found that in the context of B2B 
industries that are undergoing digitization, orientation towards downstream 
stakeholders may be useful for finding guidance for radical innovation. 
However, not all stakeholders are equal: customers’ contributions may be 
limited to guiding incremental innovation whereas users can be an important 
source of knowledge about future directions for radical innovations. Article 2 
proposes that high levels of internal R&D are not necessary for companies to 
benefit from their suppliers’ radical technological inventions. Therefore, it is 
possible to substitute – not only complement – internal R&D with open 
innovation. Finally, Article 3 reveals that when companies extend to new kinds 
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of partners, which they have no previous experience of, for finding radical ideas, 
they may be faced with two major sources of uncertainty: idea radicalness and 
unfamiliarity with the idea sources. In such situations, socialization and systems 
mechanisms, which typically promote the development of ideas into new 
products, may be counterproductive. 
Table 28. Overview of the findings. 
Category Definition Main findings related to the category 
Processes Systematic ways of governing 
radical innovation projects 
from early idea stages to 
commercialization. 
Article 1: Specific knowledge management practices 
are needed to leverage users for radical innovation. 
 
Article 2: When substituting internal R&D with 
suppliers’ radical technologies, supplier 
management capabilities help manage the 
collaborative innovation processes. 
 
Article 4: Innovation process models and 
governance methods may influence individual 
motivation towards radical innovation development 
tasks. 
Organizational 
structures 
The allocation of 
responsibilities and resources 
for radical innovation 
development within the 
organization and the 
integration of radical 
innovation development with 
other organizational functions. 
Article 3: Coordination mechanisms, which facilitate 
knowledge flows across functional and hierarchical 
boundaries, are critical when absorbing radical ideas 
from unusual sources. 
 
Article 4: Organizational structures and the level of 
cross-functional integration may influence individual 
motivation towards radical innovation development 
tasks. 
Culture Shared concepts, values, and 
beliefs within the organization 
that support radical innovation. 
Article 4: Organizational culture and leadership may 
influence individual motivation towards radical 
innovation development tasks. 
External 
linkages 
Search for radical innovation 
opportunities from outside the 
organization. 
Article 1: In B2B industries undergoing digitization, 
customers may be unable to guide radical 
innovation, and it is beneficial to interact with users. 
 
Article 2: Suppliers’ radical technologies may be 
used for radical innovation without high internal R&D 
investments by establishing highly collaborative 
arrangements with them.  
 
Article 3: Companies may have difficulties in 
integrating radical ideas from unusual sources as 
socialization and systems mechanisms, which may 
be useful in interacting with usual partners, may 
hinder collaboration. 
 
Article 4, which investigates individual motivation in radical innovation 
development, provides interesting insights to multiple categories. The result 
suggest that managerial actions in multiple areas – processes, organizational 
structures, and culture – influence individual developers’ motivation towards 
radical innovation development tasks. As an example, iterative innovation 
processes may be beneficial as they break long-term innovation goals into 
smaller sub-goals which provides opportunities for experiences of success 
which may have positive motivational effects. The study does not directly 
examine the motivational effects of engaging in open innovation activities, 
which have been discussed elsewhere (cf. de Araújo Burcharth et al., 2014; Katz 
& Allen, 1982). Nevertheless, as the other articles argue that promoting radical 
innovation with open innovation may require specific processes and 
organizational structures, Article 4 suggests that implementing these processes 
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and structures may have motivational effects, and companies should, therefore, 
evaluate their open innovation methods also from this point of view.  
7.1 RQ1: How do B2B manufacturing firms leverage customer 
knowledge and user knowledge for the purposes of radical 
digital innovation? 
A major ongoing debate in the innovation management community concerns 
the relationship between interactions with customers and users and radical 
innovation (Agostini et al., 2016). Some authors argue that companies should 
be strongly oriented towards their customers and users in order to gain an 
advantage over their competitors by predicting market demand and acquiring 
ideas and knowledge (Chatterji & Fabrizio, 2014; Lettl, 2007; Lettl et al., 2006). 
In these studies, customers and users are proposed to be the most important 
sources of knowledge about market demand for new innovations (Bogers et al., 
2010; Cohen et al., 2002; Fang et al., 2008). Others contest that locking in to 
the current customers limits companies’ abilities to think outside the box and 
explore radical ideas that the customers may not yet value (Christensen & 
Bower, 1996; Menguc et al., 2014).  
A weakness of this research stream is that typically no clear distinction is made 
between customers and users. The terms are often used interchangeably, even 
within a same study. This is understandable in B2C contexts where those who 
buy the products are often users themselves. Unfortunately, similar ambiguity 
can also be found in studies on B2B industries, where the two groups are often 
distinct. Based on Article 1, it is proposed that it is important to make the 
distinction between customers who make the purchasing decisions and users 
who use the innovations, since these two may benefit innovation processes in 
different ways.  
In the B2B manufacturing industry, customers were found to be an important 
source of knowledge related to changes in short-term requirements regarding 
the functions, properties, constraints, and rationale according to which new 
products and services should be designed (Berente et al., 2009), hence 
supporting incremental innovation. However, they were found not to be able to 
express their long-term future needs in a situation where digital technologies 
have created opportunities for radical innovations and dominant trajectories for 
future development have not yet been established. Simply asking the customers 
what they want is therefore not likely to provide sufficient guidance for radical 
innovation. In contrast, interactions with users were considered to facilitate the 
development of radical innovations. By understanding their users’ latent needs 
and the users’ work context, companies may be able to envision future users' 
needs and usability criteria for new digital products and services. These findings 
support earlier research that sees users as especially valuable in radical 
innovation (Chatterji & Fabrizio, 2014). Based on the findings, the need to 
distinguish customers and users is emphasized, a distinction that has been 
lacking in the extant literature (Callahan & Lasry, 2004; Fuchs & Schreier, 2011; 
Nijssen et al., 2012; Sánchez-González et al., 2009). 
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The findings of Article 1 suggest that the different roles of customers and users 
may be explained by the type of the knowledge received from them. It is found 
that the companies studied are able to access explicit knowledge from their 
customers and tacit knowledge from their users. Consequently, they are found 
to use different practices for acquiring the knowledge, distributing it within 
their organizations, and using it for innovation. As expected based on earlier 
literature (Alavi & Leidner, 2001; Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; von Hippel, 1994), 
explicit knowledge is relatively straightforward to manage, but tacit knowledge 
requires more indirect methods, such as on-site user studies, prototypes, and 
workshops. These findings are valuable as they concern effective ways of 
acquiring and integrating external knowledge and hence address a key issue in 
many forms of open innovation (Azadegan, 2011; Cheng & Huizingh, 2014; 
Christensen et al., 2005; Geum et al., 2013; Sáenz et al., 2014). They also 
emphasize that external partners may vary in their knowledge contents, which 
influences what kind of management practices are applicable. The findings are 
therefore increase understanding of how to design innovation processes that 
enable the integration of external knowledge for the purpose of developing 
radical innovations. 
These findings are in line with the distinction between customer-led and 
market-oriented philosophies by Slater & Narver (1998). They argue that the 
customer-led philosophy focuses on the expressed needs of customers and is 
therefore suitable for short-term adaptation to changes in customer needs. 
Market-oriented philosophy, in contrast, has its focus on understanding the 
latent needs of the customers. Market-orientation allows companies to be 
proactive instead of responsive and therefore guide innovation in the long-term 
(Narver et al., 2004; Slater & Narver, 1998). In Article 1, it is found that 
knowledge of such latent needs may be unavailable from the customers and 
users may have to be contacted instead in the context of B2B manufacturing 
industry. The study also contributes by explicitly linking latent needs and tacit 
knowledge to radical innovation. The findings also suggest that reliance on 
explicit knowledge may, in fact, even be harmful for radical innovation, since it 
may direct innovation activities towards short-term problems and innovations 
with modest novelty. 
7.2 RQ2: How do the capabilities of acquisition, assimilation, 
transformation, and exploitation manifest themselves in 
substituting internal R&D with supplier innovations? 
Article 2 describes a form of open innovation in which the external knowledge 
is not integrated, but instead is commercialized in collaboration with the 
technology supplier using joint business models. Since the partner company 
supplies the new technology, no extensive internal R&D is needed. This 
approach is interesting, as it challenges the common assumption found in the 
literature that high internal R&D investments (and resulting absorptive 
capacity) are a requirement for inbound open innovation (Bianchi et al., 2016; 
Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Dahlander & Gann, 2010). Open innovation is widely 
understood as a strategy to complement internal R&D (Dahlander & Gann, 
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2010; Hung & Chou, 2013), where, in addition to companies’ internal resources, 
they tap into external sources for knowledge, ideas, and capacity (West & 
Bogers, 2014). It is often implied that the company in question has the main 
responsibility for managing the collaborative innovation projects and, for doing 
so, a certain level of technological proficiency is necessary (Cohen & Levinthal, 
1990). Previous studies have, however, ignored situations where the buying firm 
has low R&D intensity and therefore a limited capacity to learn from new 
technological insights and implement them in development projects (Dahlander 
& Gann, 2010). The implicit assumption is that inbound open innovation cannot 
take place in such contexts. The findings of Article 2 suggest that there are 
different forms of inbound open innovation which have varying requirements 
and outcomes — a point which is sometimes absent in the abstract portrayals of 
open innovation. Based on the findings, it can be argued that not all forms of 
open innovation necessitate heavy investments in the development of 
technological proficiency prior to the partnership – even in the case of radical 
innovation projects. The kinds of arrangements described in the article are 
made attractive for the suppliers by giving them access to the focal company’s 
capabilities that are needed to realize the their incomplete business models 
(Dahan et al., 2010). However, such arrangements are not optimal when the aim 
is to engage in intensive learning (Sobrero & Roberts, 2001), since without 
internal R&D, the focal company’s learning abilities are limited.  
Regarding the search for new partners and promising technologies, which is 
identified a key open innovation challenge (Badir & O’Connor, 2015; Enkel et 
al., 2009; Laursen & Salter, 2006), the findings of Article 2 suggest that to 
identify and evaluate potential companies with innovative technologies, they 
may conduct research activities, including internal pre-studies, collaborative 
research projects, gathering information via request for information 
procedures, and ordering sample products for testing. These examples 
emphasize that, for the purpose of partner identification and evaluation, 
research activities do not always need to be extensive. Small-scale investments 
may be sufficient for finding suitable partners in new technological areas. The 
study contributes to the open innovation literature by providing concrete 
examples of how different search strategies can be conducted in practice, thus 
addressing the question of how companies filter external knowledge (West & 
Bogers, 2014). In Article 2, innovation processes are launched by finding 
supplier companies which have already resolved relevant technological 
problems. The suppliers’ technological capabilities are then combined with the 
focal company’s internal marketing and sales capabilities to introduce new 
products that are delivered under a joint business model. Such an approach 
provides attractive opportunities for radical innovation, since companies may 
launch new products without major investments in technological development, 
which may allow them to benefit from advances in unfamiliar technology areas. 
Since the technologies are not developed internally, radical innovation is no 
longer managed only by the R&D and technology functions. Instead, other 
functions, such as purchasing, may have significant responsibilities. This may 
help reduce the increased inter-organizational complexity that is brought by the 
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increased number of external relationships (Kim & Wilemon, 2003). This 
finding is in line with a wider trend, where open innovation becomes a cross-
functional effort between R&D and other organizational units (Brattström & 
Richtnér, 2014; Koufteros et al., 2005; Luzzini et al., 2015; Melander & 
Lakemond, 2015; Schiele, 2010).  
Looking at the projects from the absorptive capacity perspective reveals that 
the substitution of internal R&D with supplier innovations sets new 
requirements to acquisition, transformation, and exploitation, which all 
emphasise the role of supplier management capabilities in the open innovation 
process. The findings suggest that while the assimilation capability does not 
strongly manifest itself in this context, the other three capabilities associated 
with the theory are still relevant. It is proposed that certain supplier 
management capabilities (cf. Foerstl et al., 2010; Reuter et al., 2010) are 
important for successfully carrying out open innovation projects with suppliers 
as they facilitate the acquisition, transformation, and exploitation of the 
suppliers’ innovative technologies. The acquisition phase requires supply 
market intelligence that provides deep insights to suppliers’ technologies and 
R&D resources. Furthermore, the transformation phase relies on buyer-
supplier negotiations that are very demanding, involving complexities on 
agreeing on the business model, exclusivity, and risk and reward sharing. The 
contracts required for transformation were found to be complicated and 
strategically important for both parties, which stresses the need for negotiating 
and contracting capabilities. Finally, supplier relationship management and 
collaboration capabilities are proposed to promote the exploitation phase in the 
low R&D context. These findings contribute to the discussion on inbound open 
innovation and absorptive capacity as they suggest that in the absence of 
internal R&D companies may be able to build the ability to exploit external 
sources of innovation by developing proficiency in supplier management (Ateş 
et al., 2017). Low R&D intensity companies have been suggested to have a great 
need for external inputs to innovation but a low ability to benefit from it (Barge-
Gil, 2010; Kim et al., 2016) and the findings increase understanding on how to 
increase this ability when the inputs are provided by suppliers. As open 
innovation activities diffuse beyond the high-tech industries it is valuable to 
identify processes which do not rely on high R&D investments (Chesbrough & 
Crowther, 2006; Spithoven et al., 2011). 
7.3 RQ3: How do social integration mechanisms influence the 
absorption of radical ideas from unusual sources?  
While it is often convenient for managers to search for new partners that are 
relatively similar to their own company or to work with their established 
partners (Birkinshaw et al., 2007), the extant literature strongly suggests that 
companies should reach out to unusual partners if they wish to promote radical 
innovation (Day & Schoemaker, 2004; O’Connor & McDermott, 2004; Phillips 
et al., 2006). It is also reported that there are often significant tendencied for 
organizations to reject ideas when they are not familiar with the idea source 
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(Antons & Piller, 2015; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; de Araújo Burcharth et al., 
2014; Katz & Allen, 1982). Unusual idea source may increase the perceived 
technological and market uncertainties associated with ideas as companies may 
be poorly equipped to evaluate their potential (Chiaroni et al., 2010). Combined 
with the radicalness of the ideas, the uncertainty levels may become particularly 
high (Chesbrough, 2006) and the managerial challenges converge on a question 
of how to reduce them to manageable levels. 
Article 3 looks at how social integration mechanisms influence the 
performance of absorptive capacity capabilities and contributes to the 
understanding of the challenges companies may face when integrating radical 
ideas from unusual sources and the mechanisms that may help them in doing 
so. Each of the absorptive capacity capabilities (acquisition, assimilation, 
transformation, and exploitation) was found to be associated with a specific 
challenge: (1) connecting inventors with the R&D unit, (2) finding resources and 
motivation to investigate the idea and reduce uncertainty, (3) challenging 
perceptions of the company’s goals and capabilities, and (4) leveraging 
organization-wide support and competences to introduce highly novel products. 
The origins of these challenges can be traced to the unusual idea source and idea 
radicality. 
In usual situations where the ideas come from within the R&D unit or from 
familiar partners, the R&D unit benefits from socialisation mechanisms related 
to shared language, background, education, values, and norms. Unusual 
inventors, however, cannot benefit from these mechanisms and hence are 
initially less trusted and understood which generates a barrier to the adoption 
of their ideas. Another source of uncertainty is the radicalness of the idea as 
certain socialisation (shared values and norms) and systems (formalisation) 
mechanisms were found poorly suitable for addressing them. Radical ideas 
often challenge companies’ existing capabilities and knowledge bases (Todorova 
& Durisin, 2007) and their potential and risks are difficult to evaluate in their 
early stages (Leifer et al., 2000). Hence, their absorption may require 
organizational culture and formal systems, such as decision-making criteria, 
which are tolerant of uncertainty and occasional failure 
The combination of radicalness and unusual idea sources may therefore make 
organizations poorly able to utilise two types of social integration mechanisms 
– socialisation and systems mechanisms – which have been identified to benefit 
absorptive capacity and innovation in previous studies (Jansen et al., 2005; 
Lewin et al., 2010; Todorova & Durisin, 2007). The findings illustrate how these 
mechanisms may generate a tendency to reject innovative ideas from outsiders 
(Katz & Allen, 1982; Laursen & Salter, 2006). Under conditions of high 
uncertainty, idea absorption seems to rely mostly on coordination mechanisms.  
In Article 3, it is proposed that, when there are major differences in the 
backgrounds and characteristics of new partners, it may be difficult to put the 
ideas that are received from them in use. This is because managers may be used 
to considering some characteristics, such as a proficiency in using certain 
technical language and a particular educational degree, as signs of expertise, 
and not all potential partners have these characteristics. Differences between 
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unusual external partners and managers in the focal company may thus become 
barriers to understanding each other and result in suspicions over whether ideas 
received from the other party are as feasible and noteworthy as proposed. Based 
on earlier research, it is known that similarities in partner companies’ 
organizational structures, compensation policies, dominant logics, and 
knowledge bases affect how well external knowledge may be assimilated and 
exploited (Lane & Lubatkin, 1998). Article 3 extends these findings by 
identifying such a situation where the partner is an individual inventor and 
explaining it by underlying socialization mechanisms that facilitate 
communication and knowledge exchange (Jansen et al., 2005; Lewin et al., 
2010; Todorova & Durisin, 2007). 
Article 3 also reports how highly motivated individuals may overcome 
organizational barriers to radical innovation. Such individuals have been 
discussed in the literature under the concept of innovation champions 
(Chakrabarti, 1974; Day, 1994; Ettlie et al., 1984). They are found to be able to 
promote radical innovation projects despite resistance from the rest of the 
organization. The results suggest that innovation champions may operate in 
secret without an official approval, hence confirming earlier findings on the 
benefits of such secretly organized “bootlegging” activities for innovation 
(Augsdörfer, 2005; Criscuolo et al., 2013) in the context of radical innovation. 
The findings suggest that mechanisms which increase interactions and network 
formation within the organization, such as cross-functional interfaces and 
open-door policies, may promote the emergence of innovation champions by 
connecting inventors with those who have the power to make things happen. 
The study also supports the notion that there may be different types of 
innovation champions (Gemünden et al., 2007). Some may act as boundary-
spanners, convincing decision-makers at different parts of the organization, 
while some may take a more direct role in using their position to allocate 
resources for the project. According to the study, radical innovations may not 
only “tend to” emerge bottom-up from individuals to the organization-level 
(Reid & de Brentani, 2004) – in some situations that may be the only option.  
Radical innovation is often suggested to benefit from separate organizational 
units where uncertain ideas and projects which would be rejected from the 
mainstream organization can be incubated (Hill & Rothaermel, 2003; Leifer et 
al., 2001; O’Connor & Ayers, 2005; O’Connor & DeMartino, 2006; Rice et al., 
2002). Some authors have proposed similar arrangements for open innovation 
(Bianchi et al., 2016; Chiaroni et al., 2010; Kirschbaum, 2005). Separate units 
may benefit inbound open innovation by bringing together the organization’s 
dispersed know-how on open innovation and coordinating the internal 
collaboration between critical functions (Bianchi et al., 2016). Based on these 
thoughts, it can be argued that when a company wishes to increase its 
receptiveness to radical ideas from external sources, it may benefit from an 
independent organizational unit. Such a unit would potentially be able to reduce 
technological and market uncertainties arising from both radicalness and the 
external source and incubate them until they may be integrated in the 
mainstream organization.  
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7.4 RQ4: How may managers motivate individuals towards 
radical innovation work? 
The majority of research on radical innovation focuses on company-level issues, 
such as organizational structures (Leifer et al., 2001; O’Connor & DeMartino, 
2006) or innovation processes (Lynn et al., 1996; Veryzer, 1998). Recently there 
have been calls for research which addresses radical innovation development at 
the micro-level, i.e. individuals and teams (Alexander & van Knippenberg, 2014; 
Holahan et al., 2014; Kelley et al., 2011). In particular, the lack of individual 
motivation has been identified as a key barrier to the successful development of 
radical innovations (Alexander & van Knippenberg, 2014; O’Connor & 
McDermott, 2004). Article 4 takes a step in increasing understanding on how 
to overcome this barrier by investigating how managers may influence the 
motivation of individual developers towards radical innovation tasks. 
In Article 4, a multi-level model is proposed and tested that draws from goal-
setting theory, social cognitive theory, and radical innovation literature. The 
model proposes that there are multiple factors which influence the initial level 
of individual motivation for radical innovation development and moderate its 
effect on success in radical innovation development tasks. These factors are 
related to goal assignment and organizational support and they can be found at 
the individual, project team, and organization level, which indicates a high 
complexity in managing motivational issues. By investigating these factors at 
multiple levels the study extends previous research which has focused on single 
levels of analysis, such as individuals (Kelley et al., 2011) and teams (Alexander 
& van Knippenberg, 2014). 
Goal assignment has been previously identified as an area where the majority 
of companies have room for improvement (Barczak et al., 2009). The study 
provides three distinct insights on goal assignment considering its effect on 
individual motivation. First, managers should identify strategic arenas (Cooper 
& Edgett, 2010), that is broadly defined domains which determine what kind of 
radical ideas are sought for. Second, they should acknowledge that radical 
innovation goals may conflict with incremental improvement goals which are 
often dominant in incumbent companies (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009). 
Employees should be provided with methods to prioritize between different 
goals. Third, radical innovation development tasks are often highly demanding 
and special attention should be paid to evaluating the skills of individual 
employees and matching them with suitable tasks. 
Considering organizational support, the study finds that how certain 
managerial and organizational factors, such as high bureaucracy, and rewarding 
may influence individual motivation towards radical innovation tasks. 
Motivational issues are typically discussed in the context of organizational 
culture (Martins & Terblanche, 2003; Stringer, 2000). Article 4, however, 
shows that organizational structures and processes may as well have 
motivational effects. By linking these factors to concrete managerial actions that 
are in use in the studied companies, links can be established between such 
managerial methods and individual motivation. As an example, the benefits of 
iterative innovation process models are widely reported in the literature (Lynn 
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et al., 1996; McGrath, 2001). They are argued to work on the basis that they are 
able to reduce high technological and market uncertainties (Veryzer, 1998). 
Article 4 proposes an additional working mechanism, according to which 
iterations provide experiences of success that are typically rare in long and 
challenging radical innovation projects. Such experiences may increase the 
developers’ beliefs in their own capabilities, which increases motivation and 
may manifest itself in improved work performance. Similarly, arrangements 
that provide radical innovation teams with independent status, for example in 
separate organizational units (Leifer et al., 2001), were found to increase 
motivation by reducing goal conflicts and improving resource allocation. The 
extant literature has addressed the benefits of such organizational units for 
radical innovation, but explicit links to motivation have been missing. By 
proposing such mechanisms, the study elaborates on the interdependencies 
between elements of the radical innovation capability at different levels 
(individual, team, organization) as well as between different management 
categories (processes, culture, organizational structures). The findings support 
the idea that the capability to develop radical innovations is a highly systemic 
one and that it consists of multiple interrelated elements which interact with 
each other (O’Connor, 2008). 
7.5 Typology of managerial positions for promoting radical 
innovation with open innovation 
Based on the extant literature, we can conclude that adopting open innovation 
practices can advance the development of radical innovations by giving access 
to a variety of resources and capabilities (Geffen & Rothenberg, 2000; Kelley et 
al., 2013; Kim et al., 2015), which can reduce uncertainties related to 
technologies and markets (Kennedy et al., 2016). However, at the same time, 
additional difficulties emerge related to the use of open innovation practices 
(Chiaroni et al., 2010; Hu et al., 2015). Companies may have difficulties in 
locating and processing relevant external knowledge, finding ways to trust and 
work with new partners, reducing negative attitudes towards radical innovation 
development tasks and the use of external knowledge, and managing innovation 
collaboration in situations, which require finding shared interests and operating 
models with external partners. Reportedly, there is variety in how companies 
are able to manage openness (Chatterji & Fabrizio, 2014; Gassmann et al., 2010) 
and radicalness (Sorescu et al., 2003) and facing these challenges 
simultaneously is likely to be demanding. Failing to manage this setting of 
particularly high uncertainty may lead to detrimental outcomes (Cheng & Shiu, 
2015; Menguc et al., 2014; Ritala & Sainio, 2014).  
Next, a typology of ways through which open innovation may promote radical 
innovation is presented (Figure 7). The typology draws from both the empirical 
studies presented in this dissertation and extant theory. Available positions 
within the typology are determined by two axes. First, whether a company 
adopts a reactive or proactive approach, that is, whether it actively seeks out 
opportunities for radical innovation from external sources or is more passive 
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and responsive to suggestions by others. Second, if the locus of innovation is 
within the company (internal) or outside it (external) (Gassmann & Enkel, 
2004). The locus of innovation refers to who has the main responsibility and 
contributes the most towards the innovation. The axes should be thought of as 
continuous instead of discrete, as companies may combine both proactive and 
reactive approaches and there is a range of open innovation forms where the 
responsibilities and contributions of the external partners vary between mostly 
internal and mostly external (Geum et al., 2013; Koufteros et al., 2007; Petersen 
et al., 2005). 
 
 
Figure 7. Examples of managerial positions for using open innovation to promote radical 
innovation. 
The proactive approach can be considered to be more demanding that the 
reactive approach as effort is needed for searching for new radical innovation 
opportunities and selecting the best partners (Article 1; Article 2; Birkinshaw et 
al., 2007; Laursen & Salter, 2006). In contrast, the reactive approach does not 
require such systematic methods as it relies on ad hoc decision-making when a 
new opportunity emerges (Article 3; Winter, 2003). The downside of the 
reactive approach is that the proposed ideas and technologies may be perceived 
uncertain, as there may be no systematically maintained understanding of the 
“search and selection space” which would help to make sense of them (Article 3; 
Bessant et al. 2014). The reactive approach is likely to be effective in situations 
where the company has high attractiveness in terms of brand and reputation, 
production process capability, and innovation capability (Tanskanen & 
Aminoff, 2015), therefore increasing the potential partners’ expectations of the 
Reactive Proactive
External
Internal
Approach
Locus of 
innovation
Develop radical 
innovations based on 
external ideas (Article 3).
Seek out external 
partners which have 
valuable knowledge to 
promote internal radical 
innovation activities 
(Article 1).
Partner up with suppliers 
to productize and 
commercialize their 
radical technological 
inventions (Article 2).
Purchase externally 
generated radical 
technologies from 
companies that propose 
out-licensing agreements 
(Bianchi et al. 2010).
Jointly develop radical innovations in 
collaboration with external partners 
(Malhotra et al. 2001).
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outcomes of collaboration (Makkonen et al., 2016) making them more willing 
to share their ideas and innovations (Lichtenthaler, 2005; Spaeth et al., 2010; 
Wagner & Bode, 2014). 
Turning now to the other axis. When the locus of innovation is found at the 
focal company, the demand for internal R&D capabilities and absorptive 
capacity are proposed to be high since the external knowledge must be fully 
internalized before it may be exploited (Article 3; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; 
Zahra & George, 2002; Todorova & Durisin, 2007). In contrast, if the external 
partner is responsible for most of the development, capabilities for relationship 
management and negotiation are emphasized over internal R&D (Article 2). 
Moreover, to be considered a potential partner, the focal company needs to have 
some complementary assets that will attract the attention of the technology 
developers (Bianchi et al., 2010) and enable the combination of the assets into 
new innovations (Dyer & Singh, 1998). In addition to these options, a middle 
position may be described. It has been suggested that the development 
processes require the most effort when the development responsibilities 
between the company and its external partners are shared close to equally 
(Koufteros et al., 2007), reflecting an intermediate form between the extremes 
of strongly internal or external loci. This position is characterized by joint 
problem solving activities, which require intensive interactions and knowledge 
exchange (Dingler & Enkel, 2016; Kühne et al., 2013; Lakemond et al., 2016; 
Malhotra et al., 2001; Wagner & Hoegl, 2006).  
Below, five positions depicted by the proposed typology are described: 
? In the reactive-internal position, companies are receptive to external 
suggestions and conduct most of the development activities internally. 
To benefit from external inputs, they need to have appropriate 
channels via which they may be contacted (Ahmed, 1998) and 
mechanisms which reduce uncertainty related to the received 
knowledge and promote its integration (Article 3; Jansen et al., 2005).  
? The proactive-internal approach describes a position where external 
knowledge and capabilities are actively sought out to promote internal 
innovation activities. While the external inputs may be used to reduce 
uncertainties related to internal radical innovation projects, effort is 
needed to conduct search activities and integrate the external 
knowledge (Article 1).  
? An example of a reactive-external position would be a situation where 
technology developers use outbound open innovation methods to 
commercialize their radically novel technologies and contact the focal 
company to bring ideas to market faster than they could by themselves 
(Enkel et al., 2009) or to penetrate new markets (Bianchi et al., 2010). 
? In the proactive-external position, companies are interested in 
relatively mature technologies that they can leverage to introduce 
radical innovations with low internal R&D effort. The lack of need for 
internal R&D reduces technological uncertainty, but collaboration is 
highly demanding since the outcomes are dependent on the company’s 
ability to align its interests with the technology supplier and agree on 
contractual issues (Article 2).   
? Finally, the joint development position covers much of the space 
between the four corners. It may be initiated by the focal company or 
the external partner and therefore be proactive or reactive. 
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Furthermore, the locus of innovation is in joint innovation activities 
and hence both parties have similar amount of responsibilities (or the 
other party has a slightly bigger role). 
The typology introduced above has some implications for the debate on open 
innovation’s benefits for radical innovation. First, it reveals that it is important 
not only to decide with whom to collaborate but also in which way because the 
chosen arrangements influence how they should be managed. As an example, 
high absorptive capacity may be needed when the locus of innovation is near the 
focal company (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990), whereas frequent communication 
may be necessary for joint development efforts (Malhotra et al., 2001).  In the 
case of external locus of innovation, where the relationship aims for efficient 
commercialization instead of mutual learning (Bianchi et al., 2010), aligning the 
interests of the partners and agreeing on contracts is important (Article 2). 
Making this distinction between the various loci of innovation may be valuable, 
as the extant literature has been noted to be ambiguous in whether radical 
innovation benefits arise from the creation of new technologies or 
commercializing existing technologies into new products (Laursen, 2012). 
Second, the findings suggest that companies may gain access to external 
knowledge via two distinct mechanisms: they may engage in an active search for 
new opportunities (Laursen, 2012; Zang et al., 2014) or invest in increasing their 
attractiveness to raise the number of received collaboration proposals 
(Tanskanen & Aminoff, 2015; Wagner & Bode, 2014). Of these, the former 
approach comes closer to the idea of developing a dynamic capability, defined 
as the firm’s ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure internal and external 
competences to address rapidly changing environments, whereas the latter 
resembles ad hoc problem solving (Teece et al., 1997; Winter, 2003). The 
proactive approach may have the benefit of being more systematic and effective 
(Zollo & Winter, 2002), but building aind maintaining the required capabilities 
is likely to require significant investments (Winter, 2003). 
Third, based on the typology, it can be argued that it may not be useful to 
explain radical innovation outcomes with general-level constructs such as 
“openness” or “open innovation”, since there are many distinct ways that 
companies may approach external relationships and the contents of the external 
inputs may vary from early-stage idea to mature technologies. The findings of 
this dissertation therefore support the view by West & Bogers (2014), according 
to which researchers need to be very clear in what they mean by innovation and 
open innovation in their studies. 
7.6 Practical implications 
The ultimate purpose of this dissertation is to help people solve practical 
problems in their work and other contexts. The potential impacts may be 
reached in two ways. First, the impacts may be indirect, where the findings 
become a part of the wider knowledge base of innovation and its management, 
which is investigated and applied by managers, consultants, policy makers, 
academics, and others seeking to understanding how to solve the challenges that 
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they face. In addition, more direct effects may be reached by presenting the 
main practical implications here, in the following paragraphs. 
The findings push managers to examine what kind of uncertainties can be 
found in their operating environment and address them. They need to predict 
potential challenges and make sure their organizations are capable of resolving 
them. Significant changes in, for example, technological and market 
uncertainties, may mean that the management methods are not just less 
optimal, but may in fact become major barriers to innovation.  
Regarding external linkages, the findings suggest that one size does not fit all, 
meaning that deciding on how to collaborate and with whom requires careful 
consideration. Whether the search is for mature technologies, fresh ideas, data, 
or experiential knowledge, makes a difference in where to look and what is 
needed from the organization. Thought should be given to matching the 
partners and methods to innovation goals, which may be anything from modest 
improvements to existing products and services to radical breakthroughs. Open 
innovation should hence not be thought as a simple technique or methodology 
but rather a more general idea of making use of the opportunities from 
collaboration. The findings from Article 1 imply that managers should wary of 
oversimplified models of, e.g. market orientation or customer focus, and 
critically evaluate their applicability to their industry. The relevant stakeholders 
and the knowledge that they possess may vary based on the industry context, 
and identifying the most relevant becomes is a key task for innovation 
managers. In particular, the findings propose that in the B2B industries a clear 
distinction should be made between users and customers and that their inputs 
to companies’ innovation processes should be evaluated separately. 
Companies may vary in how they use open innovation to promote radical 
innovation. Some may strongly rely on their internal capabilities which they 
complement with the knowledge an abilities of external partners. In other cases, 
the partners may have most of the development responsibilities, which lowers 
the requirements for internal innovation efforts. The findings from Article 2 
indicate that if a company lacks expertise on those technologies that their 
external partners have developed, the partners cannot be treated merely as 
knowledge sources. Instead, highly collaborative approach to turning the 
technologies into new products and services is needed, and significant effort 
must be put into managing the relationships, aligning the partners’ interests, 
and finding operating models that are beneficial for both the focal company and 
the external partner. 
Most managers are well aware that sometimes organizations may face 
difficulties in integrating external ideas and innovations. What can be learned 
from Article 3 is that when the ideas are radical and they originate from new 
sources, managers should expect that these difficulties are intensified. They will, 
at the same time, face organizational rigidities that arise both from the novelty 
of the ideas and of their origins. In these kind of situations, it is expected that 
the ideas will not survive for long if they are left on their own. To ensure that 
such ideas are thoroughly investigated, managers can incubate them, for 
example in a specific organizational unit, before integrating them into the 
Discussion 
117 
regular innovation process in order to decrease some of the uncertainties 
associated with them. If they are left to compete with other ideas, which might 
be more incremental or generated within the R&D unit, in the very beginning, 
they are likely to be rejected as too risky. 
It is also evident that — especially under challenging circumstances such as in 
the case of radical innovation projects — ignoring the human element in 
innovation is not an option. Innovations always trace back to the actions of 
individuals and ensuring their motivation and well-being should be included in 
the managers’ agenda. A key target should be to make sure that the whole 
organization sees the value in developing new innovations and is willing to help 
when needed. Article 4 reveals that motivation is not just a matter of leadership 
or culture. Instead, many different types of managerial choices, from deciding 
on organizational structures to establishing new product development process 
models, may influence the developers’ motivation. It is known that when 
developing radical innovations, it is crucial that the developers are able to 
maintain their motivation. The implication of this dissertation is that 
motivational considerations should be included in all decisions which may have 
direct or indirect effects on the development of radical innovations. Articles 1–
3 suggest that developing radical innovations in an open environment may 
necessitate changes in processes, capabilities, and organizational structures. In 
making such changes, it is particularly important to address motivational 
issues, since their benefits may remain low if the individual-level innovation 
drivers are missing. 
The typology presented in Figure 7 may be helpful for managers who wish to 
navigate the open environment for providing a boost to their radical innovation 
performance. Based on their existing strengths and other strategic priorities, 
companies may approach open innovation in diverse ways. Companies with 
high internal R&D may wish to leverage related competences and conduct most 
of the development tasks internally, whereas those who do not have existing 
expertise in-house may benefit from exploring arrangements where main 
technology development contributions come from external partners. 
Furthermore, open innovation may be initiated by establishing communication 
channels for others to propose collaboration or proactively seek new 
opportunities. More reactive approaches may work for prestigious companies 
who are considered attractive partners by many, whereas others may need to 
invest in active search for suitable candidates. By analysing their strengths and 
weaknesses, managers may determine which forms of open innovation would 
be the most suitable for reaching their innovation goals and develop new 
capabilities accordingly. 
7.7 Limitations and recommendations for further research 
All research entails limitations that arise from the chosen scope, methods, and 
theory that should be addressed. The identified limitations can also be used to 
identify avenues for further research. 
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One evident limitation which affects the transferability of the findings to other 
contexts is the type of companies studied. Research on innovation management 
often focuses on incumbent companies, that is, large corporations with an 
established market position. This is because such companies typically have the 
resources to implement systematic innovation management methods 
(Damanpour & Aravind, 2012; Rohrbeck et al., 2009), which gives researchers 
the opportunity to examine how different managerial systems work. Also this 
dissertation investigates incumbent companies. Radical innovation and open 
innovation are, however, relevant issues also for small and medium-sized 
enterprises (Salavou & Lioukas, 2003; van de Vrande et al., 2009), but the 
managerial challenges and optimal strategies may vary with company size. The 
issue of how relevant the findings from incumbent companies are to smaller 
companies would benefit from further research. Also, the connections between 
radical innovation literature and related literatures which address similar issues 
in new companies (e.g., entrepreneurship) could be strengthened. 
Article 4 investigates the topic of individual motivation in radical innovation 
development but focuses on the internal matters of the organizations and does 
not address motivational issues in situations where radical innovation is 
promoted by the means of open innovation. Motivational issues have been 
acknowledged also in the open innovation literature (de Araújo Burcharth et al., 
2014) and Article 3 suggests that a lack of motivation to develop radical ideas 
from external sources may be a major barrier to realizing their benefits. 
Therefore, future studies of context where radical innovation is promoted by 
open innovation would be valuable as they could provide new insights on how 
to support employee motivation. 
Considering external linkages, this dissertation focuses mainly on dyadic 
relationships between the focal company and a single external actor. Innovation 
often occurs within wider intra-organizational settings such as triads, chains, 
networks, and ecosystems. These settings may bring about additional 
challenges that should be acknowledged. If the number of actors increases the 
management of external collaboration is likely to become more complex and 
challenging (Cassiman & Valentini, 2016; Elmquist et al., 2009). Therefore, it 
becomes of interest how companies can orchestrate networks of many 
companies or participate in wider ecosystems to introduce radical innovations.  
The methodologies of the empirical studies are subject to further limitations. 
The studies do not aim to make statistical generalizations about larger 
populations. Instead, their purpose is to provide new theoretical insights into 
the phenomena of radical innovation management. The findings are proposed 
to be potentially transferable to empirical contexts of high uncertainty, other 
than the ones perented in this dissertation, more specifically to those where 
radical innovation is promoted by open innovation, and effort has been put into 
describing the empirical contexts of the studies in detail. Limits of the domains 
to which the insights could be transferred can, however, not be defined 
precisely. Nevertheless, it is likely that the results from, for example, Article 1, 
which addresses the B2B manufacturing industry and Article 3, which addresses 
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the steel industry, cannot be straightforwardly applied to significantly different 
industries. 
In this dissertation, radical innovations are defined as products, services, or 
processes which encompass novel technologies or require new market 
structures, and which have the potential to create paradigm shifts at the world, 
market, or industry level. This definition includes high-novelty innovations of 
different types: competency-enhancing and competency-destroying 
innovations, innovations based on breakthrough technologies that are targeted 
at existing markets and innovations that have moderate technological novelty 
that are targeted at new markets, and different combinations of these. It has 
been argued that all these have sufficient similarities for it to make sense to 
discuss them as a distinct group of innovation (O’Connor, 2008), and that 
barriers to radical innovation are determined more by the characteristics of 
firms, markets, and innovation process phases than the type of radicalness 
(Sandberg & Aarikka-Stenroos, 2014). Nevertheless, such a broad definition of 
radical innovation sets limits to the transferability of the findings as different 
innovation types within the umbrella of radical innovation have their special 
characteristics and demands (Markides, 2006). 
Similarly, this dissertation draws strongly from the views of uncertainty in 
radical innovation by O’Connor and Rice (2013a) who distinguish several 
different types of uncertainty and help concretize the abstract construct. The 
majority of the literature on radical innovation and open innovation, however, 
discusses uncertainty without clear definitions or references to what kind of 
uncertainty and complexity they actually refer to. It should hence be noted that 
the discussion in general is not very well grounded in clear definitions. Aiming 
for conceptual clarity is important because as it may enable managers to 
describe their innovation challenges more precisely. Furthermore, more 
conceptual clarity would help in understanding how to respond to these 
challenges. Currently, the context of high uncertainty is often described in 
rather general terms, and there is evident value in putting effort in identifying 
the precise sources of uncertainty.
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8.  Conclusions 
Innovation is becoming increasingly important for all kinds of companies, being 
critical for their competitiveness and growth. Often the improvement of existing 
products and services is not enough to ensure competitive advantage in the long 
term. In such cases, learning how to develop radical innovations is highly 
valuable. Radical innovations are, however, associated with high levels of 
uncertainty, which makes their development challenging. Companies may be 
proficient in developing incremental innovations while performing poorly in 
developing radical innovations. Previous research has investigated how certain 
processes, organizational structures, culture, and external linkages may 
promote radical innovation. However, the ability to develop radical innovations 
is difficult to achieve and more understanding is needed on the challenges 
associated with radical innovation and methods to overcome them.  
With an emphasis on the open aspects of innovation, this dissertation has 
increased understanding on the problem of how companies may develop radical 
innovations by investigating four specific issues: 1) interactions with customers 
and users, 2) substituting internal R&D with suppliers’ radical technologies,  3) 
integrating radical ideas from unusual sources, and 4) the management of 
developers’ individual motivation.  
Regarding the interactions with customers and users, it is found that these two 
stakeholder groups may differ in what kind of knowledge they are able to 
provide, and therefore they may have distinct effects on radical innovation and 
their involvement may require different managerial practices. In the B2B 
manufacturing industries undergoing digitization, customers may be unable to 
provide guidance for radical innovation and companies may instead benefit 
from interacting with users for this purpose. 
The findings on the substitution of internal R&D with suppliers’ radical 
technologies indicate that high investments in internal R&D are not necessary 
for engaging in open innovation projects with suppliers, but that these kinds of 
projects require supplier management capabilities for establishing and 
managing successful collaboration between the parties.  
On the third issue, the findings suggest that when companies aim to integrate 
radical ideas outside their usual idea sources, mechanisms which are normally 
responsible for turning ideas into new products may not be available due to high 
uncertainties, and managers should promote the use of coordination 
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mechanisms that facilitate knowledge exchange across disciplinary and 
hierarchical borders.  
Finally, the findings related to the fourth issue indicate that individual 
motivation towards radical innovation development may be influenced by goal 
assignment and organizational support at individual, team, and organization 
level, and that many elements of a company’s innovation management system 
may have – sometimes unexpected – effects on individual motivation. The 
findings indicate that in making organizational and managerial changes, such 
as those suggested by the other studies in this dissertation, their motivational 
effects should be carefully considered. 
Altogether, the findings of this dissertation suggest that the difficulties 
associated with development of radical innovations cannot be overcome by 
focusing on a single managerial category, such as processes, organizational 
structures, culture, or external linkages. These categories are interlinked and 
the benefits from one of them may not be realized if the others do not support 
radical innovation sufficiently. The empirical studies in this dissertation 
illustrate several such connections between different managerial categories. 
Opening up to stakeholders such customers, users, suppliers, and entrepreneurs 
needs to be matched with processes, structures, and culture which support the 
search, integration, and use of external inputs and the management of 
collaborative relationships. To advance radical innovation with external 
knowledge, ideas, and technologies, there needs to be processes to identify and 
use them, structures which allow their combination with the company’s existing 
knowledge base, and culture which does not shun collaboration with external 
partners and working under high uncertainty. Furthermore, in Article 4 it is 
found that motivation, which is most often discussed as an outcome of 
organizational culture, is closely affected also by what kind of formal innovation 
processes the developers must follow and what kind of organizational structures 
there are in place. Therefore, to address the issue of a lack of motivation, it is 
not sufficient to focus on culture and leadership. Instead, the entire 
management system should be analysed from the point of view of motivation.  
Many organizations have identified the need for more radical innovations but 
struggle in reaching this aim. Adopting open innovation methods has been 
shown to be helpful but openness carries with it additional managerial 
challenges. For those companies, which have traditionally focused on 
incremental and closed innovation, the extension to radical and open 
innovation may be remarkably challenging. This dissertation has hopefully been 
able to shine some light on this endeavour. 
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